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Ukraine Liberates MASSIVE Amount of Territory from Russia | Other War Stories

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Ukraine Liberates MASSIVE Amount of Territory from Russia | Other War Stories

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3009 segments

0:00

Russia thought it had it all figured

0:01

out. Take territory and force your

0:04

influence on the Ukrainian people. But

0:06

Ukraine has just slapped Russia upside

0:08

the head. A massive derussification

0:10

tsunami is sweeping through Ukraine,

0:13

eradicating Putin's forces as it goes.

0:15

The occupied lands are being reclaimed.

0:18

The end of Russia's influence is

0:19

imminent. Something just began, and

0:22

there's not a thing that Russia can do

0:23

to stop it. That something is a push.

0:26

Deep into the southeast, Ukraine's

0:28

forces are taking out Russia's soldiers

0:30

left, right, and center. Gray zones are

0:32

now being cleared, followed by Ukraine

0:34

recapturing settlements that Russia

0:36

thought was safe from liberation. This

0:38

is a counterattack, yes, and one that is

0:41

being done to set up a stalwart defense

0:44

against a Russian offensive that will

0:45

come in the spring, as you'll learn if

0:47

you keep watching. But there's something

0:49

deeper going on for Ukraine. This isn't

0:52

just about retaking territory. It's

0:54

about expelling Russian influence. It's

0:56

about teaching Putin that no matter how

0:58

hard he tries, Ukraine is rejecting

1:00

Russification at every turn. It all

1:03

started with the gray zones. In

1:05

traditional terms, a gray zone is any

1:07

area where hostility is present, but

1:09

that hostility is below the threshold

1:11

needed for true state-on-state conflict.

1:13

Think of the incursions that Russian

1:15

drones and fighter jets have been making

1:16

into NATO airspace over the last few

1:18

months, and you get the idea. But in

1:20

Ukraine, a gray zone is a little

1:22

different. It's a region where neither

1:24

side has true control. Although Russia

1:26

often claims it does, there are isolated

1:28

pockets of conflict, but the entire

1:30

idea, at least from the Russian

1:31

perspective, is to create a murky view

1:33

of the battlefield that allows Putin to

1:35

claim propaganda victories related to

1:37

territory that Russia doesn't actually

1:39

hold. Russia has been creating these

1:41

gray zones by sneaking small units

1:43

behind the Ukrainian front line. Once

1:45

in, those units dig down and wait,

1:47

ostensibly for backup, but often for the

1:49

inevitable death that will arrive when

1:51

Ukraine's forces catch up to them.

1:53

Still, chaos reigns in these zones, and

1:55

they create opportunities for Russia to

1:57

Russify by claiming that Ukraine can do

1:59

nothing to stop what Putin tries to tell

2:02

the whole world is an unstoppable

2:03

advance. Nothing could be further from

2:06

the truth, and Ukraine's campaign of

2:07

derification in the southeast is the

2:09

perfect example. It all started with the

2:12

clearing of the gray zones in

2:13

southeastern Ukraine. As Euromidan Press

2:15

reported on February 25th, the operation

2:18

started about 4 weeks ago in early

2:20

February, and it's seen Ukraine complete

2:22

a very immediate and important goal,

2:24

clearing the small pockets of Russian

2:26

infiltrators.

2:27

Amid the Starink shutdown that has wre

2:29

havoc among Russia's forces, Ukraine

2:31

sent out search and destroy squads into

2:33

the southeast gray zone that separated

2:35

Russian Ukrainian forces, spanning about

2:38

30 km or about 18.6 6 milesi from the

2:41

Ukrainian controlled settlement of

2:42

Petrovska in Denipo Petrovk oblast to

2:45

the town of Julia which is under

2:47

Russia's control and in the Zaparisia

2:49

oblast that gray zone was in danger of

2:51

being Russified if Ukraine did nothing

2:53

about it. So Ukraine pushed it searched

2:55

and destroyed and now with control over

2:57

the gray zone established Ukraine has

2:59

shifted its goals no longer solely

3:02

targeting infiltrators. Ukraine is

3:04

taking massive steps toward ridding

3:05

Russian influence from the southeast

3:07

forever. Ukraine is retaking settlements

3:09

and territory. A lot of settlements and

3:12

territory. With the gray zone cleared,

3:14

the advance could begin. And though

3:15

Ukraine has retaken several settlements,

3:17

as we'll go into in a minute, the

3:18

headliner in all of this is the village

3:20

of Tanova. Located in Denipo Petrovsk,

3:23

though close to the borders of both

3:25

Zaparisia and Bonetsk, Tanova is tiny.

3:27

It had a population of a little over 300

3:30

before it was ruined by the war. Now,

3:32

thanks to Ukraine's forces, it's a

3:33

symbol of diversification. the first

3:36

settlement that Ukraine retook in its

3:37

southeast counter offensive and the

3:39

village that set the stage for

3:40

everything that we've seen since. It all

3:42

started on February 21st. That's when

3:44

the Thor Kill 65X account posted images

3:48

and an account of what happened in

3:49

Tanova. Units from the second battalion

3:51

of Ukraine's 425th Assault Regiment

3:54

started a push into the settlement.

3:56

Therein were the entrenched, though

3:57

limited, members of Russia's 69th

3:59

Covering Brigade, which had taken

4:01

control of the settlement just weeks

4:03

before. The Ukrainian assault didn't

4:05

last long. It didn't have to. With

4:07

Russia's forces already in disarray

4:09

following their communications

4:10

breakdown, Ukraine completed the

4:12

derification of Tanova in record time.

4:14

And with control gained over the

4:16

settlement, Ukraine set itself up for a

4:18

deeper push into the southeast with

4:19

Berzova landing on the agenda. Tanova

4:22

was a sign for Russia. As Uramidan press

4:25

points out, Ukraine actively retaking

4:27

this village was a signal that the gray

4:29

zone clearing operation has morphed into

4:31

a new kind of campaign. one that would

4:33

see Ukraine push Russians out of as many

4:35

settlements in the southeast as

4:36

possible. All in service of ridding

4:38

those settlements of Russian influence

4:40

and preparing for Putin's renewed

4:42

campaign of Russification that is

4:43

anticipated to begin during the spring.

4:46

It wouldn't be long before Ukraine

4:47

started pushing deeper. At around the

4:49

same time as Ukraine's forces had pushed

4:51

the Russians out of Tanova, Pravda was

4:53

reporting that Ukraine had also pushed

4:54

the occupiers back near the settlement

4:56

of Kalinka. By February 24th, a mere 3

4:59

days after news broke of the liberation

5:01

of Tanova, Ukraine had liberated eight

5:03

settlements in flash assaults that

5:04

Russia couldn't stop. Risna, Andrekka,

5:07

Nachayka, Ostapska, and Nova Zaparisia

5:11

all fell back into Ukraine's hands. With

5:13

RBC Ukraine reporting that there had

5:15

been no evidence of the Russian presence

5:16

in these settlements for 2 weeks leading

5:18

up to February 24th, Tanova then may

5:21

have been the first liberated settlement

5:22

that we learned about, but it looks like

5:24

it wasn't the first settlement that

5:25

Ukraine cleared. What we see here is a

5:27

campaign to de-rassify settlements that

5:29

appears to have started alongside the

5:31

gray zone clearing operation. And in

5:33

many ways, that makes sense. Russia's

5:35

infiltrators would have chosen the

5:36

shattered remains of settlements as

5:38

hiding places. By clearing those

5:40

infiltrators out, Ukraine was also

5:42

liberating villages and towns,

5:43

destroying Russian influence in the

5:45

southeast as it went. By February 23rd,

5:47

the commander-in-chief of Ukraine's

5:49

military, Alexander Syski, was reporting

5:51

that Ukraine had liberated about 400 km

5:54

or around 154 square miles of territory.

5:57

Keep that figure in mind. Going to be

5:59

coming back to why it's so important in

6:00

just a few minutes. But for now, what

6:02

this amounts to for Russia is really

6:03

simple. 4 months of infiltration had

6:06

gone down the drain in 3 weeks of

6:07

Ukraine's dustification campaign. That's

6:10

according to Clement Mulan, who is a

6:12

French military analyst who mapped out

6:14

what Ukraine had been doing on February

6:15

21st. Right on the eve of news breaking

6:18

about the liberation of so many of

6:19

Ukraine's southeastern settlements.

6:21

Milan reported that a combination of

6:23

satellite imagery and confirmation of a

6:25

massive increase in Ukraine's shelling

6:27

of Russia's positions confirmed that

6:29

clearing had turned into

6:30

diversification. Milan noted 3,000

6:33

additional shelling incidents in the

6:34

turnover direction, which amounted to

6:36

Ukraine regaining control of most of the

6:38

defensive line that it had held in that

6:40

sector back in 2022. An anti-tank ditch,

6:43

barbed wire, and dragon's teeth came

6:45

back to Ukraine, offering the foundation

6:47

for fortifications that will tear

6:49

through Russia in the spring. Using maps

6:51

of artillery and air strikes, Milan

6:53

demonstrated that Ukraine has indeed

6:55

advanced and that Russia is in retreat

6:56

in the southeast. Russia's artillery

6:59

strikes have practically stopped, which

7:00

is a clear indication that the forces it

7:02

had stationed in the settlements that

7:03

Ukraine has liberated are no longer in

7:05

range. In other words, they've been

7:07

pushed back and Ukraine keeps on firing.

7:10

This situation largely benefits Ukraine.

7:12

Russia lost in 3 weeks at least 4 months

7:14

of infiltrations far behind the lines,

7:16

Milan says, adding, "This will buy time

7:19

to better defenses as well as the H15

7:22

highway leading to Zaparisia." Milan

7:24

caps off his report by claiming that

7:26

more is coming. Using a handy map, he

7:28

draws a white line that shows how deep

7:29

he believes that Ukraine will push as it

7:31

dustifies the southeast. That white line

7:34

is already loaded with barbed wire,

7:36

meaning Ukraine's goal now will be to

7:38

gain full control over it so that it can

7:39

both expand its defenses and push the

7:41

gray zone deeper into territory that

7:43

Russia thought it held. This isn't any

7:45

old counteroffensive by Ukraine. It's

7:47

the broad reshaping of the battlefield

7:49

that has happened in large part because

7:50

of the communication breakdown that has

7:52

racked Russia's military. Before we dig

7:54

deeper into that, you are watching the

7:55

Military Show. If you haven't subscribed

7:57

yet, now is the perfect time. Ukraine's

8:00

campaign of southeastern diversification

8:02

kicked off in early February because

8:04

that is the precise time that Elon Musk

8:06

and SpaceX finally decided to do

8:08

something about the illicit Starlink

8:09

terminals that Russia has been using to

8:11

coordinate its assaults. These smuggled

8:13

terminals have been in use all across

8:15

the 700 mile front line, Uridan press

8:17

reports. And Russia had been using them

8:19

to coordinate its units and even conduct

8:21

drone strikes. All that disappeared in

8:23

the wake of the Starling shutdown. And

8:25

to make matters worse, no less than

8:27

Putin himself decided days later that it

8:29

would be a good idea to restrict access

8:31

to the social media app Telegram. In his

8:34

desire to maintain his own influence,

8:35

Putin kicked his soldiers off the one

8:37

communication channel that they could

8:39

use, but would have a chance of filling

8:40

at least some of the gap that the loss

8:42

of Starink left behind. Russia's

8:44

military was and still is shambles.

8:47

Command centers could no longer

8:48

coordinate assaults. Infiltrators who

8:50

had bedded into the gray zones lost

8:52

contact with their backup. Russia's

8:54

assault units got lost. Scared, all they

8:56

could do was wait around, hoping that

8:58

help would come as they heard Ukraine's

9:00

drones drawing closer. Without Starlink,

9:03

Russia's entire southeastern line

9:05

collapsed, and Ukraine took full

9:07

advantage. Eight settlements and

9:09

counting have been liberated. The

9:11

occupied lands have been reclaimed.

9:13

Dussification can begin. If this were a

9:15

game of chess, Putin's decision to

9:17

snatch Telegram away right after Starink

9:19

was lost would be akin to taking your

9:21

queen and just tossing it away. The king

9:23

is now exposed, lost and cornered as

9:26

Ukraine's pieces advance. There's an old

9:28

joke that you should never play chess

9:29

with a pigeon. Why? Because the pigeon

9:32

will kick all of the pieces off the

9:33

board, take a dump on it, then strut

9:35

away, acting like it won. Putin seems to

9:38

have taken that joke as literal advice

9:40

when determining his strategy. His

9:41

soldiers and his influence are now dying

9:43

in Ukraine's southeast as a result. What

9:46

we're saying here is that Putin made a

9:48

bad situation for Russia even worse by

9:50

making the dumbest decision that he's

9:51

made so far in the war. And now what

9:53

we're seeing in the southeast is a

9:55

result of that decision. Earlier we

9:57

asked you to keep Serski's remarks about

9:59

Ukraine taking 400 km of territory back

10:02

from Russia in mind. The reason is that

10:04

this number is special. While Russian

10:06

forces run around like headless

10:08

chickens, Ukraine's derification

10:09

campaign in the southeast, has seen it

10:12

making the most significant gains since

10:13

August 2024, which is when Ukraine's

10:16

forces launched a counteroffensive into

10:17

Russia's Kursk region. Euromidan Press

10:20

highlights this, noting that we can

10:21

combine the territory that Ukraine has

10:23

retaken in the southeast with the

10:24

territory that it liberated in Kyansk

10:26

toward the end of December. All of which

10:28

adds up to a terrible start to 2026 for

10:30

Russia's forces. What Putin thought was

10:32

safe is now in Ukraine's hands. And it

10:35

doesn't look like Russia is going to be

10:36

able to reoccupy what Ukraine is

10:38

liberated anytime soon. That's the

10:40

entire point of the resification. And

10:42

we're going to explore some of the many

10:43

other things that Ukraine has been doing

10:45

to rid itself of Russia's influence

10:47

outside of the battlefield toward the

10:49

end of the video. First, it's worth

10:51

focusing on what happened in Capansk, as

10:53

that town was something of a precursor

10:55

to the campaign that Ukraine has

10:56

launched in the southeast. Back in

10:58

November 2025, Russia made the bold

11:00

claim that it had taken Capyansk. It

11:02

repeated that claim in mid December. And

11:04

we say that it was a bold claim because

11:06

Russia hadn't actually taken Kapyansk.

11:09

The city had been close to falling into

11:11

Russia's hands due to the infiltration

11:12

strategy we mentioned earlier. But

11:14

Ukraine certainly hadn't lost it by

11:16

December. Quite the opposite. Ukraine's

11:18

forces were actively ridding the city of

11:20

Russia's soldiers as Putin and his

11:22

cronies crowed about their control over

11:24

Capansk. By December 1st, Ukraine had

11:27

shattered the Russian narrative in

11:28

Capansk, which is in the Khiv region.

11:31

Far from falling to Russia, the city had

11:32

been practically liberated by Ukraine.

11:34

The country's forces held 90% of the

11:37

city by the same period in December that

11:39

saw Russia claiming to have taken

11:40

control. Ukraine has pushed on in the

11:42

Cupansk direction since then. According

11:45

to Uramidan press, Ukraine's forces have

11:47

retaken at least 183 km or about 70.6

11:51

miles in the Kyansk direction between

11:53

December 11th and 25th, which adds to

11:56

all of the territory that is liberated

11:57

in the southeast during February. If the

12:00

liberation of Capansk was symbolic on

12:01

the diversification front, as seen when

12:03

Ukraine put an exclamation point on what

12:05

it had achieved by raising the country's

12:07

flag in the center of the city, what

12:09

Ukraine has been doing in the southeast

12:10

serves as much of a practical purpose as

12:12

a symbolic one. Ukraine is preparing for

12:15

something. On February 9th, the Kev Post

12:18

reported that Ukrainian and

12:19

international observers all agreed that

12:21

Russia has been trying to accumulate

12:23

strategic reserves that it intends to

12:25

use for a large-scale assault against

12:27

Ukraine in the eastern and southern

12:28

regions of the country. Part of this

12:30

offensive will focus on Donetsk, where

12:32

Russia is trying to push past Papovsk

12:34

and toward the fortress belt. However,

12:37

Russia will also send troops likely as

12:39

part of a supporting attack in the

12:40

summer toward the major cities of

12:42

Zaparisia and Oorke. Those supporting

12:44

forces may head in that direction to

12:46

divert Ukraine away from Daetsk. Though

12:48

Putin will also be very happy if his

12:50

soldiers are also able to capture these

12:52

two cities. Ukraine's southeastern

12:54

campaign of diversification takes on a

12:56

different complexion with this

12:57

knowledge. As Uramidan press points out,

13:00

Russian troops planned for the spring

13:01

summer 2026 offensive must now first

13:04

fight to reestablish defensive

13:05

positions, then regain lost ground. Only

13:08

then can they launch planned operations

13:10

in the spring or summer. What Ukraine

13:12

has achieved beyond ridding at least

13:13

eight of its southeastern settlements of

13:15

Russia's influence is forcing a hard

13:17

reset of Russia's strategy. Before any

13:19

assault can be launched to distract

13:21

Ukraine's forces away from Daetsk,

13:23

Russia will first have to feed more of

13:25

its soldiers into Ukraine's defenses

13:26

simply to reclaim territory that it had

13:28

gained over the four months leading into

13:30

February. And remember, Ukraine is

13:32

reinforcing its defenses in the

13:34

liberated territories. It's creating

13:36

kill zones packed with drones, anti-tank

13:38

defenses, and artillery ambush points,

13:40

which means that Russia will have to

13:42

work much harder to reclaim what Ukraine

13:44

has liberated than it did just a few

13:46

short months ago. Russia may be planning

13:48

to distract Ukraine with a spring push

13:50

into the southeast. But the reality may

13:52

end up being that Putin has to sacrifice

13:54

reserves that he intended to use in

13:55

Donetsk just to get Russia back into the

13:57

same position that it had in January.

14:00

What we've seen in the southeast is a

14:02

process of diversification that began a

14:04

long time ago, only accelerated to an

14:06

extent that Putin never expected. As

14:08

Leamond reports, Ukraine has been trying

14:10

to rid itself of Russia's lingering

14:12

influence long before Putin launched his

14:14

full-scale invasion. That campaign began

14:16

with the Maidam revolution of 2014, the

14:18

outlet says, and it has accelerated

14:20

significantly since Putin's forces

14:22

invaded in February 2022. And while

14:25

every liberated settlement is a tangible

14:27

battlefield manifestation of Ukraine's

14:29

desire to deustify, there is plenty

14:32

going on in the country that shows us

14:33

how it's crafting a new identity that

14:35

will ultimately see it free itself of

14:37

the Soviet shackles that have for so

14:39

long held it back. Chattam House

14:41

provides more information, noting that

14:43

the period between the Maidan Revolution

14:45

and Putin's invasion had seen Ukraine

14:47

make some interesting strides. Ukraine

14:49

was steadily consolidating its

14:51

sovereignty in educational, language,

14:53

media, religious domains, the outlet

14:56

says with a pair of highlights coming in

14:58

2019. That's the year that Ukraine

15:00

restored the independence of the

15:01

Orthodox Church of Ukraine from Russia,

15:03

in addition to being the year when

15:05

Ukraine passed a new law mandating the

15:07

use of the Ukrainian language in all

15:09

education, media, and public

15:10

administration settings. Every single

15:13

one of these actions sent a jolt through

15:15

Putin. Russia's leader could feel his

15:17

influence waning. That's likely a huge

15:19

reason why he launched his invasion in

15:21

the first place. But all that Putin has

15:24

really achieved in four years of war is

15:26

strengthening the Ukrainian desire for

15:28

true sovereignty. Every scrap of

15:30

territory that Ukraine liberates,

15:32

including all that it's just retaken in

15:33

the southeast, is a reminder to Putin

15:35

that Ukraine doesn't want Russia in its

15:37

country. On the more symbolic front,

15:39

Ukraine's non-combatants are also

15:41

pushing to rid their country of Russian

15:43

influence, even as Putin sends more

15:45

soldiers to their deaths against

15:46

Ukraine's defenses. For instance,

15:49

October 2025 brought with it a push

15:51

within Ukraine to get rid of the Copek

15:53

coin, which is a piece of Russian

15:54

currency that remains in circulation in

15:56

Ukraine. As Andre Pishny, who is the

15:59

chief of Ukraine's national bank, put it

16:00

at the time, the Copek is a piece of

16:02

Moscow that remains in our pockets, on

16:04

our price tags, and most importantly, in

16:06

our heads. This is the real Ukraine.

16:09

Putin may try to deny it. He may try to

16:11

tell anybody willing to listen that most

16:13

in Ukraine want to be controlled by

16:14

Russia. But time and time again,

16:16

Ukraine's own people, from its soldiers

16:18

to its civilians, prove Putin wrong. If

16:21

Ukraine wanted Russification, it

16:23

wouldn't have spent four years fighting

16:24

tooth and nail to stop Russia in its

16:26

tracks. And now, as Ukraine liberates

16:28

more territory than it has in years,

16:30

we're seeing the push against Putin's

16:32

influence enter a new stage. The total

16:34

derusification offensive has begun, and

16:37

it signals Ukraine fighting harder

16:39

against Russia than it ever has before.

16:42

Ironically, Ukraine may be getting help

16:43

in the fight for diversification from

16:45

the most unexpected source of all,

16:47

Putin. As Ukraine eradicates Russian

16:50

influence from its own land, Putin's

16:52

Ukraine war tunnel vision is leading him

16:54

to make decisions that are destroying

16:55

the identity of Russia itself. In just

16:58

one month, Ukraine has scored victory

17:00

after victory against Russia. Massive

17:02

territorial gains are being made as

17:04

Ukrainians take back what's theirs and

17:06

crush the Russian forces. None of this

17:08

is happening by accident. Ukraine has

17:10

developed into a fearsome fighting force

17:12

that combines innovation with brilliant

17:14

tactics, resulting in liberations in key

17:17

sectors of the front lines that are

17:18

stopping Russia in its tracks.

17:20

Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian

17:22

armed forces, Alexander Sies, provided

17:24

the details in a Facebook post on April

17:26

15th, noting that Russia has launched a

17:28

more intense series of assaults as part

17:30

of its spring offensive. CSKI detailed

17:32

how Ukraine is responding and what that

17:34

response has meant for Russia. We must

17:36

seize the strategic initiative. Thus, we

17:38

are conducting an active defense, CSI

17:41

declared before breaking the bad news to

17:43

Putin. Thanks to this, in March, our

17:45

troops regain control over nearly 50

17:47

square kilmters of territory that have

17:48

been occupied by the enemy. Those gains

17:51

are the results of a series of

17:52

counteroffensive actions that have

17:54

caught Russia offg guard as Ukraine

17:56

focuses on retaking territory over which

17:58

Russia only held a tenuous grasp with

18:00

its infiltration strategy. Putin's plans

18:03

have backfired. He thought he could use

18:05

Russia's manpower advantage by sending

18:07

in soldier after soldier to turn

18:09

occupied sectors into gray zones. Putin

18:11

was wrong. Ukraine has come roaring back

18:14

and it's making gains even as Russia

18:16

attempts to ramp up the pressure during

18:17

its spring offensive. Things wouldn't be

18:20

so bad for Russia if Ukraine were making

18:22

these gains on the back of months of

18:23

Russian advances. But that isn't the

18:25

case. The latest 50 km or 19.3 miles of

18:29

territory liberation comes off the back

18:32

of a month where Ukraine retook even

18:33

more land than that. After launching a

18:36

series of counteroffensives in the

18:37

south, Ukraine had regained about 300 km

18:40

or about 115 square miles by February

18:43

20th. By the end of March, Syski was

18:45

reporting that Ukraine had bree taken

18:47

about 450 km or around 185 square miles

18:51

from Russia in a counteroffensive that

18:53

seemed sweeping at first. It isn't. What

18:56

Ukraine is doing is extremely strategic

18:58

and focused on a handful of key sectors.

19:01

As you'll discover if you keep watching

19:02

the video, the key here is that Ukraine

19:04

has seen back-to-back months of

19:05

extensive gains against Putin's forces.

19:08

And in March, the territory recaptures

19:10

were accompanied by a mind-bogglingly

19:12

bad casualty rate for Russia. Al Jazzer

19:15

reports that Russia suffered a new

19:17

monthly high for confirmed casualties

19:19

caused by Ukraine's armed forces in

19:20

March. Ukraine says enhanced drone

19:23

production made this possible. It's more

19:25

complicated than that, but the headline

19:26

figure is simple. 35,351

19:30

Russians were killed or wounded in

19:32

Ukraine in the same month that Ukraine

19:34

retook 50 km of its territory. That

19:37

casualty rate represents a 29% increase

19:39

over the rate from February, which shows

19:41

us that something is changing in

19:42

Ukraine. It's not just holding the line

19:44

anymore. Ukraine is pushing forward

19:46

using an active defense that is killing

19:48

more Russians than ever before. Adding

19:50

to Putin's woes is that Russia's

19:51

recruitment rate isn't keeping up with

19:53

its 2026 rate of attrition. Russia plans

19:56

to recruit 409,000 soldiers by the end

19:58

of the year. It's getting nowhere near

20:00

that number. Right now, Russia has a

20:03

daily average recruitment rate of 1,120,

20:06

which Alazer says will ultimately lead

20:08

to it having a 65,000 soldier shortfall

20:11

against its target by the end of 2026.

20:14

That means fewer soldiers being cycled

20:15

onto the front. And when Russia has

20:17

fewer soldiers to defend the territory

20:19

that it occupies, opportunities for yet

20:21

more counterattacks open up for Ukraine.

20:23

what we've seen in March is already

20:25

impressive, but it may just be the start

20:26

of something much bigger as Russia's

20:28

manpower problems take hold deeper into

20:30

2026. So, Russia is dealing with

20:33

recruitment issues, record casualties,

20:35

and Ukraine retaking large chunks of

20:37

territory. Could it possibly get any

20:39

worse for Putin? The short answer is

20:41

yes. All of this is happening as Russia

20:44

launches the grand spring offensive that

20:46

is supposed to result in the collapse of

20:48

the Dombas and Russia stealing vast

20:50

quantities of territory from Ukraine.

20:52

Attacks have ramped up across the entire

20:54

front as a result of this spring

20:56

offensive launch. Russia is sending

20:58

waves of soldiers in the directions of

21:00

Constantiniva, Lyman, Denipropovsk,

21:02

Zaparisia, and toward the fortress belt

21:04

of cities in Donetsk as it follows the

21:07

only strategy that Putin has ever had.

21:09

Throw cannon fodder at defenses until

21:11

Ukraine breaks. Heavy fighting has also

21:14

been reported in the Alexandria and

21:15

Povsk directions, the latter of which is

21:18

a city that Russia has claimed to have

21:19

taken since as far back as December.

21:22

Basic logic dictates that more assaults

21:24

should add up to more territory being

21:26

taken by Russia, but that hasn't been

21:28

the case. What we're actually seeing

21:29

across the front is a massive slowdown

21:32

in the rate of the Russian advance.

21:34

Business Insider highlights this, noting

21:35

that Putin's forces were moving forward

21:37

at a rate of about 12.9 km or 5 miles

21:41

per day in March 2025.

21:44

Fast forward a year and the rate of

21:45

advance is a comparatively poulry 2.58

21:49

km or one square mile per day. In other

21:51

words, Russia's rate of advance has been

21:53

slowed by a factor of five in just one

21:55

year. And to apply a healthy dose of

21:57

salt to the Russian wound, Ukraine has

22:00

snatched away the momentum to achieve

22:01

daily gains of 4.66 km or 1.8 square

22:05

miles per day, almost twice what Russia

22:08

is gaining. What this all means for

22:10

Russia is very simple. The launch of the

22:12

spring offensive has been a complete

22:14

failure. According to France 24, an

22:17

assessment by the Institute for the

22:18

Study of War, or ISW, smashes the final

22:21

nail into the coffin of Russia's March

22:23

2026 campaign, when tallying Ukraine's

22:26

advances against Russia's, March is the

22:28

first month in 2 and 1/2 years, where

22:30

Russia's gains amounted to net zero.

22:33

Ukraine is outpacing Russia. It's

22:35

putting Putin to shame by launching a

22:37

better and more effective offensive than

22:39

Russia in the precise month that was

22:40

supposed to mark the start of Russia's

22:42

victory march. This isn't just

22:44

humiliating for Putin. It's an outright

22:46

catastrophe that should be showing him

22:47

just how poorly his throw people at the

22:50

problem until it goes away strategy

22:52

works in the 21st century battlefield

22:54

that Ukraine has created. What we're

22:56

seeing now is that things are starting

22:58

to shift in Ukraine's favor. And this is

23:00

how it's happening. The obvious answer

23:02

to how Ukraine is pulling all of this

23:04

off against a Russian military that has

23:06

a massive numbers advantage is drones.

23:08

We could just say drones did it and be

23:10

done with it. I mean, there's a lot more

23:11

to it than that. Still, drones are

23:13

crucial. Do you remember those March

23:14

casualty figures that we shared earlier?

23:16

35,351

23:18

Russian soldiers killed or wounded.

23:20

According to Uramidan press, a

23:22

staggering 96% of those casualties were

23:24

caused by drones. Ukraine's flying and

23:27

ground robots have been taking a massive

23:29

toll on Russia's spring offensive, which

23:31

is allowing Ukraine to hold its ground

23:32

in the regions that Putin is targeting

23:34

as it makes advances elsewhere.

23:36

Incidentally, Ukraine's drone advantage

23:38

is getting stronger. 2026 will see the

23:41

UK send a bumper package of more than

23:43

120,000 drones to Ukraine, which will

23:45

add to the millions of drones that

23:47

Ukraine is building itself. The

23:48

longrange drone aspect of the war isn't

23:51

going any better for Russia. For a long

23:53

time, in an area where Russia held a

23:54

clear advantage, long-range drones have

23:56

been used to wreak havoc on Ukraine's

23:58

cities and infrastructure. Again, volume

24:00

was key, as it has been on the ground

24:02

for Putin. However, March represented

24:04

another turnaround in that department.

24:07

ABC News reports that March was the

24:08

first month of the entire war in which

24:10

Ukraine launched more long-range drones

24:13

at Russia than Russia managed to launch

24:15

at Ukraine. The disparity is

24:17

significant. 7,347

24:19

Ukrainian drones versus 6,462

24:22

Russian drones. And to make matters even

24:25

worse for Putin, Ukraine's new breed of

24:27

interceptor drones, which take out

24:28

Shahits for pennies on the dollar, help

24:30

Ukraine to score a near 90% interception

24:33

rate against Russia's drones. in March.

24:35

Russia is launching fewer drones than

24:37

Ukraine, and it's seeing less success

24:39

with those drones than it has in months.

24:42

And what this means is that March wasn't

24:43

just catastrophic on the battlefield for

24:45

Putin. Ukraine's growing focus on deep

24:48

strikes means that it's whittling away

24:50

at the Russian war machine from the

24:52

inside. Inside Russia alone, 76 targets

24:55

were struck by Ukraine's drones,

24:57

including 15 facilities relating to

24:59

Russia's oil refining sector. All of

25:01

this is done to weaken Russia on the

25:03

front. Be that by destroying military

25:05

assets in Russia, such as production

25:07

facilities, or by snatching away the

25:08

fuel that Russia provides to its troops

25:10

and sells for a profit to other nations.

25:12

So, drones have been huge for Ukraine in

25:14

March. But you probably knew that

25:16

already. Whenever there is a discussion

25:18

about how Ukraine has pulled off

25:19

something spectacular against Russia,

25:21

drones are usually one of the reasons

25:23

why. But pay attention to what we just

25:25

said there. One of the reasons behind

25:27

the drone barrage, there is a lot more

25:29

going on behind the scenes that has

25:30

enabled Ukraine to make massive gains

25:32

against Russia. But before we get deeper

25:34

into that, there's a lot more where this

25:36

comes from. If you're getting value from

25:37

the military show, make sure you're

25:39

subscribed to the channel. There was

25:41

something in CSKI's words that should

25:43

have caught your attention beyond the 50

25:45

km claim. Saski used the words active

25:48

defense, and that term represents far

25:51

more than many realize. CSKI himself

25:54

gave us some clues as to why when he

25:56

said, "We are countering Russian numbers

25:58

with Ukrainian quality of combat

25:59

operations, forcing the enemy to play by

26:02

our rules and constantly postponing the

26:03

deadlines for completing tasks." He adds

26:06

that Ukraine has been using strikes

26:07

against Russia's military and defense

26:09

industrial complexes both in Russia and

26:12

in the occupied territories to reduce

26:14

Russia's offensive capabilities.

26:16

Ukraine's defense minister, Milky

26:18

Federov, also spoke about the need for

26:20

Ukraine to take the initiative and go on

26:22

the attack earlier in 2026. Back in

26:25

January, Fedorov said that Ukraine was

26:26

going to focus on boosting Russia's

26:28

killed in action rate as he set a target

26:30

of 50,000 irreoverable casualties for

26:33

Russia per month. That combined with the

26:36

systemic reform inside the Ukrainian

26:38

military would lead to a situation where

26:40

Ukraine could take the initiative

26:41

against Russia. That's what we're now

26:43

seeing on the battlefield. But taking

26:45

the initiative doesn't translate to

26:47

Ukraine launching a sweeping counter

26:49

offensive across a front line that now

26:50

stretches for 1,200 km or about 745 mi.

26:56

Ukraine is being much smarter than that.

26:58

The reason why it's made gains against

26:59

Russia in both March and February is

27:01

that Ukraine has taken a sectorbased

27:03

approach to its counterattacking

27:04

strategy. George Baros of the ISW tells

27:07

Business Insider, "It's not accidental.

27:10

It's not circumstantial. There are

27:12

reasons for it." when describing how

27:13

Ukraine has been degrading Russia's

27:15

defenses in key sectors for months to

27:17

set the stage for the counter offensives

27:19

that we're seeing today. What this tells

27:21

us is that Ukraine has learned from the

27:22

mistakes of the past. It's launched a

27:24

counter offensive against Russia before

27:26

back in 2023. That counter offensive

27:29

ultimately failed for several reasons.

27:31

One of which was that Ukraine spread its

27:32

forces too thin. Ukraine isn't making

27:35

that mistake now. Instead, it's looking

27:37

at areas where Russia has spread itself

27:39

too thin and is countering there. The

27:41

idea is simple. Russia's infiltration

27:43

strategy, which it used for much of

27:44

2025, allowed it to claim territory even

27:48

when it had only managed to sneak a

27:49

handful of troops into that territory.

27:52

These small gatherings of defenses are

27:54

what Ukraine is targeting now. And the

27:55

results are plain to see, where Russia

27:57

is weak, Ukraine attacks, and it

27:59

launches those attacks while maintaining

28:00

a stalwart defense in the regions that

28:03

Russia really wants to take. That

28:05

defense inflicts massive casualties

28:07

which further weakens Russia as Putin is

28:09

forced to move troops around the

28:10

battlefield before he's ready. Those

28:12

unanticipated movements lead to more

28:14

weakening and more opportunities for

28:15

Ukraine to make gains. Alexandrika,

28:18

where Russia is now trying to launch

28:19

attacks, was one of those sectors. The

28:21

Nepo Petrovski is another business

28:23

insider points out. And even before we

28:25

started hearing about Ukraine's counter

28:27

offensives in 2026, it was giving us

28:29

hints about the type of strategy it

28:31

would deploy. Heading to Cupyansk in the

28:33

Kivo blast, Ukraine spent the end of

28:35

December shattering an attempted Russian

28:37

occupation of that city, rubbishing

28:39

claims made by Putin and his cronies

28:41

that Kupansk had fallen in the process.

28:43

That gave us some early insight into the

28:45

strategy that Ukraine is pursuing now.

28:47

It's allowing Russia to take territory

28:49

in strategically unimportant areas while

28:51

Ukraine focuses on retaking key pieces

28:53

of territory that actually have an

28:55

impact on Russia's long-term plans. In

28:58

Capansk, Ukraine destroyed Russia's

28:59

attempt to project strength ahead of

29:01

peace negotiations. Now in Alexandria

29:03

and Nepropsk, Ukraine is preventing

29:05

Russia from building a buffer zone to

29:07

protect its forces in Donetsk as well as

29:10

pushing back against an attempted

29:11

Russian advance in Zaparisia. This is a

29:13

maturation in Ukraine's operational

29:15

planning and it shows us that Ukraine is

29:17

getting better at both anticipating what

29:19

Russia wants to achieve and countering

29:21

in places that Russia can't defend.

29:23

Business Insider says that Ukraine's

29:25

Delta system, which is a huge

29:27

cloud-based battlefield management

29:29

system that lets Ukraine review

29:31

real-time data recorded by drones and

29:32

other units from the battlefield, is

29:34

playing a huge role. Ukraine constantly

29:37

gets its hands on up totheminute

29:38

intelligence that feeds into the

29:40

planning of its operations. The

29:41

maturation of Ukraine's approach can

29:43

also be seen in its military command.

29:45

We've already mentioned that Fedorov is

29:47

working on overhauling Ukraine's

29:49

military structure. Ukraine is shifting

29:51

to a core system which improves

29:52

coordination between units and aids

29:55

operational planning. All of these

29:57

changes are already being reflected on

29:58

the front and they're being accompanied

30:00

by a new Ukrainian focus on mid-range

30:02

strikes. Ukraine is hitting more targets

30:04

in places like occupied Donetsk as it's

30:07

introduced a new generation of drones

30:09

that fly further than FPV drones and

30:11

don't cost as much as the long range

30:13

drones it already has. We mentioned

30:15

Ukraine's targeting of Russia's air

30:17

defenses earlier. That has a purpose,

30:19

too. The key independent says that the

30:21

period between June 2025 and March 2026

30:24

saw Ukraine carry out 429 strikes

30:27

against Russian air defense systems.

30:29

Those strikes set up the mid-range

30:30

strikes we're seeing now. Ukraine uses

30:33

these strikes to target Russia's

30:34

ammunition depot and its Shahid drone

30:36

storage units in the occupied

30:38

territories. It's taking out command

30:39

centers and troop gatherings, forcing

30:41

Russia into a position where it's having

30:43

to deploy frontline units that don't

30:45

have what they need. That's been made

30:47

possible because the air defenses that

30:48

once protected Russia's infrastructure

30:50

in the near rear have been taken out of

30:52

the game, which creates safe aerial

30:54

corridors that Ukraine can exploit to

30:56

smash Russian logistics and supply

30:58

lines. Ukraine's strategy is complex and

31:01

requires a great deal of coordination.

31:03

However, we can sum it up as follows.

31:05

Ukraine is weakening Russia from the

31:07

inside to create opportunities for the

31:09

types of counterattacks that were seen

31:10

in February and March. Now, are these

31:13

counterattacks warending? No. but

31:15

they're not supposed to be. Again, it's

31:17

all about the active defense that CSKI

31:19

mentions. Ukraine is taking territory

31:21

and strategic positions that enable it

31:23

to defend other sectors better than it

31:25

would otherwise be able to. Take Donetsk

31:27

as an example. Now that Ukraine has

31:29

liberated the southern territories that

31:31

Russia intended to use as a buffer zone,

31:33

it can start funneling more soldiers

31:34

north and into the Donetsk region. If

31:36

Russia wants to counter that, it has to

31:38

send soldiers who were previously

31:40

destined for Donetsk to the south.

31:42

Either way, Russia's attempts to advance

31:43

into Netsk weakened because Ukraine took

31:46

the initiative in a completely different

31:47

sector of the battlefield. And there are

31:49

other factors at play. Just when Russia

31:51

might start to think that it has a

31:52

handle on Ukraine's tactics, Ukraine

31:54

finds new surprises for Putin. According

31:57

to the Keefe Post, Ukraine is now taking

31:58

advantage of underground routes through

32:00

which it's moving troops and military

32:01

equipment. The outlet doesn't provide

32:03

much more information than that, though

32:04

we do know that Ukraine has invested in

32:07

building networks of tunnels in the kill

32:08

zones that it's created. Those tunnels

32:11

were and likely still are being used to

32:13

ambush Russian infiltrators. Perhaps now

32:16

the underground network Ukraine has

32:17

created is large enough to enable it to

32:19

use the tunnels as logistical arteries.

32:22

Russia would never have seen that

32:23

coming. And that's the point. Speed and

32:26

innovation have always been key

32:27

advantages that Ukraine has held over

32:29

Russia. As we speak, Ukraine is working

32:32

to embed research and development into

32:33

the military units that are actively

32:35

fighting against Russia. The Center for

32:37

Strategic and International Studies

32:38

claims it adds that Ukraine has also

32:41

created a better training pipeline for

32:43

its air defense operators, which all

32:45

adds up to Ukraine using its

32:46

technological advantage to hurt Russia.

32:48

Ci himself says that Ukraine's military

32:50

never stands still. Every month,

32:52

Ukraine's military conducts assessments

32:54

of the combat operations that it

32:56

launches, which it uses to refine its

32:58

tactics and figure out how it can

32:59

improve coordination across all levels

33:01

of military command. In short, Ukraine

33:04

is always looking for ways to get

33:05

better. Putin would have been happy with

33:07

waging a war using decades old tactics.

33:10

Even now, Russia is having a hard time

33:12

adapting. Yes, it's using drones against

33:14

Ukraine, but beyond that, Russia is

33:16

following the same attritional playbook

33:18

in 2026 as it was in 2022, and the

33:21

strategy is starting to fall apart. So,

33:23

when we say that Ukraine retaking 50 km

33:26

of territory from Russia is an

33:27

unbelievable victory, we aren't just

33:29

referring to the territory itself.

33:31

That's important, of course, but far

33:32

more vital for Ukraine is that these

33:34

gains are being made as a result of the

33:36

country's ability to constantly adapt

33:38

and mature. Putin's invasion, as brutal

33:40

as it has been, has led to Ukraine

33:42

becoming one of the world's strongest

33:44

military powers. The bite back is now

33:46

underway. Ukraine has the momentum as it

33:49

claws back territory and destroys

33:50

Russian soldiers in record numbers. The

33:53

spring of 2026 was supposed to kickstart

33:55

the final push for a Russian victory.

33:57

Instead, it's starting to look like the

33:59

beginning of Ukraine ending Russia's

34:00

invasion for good. They said that

34:03

Ukraine would lose the war. It was

34:05

inevitable. Russia was simply too big,

34:08

too powerful. A military superpower

34:10

against a mino needed the West to give

34:12

itself even a fighting chance of

34:14

surviving more than a month or two. How

34:16

things have changed. Ukraine is now a

34:19

master of war. And it's grown so

34:20

powerful that even the US needs its help

34:22

in Iran. The country that once relied on

34:25

others is now ready to become the nation

34:27

that its allies can rely on in every

34:29

aspect of modern warfare. Ukraine's

34:31

president, Vladimir Zalinski, has made

34:34

an announcement. For the first time in

34:36

Ukraine's history, the courage of our

34:37

warriors and the resilience of our

34:39

people are sufficiently armed to defend

34:41

against Russian strikes. Zalinski said

34:43

during an address to mark Ukrainian Arms

34:45

Makers Day on April 13th. What this

34:48

means is that Ukraine has combined the

34:50

support that it's received from so many

34:51

allies since Putin invaded with the

34:54

development of its domestic defense

34:55

industry, become the sort of powerhouse

34:57

that Putin always feared it would

34:59

become. Now Ukraine is stronger than it

35:01

ever has been at any point during its

35:03

history. And Zalinski is quick to let

35:05

the world know about it. This is not the

35:07

first time that Russia has come to

35:08

destroy Ukrainian statehood and freedom,

35:10

Ukraine's president said of Russia's

35:12

invasion of its territory before adding.

35:14

But now, Ukrainians are in a stronger

35:15

position than ever before, stronger than

35:17

in 2014, stronger than in the 20th

35:19

century, and stronger than at any

35:21

earlier time. For some, these might seem

35:23

like empty words. That's how Putin wants

35:26

the rest of the world to hear what

35:27

Zilinski has to say. For years, Russia's

35:29

president has been trying to craft the

35:31

narrative that Russia is the

35:32

allconquering power that will take

35:34

Ukraine any day now. It's been over 4

35:36

years, and any day now hasn't arrived

35:39

yet. Still, Russia tells its own story

35:41

of dominance. Even as recently as the

35:44

end of March, Putin was giving Ukraine a

35:45

two-month deadline to get out of the

35:47

Dombas, or else Russia's forces would

35:49

sweep through and take it. Again, Russia

35:51

has been trying to do that for years. It

35:54

hasn't succeeded yet, and it has a whole

35:56

fortress belt to topple before it does.

35:58

The reality that we're seeing on the

35:59

ground is that what Zalinsky claims

36:01

Ukraine to be is precisely what it has

36:03

become. And the results speak for

36:05

themselves. In March, which is the month

36:07

when Russia launched the spring

36:08

offensive that is supposed to lead to

36:10

the fall of the Dombas by the end of

36:11

2026, Ukraine has beaten Russia in every

36:14

category that matters. On the long range

36:17

front, Ukraine intercepted close to 90%

36:19

of Russia's drones and the vast majority

36:21

of its missiles. And as only one in

36:23

every 10 Russian drones was finding its

36:25

mark, Ukraine came out on top in

36:26

long-range attacks for the first time

36:28

since the war began. Ukraine launched

36:30

885 more deep strike drones at Russia

36:33

than Russia launched at Ukraine in

36:34

March, hitting a staggering total of

36:37

7,347,

36:39

which amounts to 237 unmanned aerial

36:41

vehicles attacking Russian territory

36:43

every single day. Records fell left and

36:47

right throughout all of March. On March

36:48

17th, Russia endured more casualties

36:50

than it has on any day in 2026 so far,

36:53

as 1,710 of Putin's soldiers fell to

36:56

Ukraine's weapons. By the end of the

36:59

month, Russia had lost 35,351

37:02

of its soldiers to death or injury,

37:04

which is a high water mark for the year

37:05

so far and one of the highest monthly

37:07

totals yet recorded in over 4 years of

37:10

fighting. April was also the month when

37:12

Russia's total casualty count climbed

37:14

past the 1.3 million mark. And in

37:17

Donetsk, which is part of the Dombas

37:18

that Russia still has to try and rest

37:20

away from Ukraine, Putin's forces are

37:22

now in the position where they're losing

37:23

316 soldiers for every square kilometer

37:26

of Ukraine that they are managing to

37:28

claim, which is equivalent to 0.38

37:31

square miles. So Russia is losing

37:33

somewhere in the region of 900 soldiers

37:35

for every square mile that it takes. Not

37:37

that it's taking many. March saw Russia

37:40

make absolutely no territorial gains,

37:42

which is the first time that has

37:43

happened for 2 and 1/2 years. Every gain

37:45

that Russia managed to make was

37:47

counteracted by Ukraine making gains of

37:49

its own, leading to Russia losing over

37:51

35,000 soldiers for absolutely no

37:54

progress forward. These are the results

37:56

that Ukraine achieves now that it has

37:58

everything that it needs to defend

37:59

itself. And in a few minutes, we're

38:01

going to be explaining why the United

38:02

States should be paying very close

38:04

attention to what Ukraine is doing, as

38:06

Ukraine could end up making all the

38:07

difference in Iran. But before we get to

38:09

that, Zilinsky had plenty more to say

38:11

about Ukraine's transformation into a

38:13

military power that is more than capable

38:15

of defending itself against Russia.

38:17

Today, our diplomatic strikes are no

38:19

longer a sensation. Although each time

38:21

it is a very fair and very pleasant

38:22

piece of news, today our Ukrainian

38:24

drones have fundamentally changed

38:26

approaches to warfare. And once

38:28

everything was decided by the quantity

38:29

of artillery, now the battlefield is

38:31

undoubtedly the bravery of the infantry

38:33

and the scale of drone application,

38:35

Ukraine's president declared. He added

38:37

that Ukraine has developed its own

38:39

electronic warfare or EW systems and

38:41

that the work the country has done up to

38:42

this point has done more than put it on

38:44

a level footing with Russia. Ukraine is

38:46

now achieving par with its partners.

38:48

Those who give to Ukraine are now

38:50

receiving from the nation. As Ukraine

38:52

works to develop new strategies to

38:54

overcome Russia's ballistic missiles.

38:56

It's building defense partnerships with

38:57

allies in Europe and elsewhere. Many in

39:00

Europe are now thinking about this,

39:01

Zilinsky says of Russia's ballistic

39:03

threat. That shouldn't be a surprise. As

39:05

Russia's actions in Ukraine have led to

39:07

many in Europe theorizing that Putin and

39:09

his cronies want to turn their attention

39:10

to Europe and its NATO nations if they

39:13

manage to win the war in Ukraine.

39:15

Ballistic missiles would be key to any

39:17

Russian assault against a European

39:18

nation. For Zalinski, that fact alone

39:20

creates an opportunity for Ukraine and

39:22

its European allies to work together on

39:24

developing countermeasures. Ukraine can

39:26

be this leader, Zilinski says when

39:28

talking about a ballistic missile

39:29

project. And again, Zalinski comes with

39:31

the receipts to prove that Ukraine can

39:33

step up as one of the key defenders not

39:35

only of Europe, but of nations outside

39:37

of the continent who are being affected

39:38

by the actions of Russia and the nations

39:40

that align with Putin's course. We feel

39:42

this very concretely now when countries

39:44

in Europe, the Middle East, the Gulf,

39:46

Asia, Africa, all are very interested in

39:48

Ukrainian weapons, Ukrainian military

39:51

expertise coming to their defense,

39:52

Zilinsky declared. And he made it clear

39:54

that Ukraine has a model in place to

39:56

make all of this happen. We'll get into

39:58

that model in a moment. There is

40:00

something in what Zalinski said there

40:01

that offers another sign that the US

40:03

needs Ukraine to help in Iran. Two

40:05

things actually. Ukraine is working with

40:07

nations in the Gulf region and in

40:08

Africa. In the wake of the US launching

40:11

Operation Epic Fury against Iran, the

40:13

Iranian regime closed the straight of

40:14

Hormuz and started sending drones into

40:16

the territory of its Gulf neighbors.

40:18

Hundreds of Iran's Shahi drones have

40:20

been launched and these are precisely

40:22

the types of drones that Russia has been

40:23

receiving and then building upon to

40:25

attack Ukraine. Counters for these

40:27

drones have been created by Ukraine,

40:29

including lowcost interceptors that are

40:31

a big reason why Ukraine's drone

40:33

interception rate is so high right now.

40:35

Gulf nations have been taking notice.

40:37

Ukraine has signed decadel long deals

40:39

with Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United

40:42

Arab Emirates, all of which want to make

40:44

use of the weapons that Ukraine is

40:45

building so they can defend themselves

40:47

against Iran. It gets even deeper. Back

40:50

in March, Zalinski revealed that Ukraine

40:52

had sent over 200 of its anti- drone

40:54

experts to the Middle East to fulfill

40:56

its end of the defense deals that it

40:57

struck. Those experts are doing more

40:59

than training Ukraine's new Gulf allies.

41:02

Zilinski himself has revealed that they

41:04

have been directly involved in the

41:05

destruction of Russian Shahid drones,

41:07

which means that Ukrainian soldiers are

41:09

now helping to defend the Gulf against

41:10

Iran. As for Africa, RFI has broken the

41:14

news that Ukraine now maintains a trio

41:15

of bases inside Libya, which it may have

41:18

used to conduct strikes against Russia's

41:19

shadow fleet assets in the Mediterranean

41:21

Sea. Again, this is all due to what

41:23

Ukraine has to trade. Drone expertise

41:25

and weapons have become hot commodities,

41:28

and Ukraine is using them to build the

41:29

types of relationships that it never

41:31

would have had if Putin hadn't forced

41:33

Ukraine to turn itself into a military

41:35

power. Russia only has itself to blame.

41:38

A war that was supposed to be over in

41:40

days has lasted for years, and it's led

41:42

to Ukraine reaching the point where it

41:43

can not only defend itself against

41:45

Russia, but it can also work with and

41:47

provide for others. All of this has been

41:49

made possible by what Zalinsky dubs the

41:51

G2G or government to government model.

41:54

With these kinds of agreements, Ukraine

41:56

focuses on building trust with a

41:57

partners first, then it moves on to

41:59

everything else later. Contracts between

42:02

enterprises within the nation in

42:03

question are only negotiated once an

42:05

intergovernmental framework has been put

42:07

in place, which is what we're seeing now

42:08

in the Gulf, Libya, and many countries

42:10

in Europe. Ukraine has the model, it has

42:13

the weapons, and it's willing to share

42:14

them to help its partners. Here's where

42:16

the US comes into play. Right now, the

42:18

US is embroiled in a war with Iran that

42:20

is presenting it with problems that

42:21

Ukraine is perfectly positioned to

42:23

solve. The US needs Ukraine in Iran. But

42:26

before we explain how and why, this is a

42:28

reminder that you are watching the

42:29

military show. If you haven't subscribed

42:31

yet, now is the perfect time. So, the US

42:34

needs Ukraine. Why? We'll need to cover

42:36

some quick background before we dig into

42:38

the question. On April 13th, the US

42:40

announced that it's going to enforce a

42:42

blockade in the Straight of Hummus after

42:43

a fragile ceasefire with Iran fell

42:45

apart. Iran won't stop its nuclear

42:47

program, the US claims. So, it intends

42:50

to turn what has been a key piece of

42:51

leverage that Iran has held throughout

42:53

Operation Epic Fury against it. A

42:55

blockade by the US means very different

42:57

things than the one that Iran had in

42:58

place. Iran uses fast boats. The US uses

43:01

warships. And while this disparity in

43:03

naval power should mean that the US is

43:05

able to successfully blockade Iran's

43:07

ports, it also creates problems. For a

43:10

start, warships are far bigger targets

43:12

than fast boats. When those ships have

43:13

to stay in the same place for an

43:15

extended period, as is the case when

43:17

they're being used to create a blockade,

43:18

they become vulnerable to Iran's Shahid

43:20

drones. Furthermore, the fact that this

43:22

blockade has even been created at all

43:24

tells us that the Iran war is

43:26

reigniting. US President Donald Trump

43:28

has already threatened that anybody who

43:30

attempts to attack a US vessel will be

43:32

blown to hell, which tells us that he's

43:34

more than ready to pull the trigger on

43:36

conducting yet more of the types of air

43:38

strikes that have led to Iran to attack

43:39

so many of its Gulf neighbors in

43:40

response. Those affected Gulf states

43:43

have formed partnerships with Ukraine

43:44

for a reason. Now, the US should do the

43:47

same for that very reason. One of the

43:49

greatest threats that Iran poses to any

43:51

enemy, be it the US or anyone else, is

43:53

its Shahid drones. The US already knew

43:56

this way back at the beginning of

43:57

Operation Epic Fury, and it has called

43:59

on Ukraine for help in the past. At

44:01

least that's according to Zalinski. On

44:03

March 5th, Ukraine's president said

44:05

there had been requests from the

44:06

American side to help it deal with

44:08

Iran's Shahi drones, which resulted in

44:10

Zilinsky providing instructions to

44:11

Ukrainian specialists to provide

44:13

whatever means necessary to help the US

44:15

and its Gulf allies fend off Iran's

44:18

attacks. At the time, Trump seemed very

44:20

open to the offer, stating, "I'll take

44:22

any assistance from any country."

44:23

Ukraine saw an opportunity to make a

44:25

deal. Interceptor drones for Patriot

44:27

missiles that Ukraine could use to

44:29

defend itself against Russian ballistic

44:30

missiles. Trump's reaction to that

44:33

request was to reject help from Ukraine.

44:35

But now, as the situation in the Strait

44:37

of Hummus heats up again and the US

44:39

warships are being ordered to sail into

44:40

positions that make them vulnerable to

44:42

Shahid drones, the US has to face up to

44:44

a clear fact. It needs Ukraine. And

44:46

there are five reasons why. First up is

44:49

something that we've already touched on

44:50

several times. Ukraine has become the

44:52

global master in drone warfare. The Gulf

44:54

States know it, which is why they're

44:55

signing 10-year defense deals with

44:57

Ukraine. The very Shahid drones that

44:59

Iran is now using against the US, its

45:01

bases, and likely soon American warships

45:03

are the weapons that Ukraine has been

45:04

dealing with for much of the war. Iran

45:06

provided Shahids to Russia. For Ukraine,

45:08

that makes Iran complicit in the crime

45:10

of aggression against Ukraine, as the

45:12

country's Ministry of Foreign Affairs

45:14

puts it. However, it also means that

45:16

Ukraine has been forced to come up with

45:17

counter measures to the very weapons

45:19

that the US needs to overcome. One of

45:21

those counters is interceptor drones,

45:23

and they are the second reason why the

45:25

US needs Ukraine right now. According to

45:27

the American Foreign Policy Council,

45:30

Ukraine has been developing interceptor

45:31

drone technology throughout its war with

45:33

Russia. Now, Ukraine has the tech down

45:35

to a fine science. Tiny interceptor

45:38

drones use a combination of kinetic

45:39

energy and in some cases small warheads

45:42

to take out Shahid drones that are much

45:43

larger than they are. In January alone,

45:46

Ukraine deployed 40,000 of its

45:48

interceptors, which is proof that

45:49

Ukraine is able to build these defense

45:51

weapons at scale. Per the proof comes

45:53

from the fact that Ukraine can now build

45:54

around 1,500 interceptor drones every

45:57

day, creating a monthly output of about

46:00

45,000. The odds are high that it will

46:02

be able to build more, assuming that it

46:04

has investment from a country like the

46:06

US. So, Ukraine has the expertise and

46:08

the tools that the US needs in Iran

46:10

right now. The third reason the US needs

46:12

Ukraine is that the price is right. The

46:14

council adds that it costs Ukraine

46:16

somewhere between $300 and $1,200 to

46:19

build an interceptor drone. That's

46:21

peanuts in the context of the US defense

46:23

budget. And even when you add a markup

46:25

for exporting these interceptors to the

46:27

US, Ukraine's interceptor drones are far

46:29

cheaper than the Patriot missiles that

46:31

the US has often used to stop Iran's

46:33

Shahi drones in their tracks. These

46:34

missiles are effective, but they also

46:36

cost about $4 million each, which is far

46:39

too much to spend on Iranian drones that

46:40

cost $20,000 to $50,000 to build. Even

46:43

America's own attempts at interceptor

46:45

drones, such as the Lucas, cost far more

46:47

than Ukraine's proven solution. A single

46:50

Lucas drone costs roughly the same as a

46:51

Shahid. A Ukrainian interceptor costs as

46:54

much as 66 times less than the lowest

46:57

priced Shahid. That brings us to the

46:59

fourth reason why the US needs Ukraine

47:00

in Iraq. Ukraine is so much more than a

47:03

producer of cheap interceptor drones.

47:05

You'll have picked up on that already

47:06

due to Zilinski's comments about how

47:08

effective Ukraine's defense industry has

47:10

become and how many of Ukraine's

47:12

partners are looking for weapons of all

47:13

types from Ukraine. But let's put some

47:15

numbers on Ukraine's innovation. On

47:17

April 14th, United 24 media reported

47:20

that Zalinski unveiled a video

47:22

showcasing 56 weapon systems that

47:24

Ukraine has developed itself. Of the 56,

47:27

31 were drones, seven were missile

47:30

systems, four were electronic warfare

47:31

tools, and six were robotic ground

47:33

platforms. Other innovations included

47:36

four new types of armored vehicles, a

47:38

trio of unmanned naval systems, and even

47:40

a mobile air defense turret. Think about

47:42

this list of weapons for a moment.

47:43

Almost every single one is something

47:45

that the US could use in its war with

47:47

Iran. Beyond the interceptors, the US

47:49

could be using Ukrainian drones to

47:50

strike Iranian positions and fast boats.

47:52

It could be deploying unmanned naval

47:54

systems against those boats. And a few

47:56

mobile air defense units to go along

47:58

with the defenses that are already built

47:59

into America's warships would go a long

48:01

way toward keeping those vessels safe in

48:03

the straight of Hormuz. Ukraine is the

48:05

sort of innovator that can help the US

48:07

deal with almost anything that Iran

48:08

throws at it. But more important than

48:10

that, and perhaps more crucial than any

48:12

other reason why the US needs Ukraine

48:14

that we've shared so far, is that

48:15

Ukraine offers the US something that

48:17

almost no other allies offer. Support

48:19

for Operation Epic Fury. Trump has

48:22

regularly bemoaned the fact that

48:23

America's NATO allies aren't willing to

48:25

get involved with the reopening of the

48:26

Straight of Hormuz or the war that the

48:28

US started with Iran. NATO wasn't there

48:30

when we needed them, and they won't be

48:32

there if we need them again, Trump

48:33

blared in the wake of a meeting with

48:35

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutter on

48:37

April 8th. Whether that's true or not is

48:39

up for debate. To this day, the US is

48:41

the only nation for which NATO has

48:43

invoked Article 5 of its charter, which

48:45

was done so that the US could receive

48:47

direct help from its NATO allies in the

48:49

wake of the September 11th terrorist

48:50

attacks. Many of those allies then went

48:52

to war, first in Iraq and then

48:54

Afghanistan to help the US. But it's

48:57

what Trump is saying, and it reveals

48:58

that the US isn't getting the help that

49:00

it might have anticipated when it

49:01

launched Operation Epic Fury. But

49:03

Ukraine wants to help. More than any

49:05

other ally of the US, Ukraine has an axe

49:07

to grind with Iran for supplying Shahi

49:09

drones to Russia. On February 28th,

49:12

which is when the US launched Operation

49:13

Epic Fury, Zalinski himself took to X to

49:16

share his opinion. He pointed out that

49:18

Russia has used over 57,000 Shahiti type

49:21

drones against Ukraine, which Russia

49:23

wouldn't have had if not for Iran. It's

49:25

important that the United States is

49:26

acting decisively. Whenever there is

49:28

American resolve, global criminals

49:30

weaken. This understanding must also

49:32

come to the Russians, Zilinski said,

49:34

adding that he believes that America's

49:35

actions will ultimately bring peace to

49:37

the Middle East. Opportunistic perhaps,

49:39

but it's about as strong a statement of

49:41

support that the US has received for

49:42

Operation Epic Fury from any nation that

49:45

isn't directly involved in the war. So,

49:47

what is the US waiting for? Ukraine has

49:49

the antidote for Iran's Shahid drones.

49:51

It can make that antidote cheaper than

49:53

any other nation, and it's become one of

49:55

the most innovative military powers in

49:56

the world. Most importantly, Ukraine

49:59

wants to help the US. Ukraine is the

50:01

master of what the US needs most. Now

50:04

it's ready to answer America's call,

50:05

just as the US did when Ukraine was in

50:07

its hour of need. The only barrier that

50:09

seems to be standing in the way is the

50:11

Trump administration. But perhaps

50:12

Ukraine's expertise in other areas might

50:15

convince the US to form a partnership.

50:17

After all, it's not just weapons that

50:18

Ukraine has to offer. Putin had a war

50:21

plan for 2026. The collapse of the

50:23

Dombas, a taking of territory on the

50:26

left bank of the Denipro River. This was

50:28

all supposed to happen as Russia's

50:30

unstoppable momentum led to Ukraine's

50:32

forces crumbling under Russian pressure.

50:35

But those plans have already fallen to

50:37

pieces. Ukraine is taking control as it

50:40

has flipped the script. Russia thought

50:42

it would finish the war in 2026, but

50:44

it's Ukraine who will win it all as

50:46

Putin burns through more soldiers than

50:48

he can replace. Russia's plan is all

50:51

about advancing. Putin has built a force

50:53

of about 700,000 soldiers in Ukraine,

50:56

and their job in 2026 is to advance deep

50:59

into Ukraine on several axis. The Denro

51:02

River is a key target. Putin wants

51:04

Russia's troops to get as close to the

51:06

left bank of that waterway as possible

51:08

and perhaps even get to the point where

51:10

they could cross it. Donetsk, of course,

51:13

is very high on the agenda. Putin has

51:15

the legendary fortress belt in his

51:17

sights and he wants Russia to push

51:18

toward the cities of Slovansk and

51:20

Crmaturk.

51:22

This one is huge for Russia. The closer

51:24

it gets to taking those cities, the

51:26

nearer it comes to taking Donetsk and by

51:28

extension the entire Dombas region that

51:31

has been the key in all peace talks that

51:32

have occurred between Ukraine and Russia

51:34

so far. But there's more. Putin's plans

51:37

are as ambitious as they come in 2026.

51:41

Beyond these two key targets, Russia

51:42

will do everything in its power to

51:44

consolidate its control over the Black

51:46

Sea coast, which in turn feeds into the

51:48

taking of Donetsk and could also relieve

51:50

Ukrainian pressure on Crimea and the

51:52

Black Sea fleet that has been backed

51:54

into a useless Novaisk corner for much

51:57

of the invasion. That hasn't been

51:59

working out well recently as Ukraine is

52:01

building bigger and better drones that

52:02

it's using to attack that new base as it

52:04

did on March 2nd when Ukraine damaged a

52:07

pair of warships that are part of the

52:09

Black Sea fleet in Novarosk. And it

52:11

keeps on going. Russia wants to complete

52:13

the capture of Luhansk, which is the

52:15

other key part of the Dombas region that

52:16

needs to fall alongside Donetsk. But

52:18

wait, Russia says that the fall of

52:19

Luhansk has just happened for the third

52:22

time since the Ukraine invasion started.

52:25

The Institute for the Study of War or

52:26

ISW reported on April 1st that Russia's

52:29

Ministry of Defense made the grand

52:31

proclamation that Russia has seized the

52:33

entirety of the Luhansk region. But even

52:36

though this is the third time that

52:37

Russia has claimed as much and the ISSW

52:39

notes that it does indeed control 99.84%

52:43

of Luhansk, the Oblast is still yet to

52:45

completely fall. Nadia and Nova Rivka,

52:48

which both lie east of Bova, are still

52:51

holdouts. Presumably, Russia will want

52:53

to capture those settlements so that it

52:54

can claim for a fourth time that

52:56

Luhanska's fallen. The fourth time might

52:59

actually be the charm. Oh, and Russia

53:01

still wants to create a buffer zone that

53:02

stretches from Chernah through Sunumi

53:05

and into the Kiva blast, which would

53:07

provide protection for Russian border

53:09

regions against Ukrainian counter

53:10

invasion. Advances in the Zaparisia and

53:13

Julia Polola directions are also on the

53:15

agenda with the former also supposed to

53:17

enable Russia to create a secondary

53:19

buffer zone that it can use to prevent

53:20

Ukraine's forces from advancing from the

53:22

south and into Donetsk. Phew. Those are

53:25

some very grand plans and they'll

53:27

require every scrap of manpower that

53:29

Russia has to pull off. Putin is as

53:32

ambitious as he has been since the very

53:34

beginning of the so-called special

53:35

military operation. Russia has already

53:38

launched the spring offensive that will

53:39

feed into the summer and then into the

53:41

fall which is supposed to achieve all of

53:44

these objectives. But the real problem

53:46

is this. That operation failed to take

53:49

Kev and these latest plans are also

53:51

falling apart before Russia even gets a

53:53

chance to execute them. Something has

53:55

changed for Russia as it tries to

53:58

present itself as an allconquering force

54:00

on the battlefield. What we're actually

54:02

seeing is a complete switch in momentum.

54:04

Putin might have the plans, but Ukraine

54:06

has the advantage. Russia's script has

54:09

been flipped and torn apart by Ukraine.

54:11

What is supposed to be a war ending 2026

54:14

for Putin is being transformed into the

54:16

year where Russia will suffer its most

54:18

embarrassing humiliations on the

54:19

battlefield that it's seen so far. And

54:22

the reason why comes down to the fact

54:23

that Ukraine has a plan of its own to

54:26

counter everything that Russia is doing

54:28

while simultaneously setting the stage

54:30

for a comeback that will see it liberate

54:32

territory even as Russia attempts its

54:33

advances. That plan can be summed up in

54:36

four words. Exhaust, hold, build, and

54:40

strike. That's according to the

54:41

Ukrainian armed forces commanderin-chief

54:43

Alexander Sirki, who spoke to ICTV on

54:46

Russia to detail Ukraine's counter plan.

54:49

2026 will see Ukraine do everything that

54:51

it can to hold the territory that Russia

54:52

intends to assault, which is the most

54:54

obvious portion of the plan. Ukraine

54:56

doesn't want to lose that territory.

54:58

Every square mile relinquished to Russia

55:00

brings Putin closer to his goals. In

55:02

holding that territory, Ukraine also

55:04

completes the second part of this plan,

55:06

which is to exhaust Russia's forces.

55:09

Again, the logic is clear. Putin and his

55:12

cronies have shown time and time again

55:13

that their main strategy on the ground

55:15

is to throw meat and metal at Ukraine's

55:18

defenses until they collapse. The longer

55:20

Ukraine holds the territory that Russia

55:22

attacks, the more of this meat and metal

55:24

gets destroyed, which in turn limits the

55:26

strength of Russia's military.

55:28

Long-range strikes add to this second

55:30

part of the Ukrainian strategy as they

55:32

shatter the Russian war machine from the

55:34

inside. However, it's parts three and

55:37

four of Ukraine's strategy that change

55:39

the game for Ukraine. The country plans

55:42

to build strong reserves as its military

55:44

holds positions. And as you'll discover

55:46

soon, those reserves amount to more than

55:48

building a large army of soldiers. Then

55:50

there is the strike portion. Cies says

55:52

that Ukraine is going to strike wherever

55:54

Russia is weakest, no matter where it is

55:56

on the front lines. In other words,

55:58

Ukraine is going to liberate as much

56:00

territory as it can, and it'll do it for

56:01

two reasons. First, territory liberation

56:04

puts the wind of the Ukraine war firmly

56:06

behind Ukraine's sails. As CSKI himself

56:08

points out when he states, "Right now,

56:10

the enemy is playing by our rules. That

56:12

is, they are forced to adapt and

56:14

concentrate their efforts where we are

56:15

advancing." And that clues you into the

56:17

second reason, is that the territory

56:19

that Ukraine retakes is more territory

56:21

than it can hold, which disrupts Putin's

56:23

war plans and forces Russia to dedicate

56:25

forces to unexpected areas of the front.

56:28

That in turn weakens the Russian

56:29

offensive that is supposed to achieve

56:31

the grand goals that Putin has laid out.

56:33

So we have two countries with two very

56:35

different plans. And here's where it

56:37

gets painful for Putin. Russia's plan

56:39

has been a whole lot of talk followed by

56:41

the complete destruction of every early

56:43

effort to turn that plan into something

56:44

practical. As for Ukraine's plan, it's

56:47

already been executed and we can see

56:48

that all over the battlefield as we

56:50

speak. Let's start with the most

56:52

interesting part of Ukraine's

56:54

four-pronged approach, which is the

56:55

intention to strike wherever Russia is

56:57

weakest. Ukraine has been putting that

56:59

particular part of its plan into action

57:01

since late January when SpaceX finally

57:03

eliminated Russia's ability to access

57:05

Starlink via elicit terminals. That

57:08

single decision caused a communication

57:10

breakdown in the Russian military that

57:11

would have made Led Zeppelin proud and

57:13

it led to massive pockets of weakness

57:15

opening up in Ukraine's south where

57:16

Russian infiltrators had tenuous holds

57:18

on territory taken throughout the latter

57:20

portion of 2025. Ukraine has struck hard

57:23

and fast, making impressive gains as it

57:26

liberates sades of territory and

57:27

multiple settlements from under Russia's

57:29

nose. UK are informed reports that Syski

57:32

said on March 31st that Ukraine has

57:34

liberated over 480 km or 185 miles of

57:39

its territory in the Alexandria

57:41

direction since it began its strike

57:43

campaign earlier in 2026. That adds to

57:46

430 km or 166 miles that Ukraine

57:50

reclaimed in the Doorelia

57:52

counteroffensive that came earlier, as

57:54

well as Ukraine's retaking of Capansk,

57:56

which has seen the city fall completely

57:58

out of Russian hands. CSGI adds that

58:00

these operations are already forcing

58:02

Russia to divert troops from the PROVs

58:04

and Artina directions, which means that

58:06

they're having the precise impact that

58:07

Ukraine wants them to have, force

58:10

Russian diversions, create yet more

58:12

weakness on the front. Oh, and do you

58:14

remember the southern buffer zone that

58:15

we mentioned earlier? Ukraine retaking

58:17

so much territory in the Alexandrika

58:19

sector has made that buffer zone a no-go

58:22

for Russia. Putin can't create a buffer

58:24

using territory that Russia no longer

58:26

controls. And as Ukraine advances

58:28

further in that direction, which seems

58:29

the most likely course in the coming

58:31

months, what was supposed to be a buffer

58:33

zone is going to transform into an

58:35

avenue that Ukraine can use to funnel

58:37

troops in the direction of Donetsk. So,

58:39

the strike portion of Ukraine's

58:41

four-part war-winning plan is already

58:43

well underway. And remember, every scrap

58:45

of territory that Ukraine retakes

58:47

becomes territory that it can hold,

58:48

which in turn makes it territory that

58:50

Ukraine can use to exhaust Russia's

58:52

forces. And speaking of holding, Ukraine

58:54

is doing a great job of that, too.

58:57

Before we get deeper into that, this is

58:58

why we make the military show, to

59:00

explain how power really moves on the

59:02

battlefield. If you want to see more,

59:04

make sure that you subscribe to the

59:06

channel so you never miss a video. Now,

59:08

holding territory. Ukraine has been

59:10

doing plenty of that since Russia

59:12

launched its spring offensive earlier in

59:14

March. According to Euromaidan press,

59:16

Ukraine has successfully disrupted and

59:18

for the most part blocked a 13-pronged

59:21

Russian offensive that focuses on all of

59:23

the locations we mentioned. There are

59:25

individual examples of Ukraine's

59:26

success, such as what the country's

59:28

Ronini Battalion, which is part of

59:30

Ukraine's 65th separate mechanized

59:32

brigade achieved on March 28th. Russia

59:35

attempted to launch an armored assault

59:37

near the settlement of Robertina, which

59:39

is in Zaparisia on that date. The result

59:41

was complete failure for Russia as

59:43

Ukraine's drone operators destroyed all

59:45

10 of the armored vehicles that Russia

59:47

dedicated to the assault. This is a

59:49

story that's playing out all over the

59:51

front lines as Russia tries to throw

59:53

more meat and metal at Ukraine. Medusa

59:55

highlighted as much in an April 1st

59:56

analysis where it noted that there is

59:58

currently something of a lull across the

60:00

front lines. Even as Russia tries to

60:02

scale up the number of its assaults, the

60:04

counteroffensive that led to Ukraine

60:06

reclaiming so much territory means that

60:07

attempted Russian advances along the

60:09

Khiv, Zaparisia, and Denipo Petrovsk

60:12

axis have all been stopped in their

60:13

tracks. Ukraine still holds the

60:15

outskirts of Constantin, which is where

60:17

the city's high-rise buildings are

60:19

located. This is setting the stage for a

60:21

brutal attritional battle that will see

60:24

Putin's forces lose thousands as they

60:26

try to take the city. Ukraine reports

60:28

that the situation has stabilized in the

60:30

Slavansk direction and that Ukraine has

60:32

even managed to retake part of the

60:34

village of Minkka in another successful

60:36

counterattack. And in the Ora and Julia

60:39

Polola directions, yet more Ukrainian

60:40

counterattacks have slowed Russian

60:42

advances to acrruel. What we're seeing

60:44

here is Russia trying and failing to

60:46

advance on key settlements. It's not

60:48

even trying to take those settlements

60:50

directly right now. It's attempting to

60:52

capture territory around them to set up

60:54

for a deeper offensive. But Ukraine is

60:56

still holding even against those

60:57

efforts. That's all feeding into the

60:59

exhaustion part of Ukraine's plan.

61:02

Before we cover that, there's the

61:03

building aspect to focus on. Ukraine

61:05

says that it wants to build reserves. As

61:07

we've already said, that means more than

61:09

just collecting manpower. Ukraine

61:11

suffered through a terrible winter as

61:13

Russia bombarded its energy

61:14

infrastructure with drone and missile

61:16

strikes that were designed to inflict as

61:18

much terror on Ukraine's civilians as

61:19

possible. Blackouts and loss of heating

61:22

were common throughout Ukraine during

61:23

much of the winter of 2025 into 26. And

61:27

Ukraine is going to do everything that

61:28

it can to make sure it's prepared for

61:30

Russia trying to do the same thing again

61:32

at the end of 2026. That's according to

61:34

Reuters, which said on March 30th that

61:36

Ukraine is building up its gas reserves

61:38

already for the next winter. It's

61:40

looking to increase its supply of

61:41

liqufied natural gas from pipelines in

61:43

the vertical corridor system that runs

61:46

through Greece. Diesel fuel imports are

61:48

already being stepped up as Ukraine

61:50

stockpiles for what it believes is to

61:52

come. Reserves come in several forms.

61:54

This example will be one of the most

61:56

important for Ukraine as it tries to

61:58

extend the war long enough to really

62:00

make its exhaustion strategy pay off. Of

62:02

course, there are also the types of

62:03

reserves that most directly impact the

62:05

Ukrainian armed forces, which is the

62:07

buildup of manpower that can be sent to

62:09

the front as and when the need arises.

62:11

That's one aspect of Ukraine's plan that

62:13

is quite difficult to pull off. As far

62:15

back as August 2025, Syski said that

62:17

Ukraine was focusing on building combat

62:19

ready reserves. Fast forward to now and

62:21

Syski says that personnel are still a

62:23

main priority for Ukraine. Mobilization

62:26

is in force in Ukraine and Syski says

62:28

that he rates the efforts that Ukraine

62:29

has implemented so far as a 6 or 7 out

62:32

of 10, which implies that Ukraine could

62:34

do better. Syski recognizes that the

62:36

armed forces must create the proper

62:38

conditions to ensure those it recruits

62:40

don't go absent without leave or AWOL.

62:41

Aussie states, "The main reason for

62:43

going AWOL is unwillingness to serve and

62:45

fear for one's life. The transition into

62:47

military service, from recruitment

62:49

centers to training should be as smooth

62:50

and painless as possible. Ukraine is

62:53

working on improving the conditions for

62:55

mobilization with a focus on every part

62:57

of the chain from accommodation to

62:59

training and nutrition. The aim seems to

63:01

be to make that process as smooth as

63:03

possible, which will lead to benefits on

63:04

the back end as Ukraine manages to

63:06

retain more of the soldiers that it

63:07

recruits. Higher attention leads to the

63:09

ability to build reserves. And those

63:11

reserves feed into every other aspect of

63:13

the plan that Ukraine has implemented to

63:15

[ __ ] Russia's 2026 campaign. And with

63:18

that, we come back to exhaustion. Russia

63:20

launched its spring offensive in early

63:21

March. We were already starting to see

63:23

the impact of Ukraine's exhaustion

63:25

strategy pay off earlier in 2026. The

63:28

first 3 months of 26 have seen Russia

63:30

churn through 89,000 soldiers, and

63:33

Russia is now dealing with around 1,500

63:36

casualties per day. The good news for

63:38

Putin is that this figure is lower than

63:40

the 100,000 or so soldiers that Russia

63:42

lost between November 2025 and January

63:44

26. However, we've also seen a sharp

63:47

increase in Russia's casualty rate since

63:49

the spring offensive was launched,

63:50

including a record-breaking day when

63:52

Putin burned through over 1,700 of

63:54

Russia's soldiers on March 17th, which

63:57

is the highest daily total so far in

63:59

2026. And that's the big point. So far,

64:03

as Russia attempts to intensify its

64:05

attacks, Ukraine's successful execution

64:08

of the strike and hold parts of its

64:10

strategy are key to ramping up Russia's

64:12

losses even further. Ukrainian Defense

64:14

Minister Mko Fedorov says he wants

64:16

Ukraine to achieve a monthly casualty

64:18

toll of 50,000 against Russia. Ukraine

64:21

isn't there yet, but if it manages to

64:24

make 1,700 plus daily Russian casualties

64:26

a regular occurrence, which is very

64:28

possible as Russia tries to push harder

64:30

than it has for months, 50,000 may not

64:32

seem such a crazy target. After all,

64:35

1,700 multiplied by 30 days makes 51,000

64:38

casualties. Even if Ukraine doesn't hit

64:40

the 50,000 casualties target, the plan

64:42

Ukraine has created means that any

64:45

shortfall will be more down to Russia

64:46

backing off because of the scale of its

64:48

losses rather than Ukraine's defenses

64:50

crumbling. When Syski says that he wants

64:52

to make Russia play by Ukraine's rules,

64:54

this is what he means. More casualties,

64:57

the liberation of territory, holding

64:59

where it's most important, diverting

65:01

Russia's forces, and building reserves

65:02

to ensure Ukraine can keep fighting for

65:04

as long as possible combined to form the

65:06

path to victory for Ukraine. As for

65:09

Russia, its main goal of finishing the

65:11

war that Putin started over 4 years ago

65:13

by the end of 2026 has already been

65:16

shattered. What Russia wants is to

65:18

increase the scale and size of its

65:20

assaults, which it sees as the key to

65:22

toppling Ukraine's defenses. Of all the

65:24

directions in which Putin wants to push,

65:26

Ora stands out as the most important

65:28

outside of the Donet's fortress belt.

65:30

That settlement would provide Russia

65:32

with a route to the Denipro River's left

65:34

bank, which in turn allows for a push

65:36

against Saparisia City. But to take

65:38

Arakiv, Russia has to topple Julia

65:40

Polola. As we mentioned earlier, Ukraine

65:42

has been counterattacking in that

65:43

sector, causing casualties in the

65:45

process. The Russian march on has

65:47

already been reversed, and Ukraine

65:49

clearly plans for more of the same. This

65:51

is not how things were supposed to go

65:53

for Putin. Ramping up assaults was meant

65:55

to mean more territory taken, not

65:57

territory lost amid thousands of

65:59

casualties. But that's what's happening

66:00

to Russia right now. And as the new

66:02

voice of Ukraine reports, the Kremlin is

66:04

already so wary of what it's seeing on

66:06

the battlefield so early in Russia's

66:07

offensive that it's already starting to

66:09

scale back its goals for 2026. Troop

66:12

shortages are already starting to choke

66:14

that offensive. The outlet reports that

66:16

has led to the Kremlin pushing back

66:18

goals like creating the buffer zone in

66:19

the Sunni region and pushing further

66:21

into Zaparisia back into the second half

66:23

of 2026 and in some cases 2027.

66:27

Objectives in Khiv and on the Black Sea

66:29

coast are already being shelved

66:31

entirely, Ukraine's military

66:32

intelligence points out. And in place of

66:34

the grand offensive that Putin

66:36

envisioned for 2026 are the same

66:38

infiltration tactics that Russia started

66:40

using in 2025. So small groups of

66:43

Russian soldiers are going to push

66:44

forward, get isolated, be destroyed, and

66:46

then be replaced by more in a cycle of

66:48

death that feeds right into the

66:50

exhaustion aspect of Ukraine's own

66:52

plans. Ukraine is taking control of the

66:55

war. The battlefield has been flipped

66:57

and every plan that Russia created for

66:59

2026 is already in tatters. Russia will

67:02

keep trying to push forward. It will

67:04

even make some gains. But with

67:05

objectives already being pushed back,

67:06

the Kremlin is basically admitting that

67:09

it's overreaching. This is Ukraine's

67:11

year to put an end to Russia's

67:12

aggression, and it's already executing

67:14

its plan to do that very well. Putin

67:17

tried to create a narrative about an

67:19

inevitable Russian victory in Ukraine.

67:21

Russia would steamroll Ukraine's

67:23

defenses in 2026. Putin shouted from the

67:26

rooftops. Russia's leader wanted to

67:28

project strength, but 2026 has revealed

67:31

that his grand proclamations were a sign

67:33

of desperation. Something has broken on

67:36

Russia's front lines, and the inevitable

67:38

2026 victory isn't coming. Ukraine is

67:42

now winning the war, and experts have

67:44

explained why. It all comes down to

67:47

advances on the battlefield. Russia is

67:49

making far fewer of them, and Ukraine is

67:52

building momentum. On the Russian side,

67:54

the Institute for the Study of War, or

67:56

ISW, the experts who have the numbers,

67:58

reveal just how much of a lie Putin's

68:00

claims of a 2026 victory have turned out

68:03

to be. The reality for Russia is that

68:05

the last 6 months have seen its gains in

68:08

Ukraine slow down substantially as

68:10

Ukraine mounted a combination of

68:11

devastating defense and overwhelming

68:14

offense to take a fight that Putin

68:16

claimed was practically won right back

68:18

to Russia. The ISW looks at the period

68:20

between October 2025 and March 2026 in

68:23

its March 31st assessment of the Russian

68:26

invasion of Ukraine. Amidst the loss of

68:28

Starlink access and the Kremlin's

68:30

efforts to throttle Telegram, both of

68:32

which have caused havoc on the front

68:33

line, the gains made by Putin's forces

68:36

have slowed. The 6 months in question

68:38

saw Russia take 1,929.69

68:42

km or about 745 miles of Ukrainian

68:45

territory. That amounts to an average

68:47

gain of just over 124 square miles per

68:50

month or as the ISW puts it 10.66 km or

68:54

a little over 4.1 miles per day. What's

68:58

the problem? You might wonder. These

68:59

figures still show that Russia is

69:00

pushing forward. You're right, they do.

69:02

But remember the narrative that Putin

69:04

has been trying to build. 2026 is to be

69:07

the year that Ukraine's defenses finally

69:08

crumble. However, when we compare these

69:10

gains to what Russia achieved a year

69:12

earlier, we start to see the holes in

69:14

that particular narrative. The ISW's

69:17

experts compared the figures for the 6

69:18

months into March 2026 with the

69:20

equivalent period between October 2024

69:23

and March 2025. What they found is that

69:25

Russia's forces managed to seize 2716.57

69:30

km or almost 1,049 miles of Ukraine

69:33

during that period. That amounts to

69:35

close to 175 miles per month, which is

69:38

14.9 km or 5.75 miles per day. Are you

69:43

starting to see a problem here? Russia

69:45

is supposed to be on the verge of

69:46

breaking Ukraine, but its battlefield

69:48

gains are telling a very different

69:49

story. What we really see here is the

69:51

last 6 months have been a failure of

69:53

epic proportions for Russia. It has

69:55

taken 300 square miles less between

69:58

October 2025 and March 2026 than it did

70:01

during the same period between October

70:03

2024 and March 2025. this even though

70:06

Russia is launching more long-range

70:08

drones at Ukraine than it ever has

70:09

before, which included a March 24th

70:12

assault that involved almost 1,000

70:14

drones. These types of attacks were

70:16

ramped up during the winter as Russia

70:18

attempted to pressure Ukraine's forces

70:19

on the ground by terrorizing the

70:21

country's citizens with the loss of

70:22

electricity and heating. None of these

70:25

strategies have worked. Far from being

70:27

finally defeated by Russia's relentless

70:29

attacks, Ukraine is not only standing

70:31

firm, but it's creating problems behind

70:33

the slower Russian advances that will

70:35

leave Putin scratching his head. We'll

70:37

get to those problems soon, but right

70:39

now it's all adding up to a turning

70:40

point in the Ukraine war. And to make it

70:42

all even worse for Russia, March has

70:45

brought with it the beginning of the

70:46

spring offensive that is supposed to end

70:48

it all for Ukraine. And still, the gains

70:51

are far lower than they were just a year

70:53

ago. We can see how hard Russia is

70:55

trying to make it appear as though it's

70:57

actually pushing in the numbers. Once

70:58

again, both the Kev Independent and RBC

71:01

Ukraine have reported on Russia ramping

71:03

up the number of its assaults in March.

71:05

The former reported on March 23rd, the

71:07

commander-in-chief of Ukraine's armed

71:08

forces, Alexander Syski, has confirmed

71:11

that Russia's ground forces launched 600

71:14

assaults in the 4 days leading up to the

71:16

article's publication. That didn't go

71:18

well for Russia. Those 600 assaults were

71:20

stifled, as well as we've seen Ukraine

71:22

manage in the six-month period the ISW

71:24

covers, and Russia's losses were

71:26

enormous. Putin committed tens of

71:29

thousands of troops to these attacks,

71:30

and the 4 days in question saw it suffer

71:33

6,090 casualties, Zitzki says. Taking

71:36

the entire week up to March 23rd into

71:38

account, Russia suffered 8,710

71:42

infantry losses, but practically no

71:44

gains. Thanks to the professional and

71:46

coordinated actions of Ukrainian troops,

71:48

the enemy's offensive operations have

71:50

been halted on several fronts, CSI

71:52

declared at the time. RBC Ukraine's

71:54

report highlights how unrealistic

71:56

Russia's goals have become as its

71:58

offensives are stalled and it makes

71:59

fewer gains. The outlet says the Donetsk

72:02

fortress belt, which includes the key

72:04

cities of Slavansk and Katausk, is

72:07

supposed to be in the Kremlin sights. To

72:09

get to those cities, Russia has to

72:10

occupy another part of the fortress

72:12

belt, Constantinka.

72:15

Putin has set a deadline of April 25th

72:17

for Russia's forces to get that

72:18

particular job done and he says that all

72:20

of Donetsk should fall into Russia's

72:22

hands by 2026. These are absolutely

72:25

ludicrous demands. It took 21 months for

72:28

Russia to achieve any sort of

72:30

breakthrough in the Donetsk city of

72:32

Prosk and then several more months

72:34

afterward to get to the point where they

72:36

could legitimately claim to have taken

72:38

the city. Across is smaller than many of

72:40

the major cities in the fortress belt.

72:42

Yet Putin seems to think that the belt

72:44

will fall in the next 9 months. How?

72:47

Russia is moving forward at a slower

72:48

pace than it was a year ago. Yet Putin

72:50

somehow thinks that things are going to

72:52

magically speed up even as his army is

72:54

losing more soldiers than at any other

72:55

point in 2026. If there's any semblance

72:58

of logic here, then we can't find it.

73:00

What we see are desperate demands from a

73:02

Russian president who knows that the

73:04

supposedly inevitable collapse of

73:06

Ukraine is far from the reality that's

73:08

being showcased on the battlefield. The

73:10

gains are far too slow for the demands.

73:12

They're definitely too slow for the

73:14

deadlines that Putin has set for his

73:15

forces. As the ISW puts it, "Battlefield

73:18

realities as of late March 2026,

73:21

continue to show that significant

73:22

Russian battlefield gains, let alone

73:24

total victory, are not imminent, nor

73:27

inevitable. But this is where the real

73:29

problem lies for Putin. as his forces

73:31

have been slowed to a crawl all across

73:33

Ukraine. They're also having to deal

73:35

with the fact they have been losing

73:36

territory in a key part of the

73:38

battlefield. In Ukraine's south, where

73:40

Russia had spent much of the latter part

73:41

of 2025 taking territory with the goal

73:44

of creating a buffer zone to protect its

73:46

main offensive in Donetsk in 2026,

73:48

Russia has been losing ground. On March

73:51

31st, CSI revealed that Ukraine's

73:53

successful southern offensive has

73:55

disrupted Russia's plans for the spring.

73:57

We're seeing that right now in the slow

73:59

gains and the massive losses. Ukraine

74:01

has also managed to liberate 480 km or

74:04

about 185 miles of territory in the

74:07

Alexandrika sector so far and more may

74:10

be coming. What we're seeing here is

74:12

more Russian losses to add to those that

74:14

Russia has already experienced in recent

74:16

months. These latest gains exceed the

74:18

indicators seen during the Doorelia

74:20

counter offensive which UNN reports saw

74:22

Ukraine take back about 430 km or about

74:26

166 square miles of territory from

74:28

Russia. And in Capansk which Russia was

74:30

claiming to have captured toward the end

74:32

of 2025. There has been a complete

74:34

turnaround that adds up to at least

74:36

another 183 km or 70.65 miles of

74:41

territory liberal. This is a lethal

74:43

combination for Russia. It's gaining

74:45

less ground than it was a year ago. And

74:47

that problem is being compounded by the

74:49

fact that Ukraine is liberating

74:51

territory. Not just any territory

74:53

either. These are key settlements and

74:55

patches of land that Ukraine has taken

74:57

back. Territory that Russia expended

74:59

huge amounts of time and manpower to

75:01

occupy in the first place. What this

75:03

means is that Russia now has to waste

75:05

even more of its resources in vain

75:06

attempts to recapture territory that it

75:08

thought it safely held. More reserves

75:11

will be sent from the main eastern front

75:12

by Putin, which slows down the already

75:15

faltering offensives there, which means

75:17

even less territory taken. There is now

75:19

a cycle of Russian failure in place as

75:22

Putin's forces are stretched while

75:24

Ukraine continues to build momentum on

75:26

the battlefield. This is what Ukraine's

75:28

inevitable collapse looks like. Putin,

75:30

if it is, Ukraine will want a lot more

75:33

of the same. Let's come back to those

75:35

ambitious Kremling goals that we

75:36

mentioned. Is there any chance of them

75:38

being achieved? The ISW's experts say

75:42

no. Russia has been forced to turn to

75:44

covert mobilization efforts just to

75:46

sustain the slower rate of advance that

75:48

we're seeing as more of its soldiers are

75:50

churned up by Ukraine's defenses. In

75:52

Ria, a decree was signed on March 20th

75:54

that requires businesses with between

75:57

150 and 500 employees to choose between

76:00

two and five of their employees to sign

76:02

contracts with the Russian military.

76:04

That is insanity and desperation

76:06

colluding to force soldiers into a

76:08

supposedly volunteer arm. And it's

76:10

happening because Putin knows that

76:12

Russia can't come close to hitting the

76:14

targets that he has set for its

76:15

soldiers. How could it? The Kremlin is

76:17

forcing people out of the workplace to

76:19

fight, which is as sure an indicator as

76:21

any that the stream of volunteers that

76:23

has allowed Russia to get this far in

76:24

Ukraine is drying up. We see the

76:26

collapse in Russia's gains happening in

76:28

real time. The question is, how did all

76:31

of this happen? That is exactly what

76:33

we're going to cover next. But before we

76:35

do, this is a quick reminder that you

76:37

are watching the Military Show. We bring

76:39

you the full picture, not just the

76:41

headlines. If you want to stay ahead of

76:43

the curve, make sure you subscribe to

76:45

the channel.

76:47

So, what happened to cause Russia's

76:48

slowdown? Ukraine's counterattack, which

76:51

we've already discussed, has played a

76:52

huge role. It's forced Russia to divert

76:55

troops to retake territory that it

76:56

thought it held, and that has naturally

76:58

had an impact elsewhere on the front.

77:00

Elite Russian airborne and naval

77:02

infantry were sent south early in March

77:04

to stop Ukraine's advance. They've

77:05

clearly failed. For its part, Ukraine

77:07

has been conducting counterattacks along

77:09

areas of the front lines where Russia's

77:11

troops are at their weakest. This forces

77:13

yet more shuffling in the Russian ranks

77:15

as military commanders have to divert

77:17

troops to wherever the latest Ukrainian

77:18

counter is happening. Those troops take

77:20

time to arrive, which leads to more

77:22

territory being liberated. And every

77:24

reshuffle disrupts what Russia had

77:26

planned across the entire front line.

77:28

Again, it's a cycle, and as long as

77:30

Ukraine keeps it up, Russia doesn't have

77:32

any real answers for it. However, there

77:35

is more to this shift of momentum in

77:36

Ukraine's favor than just the counter

77:38

offensive. Ukraine's defensive evolution

77:41

has also just played a massive part in

77:43

what we're seeing on the battlefield

77:45

now. And we don't mean the increase in

77:47

FPV drones in the kill zones that were

77:49

already tearing through Putin's forces.

77:51

Those zones have tripled in size across

77:53

the front line because Ukraine has

77:54

developed and is now utilizing mid-range

77:57

drones to wreck Russia's rear in the

77:59

occupied territories. The ISW covered

78:02

this in a March 15th expost where it

78:04

noted that Ukrainian forces are

78:06

intensifying their mid-range strike

78:08

campaign, increasing their ability to

78:10

contest Russian missile strikes, degrade

78:12

Russian air defenses, and disrupt

78:14

offensive operations ahead of an

78:16

expected Russian spring summer 2026

78:19

offensive. Other outlets including

78:21

Pravda and the Kev Independent have

78:23

reported that Ukraine taking out Russian

78:25

air defenses has become a key pattern in

78:27

2026. The mid-range drones can travel

78:30

almost three times the distance of

78:31

weapons like the highar rockets which

78:33

Ukraine has used to attack Russian

78:35

targets in the occupied territories in

78:36

the past. Those rockets are now being

78:38

joined by drones that shatter Russian

78:40

air defenses, which then create safe

78:43

aerial corridors Ukraine can exploit to

78:45

use the same drones to destroy troop

78:47

gatherings, command and control posts,

78:49

drone operation headquarters, and

78:51

anything else that Russia has behind the

78:52

lines that it uses to support its forces

78:54

on the front. This is a systematic

78:56

degradation of the fighting force that

78:58

Putin has amassed, and it's slowing

79:00

Russia down. It has to. The logic here

79:02

is very simple. If one of Ukraine's

79:04

middle-range drones hits a Russian

79:06

ammunition stockpile, that ammo can't be

79:08

given to the soldiers tasked with

79:10

assaulting positions on the front. What

79:12

happens next? Those soldiers with no

79:15

ammo are still ordered to advance, and

79:17

they get picked apart by Ukraine's

79:18

drones before they get close to

79:20

achieving any sort of forward momentum.

79:22

As Russia's air defense web inside

79:24

Ukraine crumbles, these attacks on the

79:26

near rear will become more intense. And

79:28

they're being accompanied by the deep

79:30

strikes into Russian territory that

79:31

we've seen for well over a year. and

79:33

that serve the same purpose of crippling

79:35

Russia's military from the inside as the

79:37

mid-range drones. Ukraine has offered

79:40

the perfect example in March with a

79:42

relentless assault against Russia's

79:43

Baltic Sea ports. Attacks against those

79:45

ports have taken 40% of Russia's crude

79:48

oil export capacity offline. The Kev

79:50

Post reported on April 1st. That means

79:53

Russia isn't able to sell oil and fuel

79:55

at a time when prices are at the highest

79:57

they've been since the co era due to

79:58

Iran's blockade of the straight

80:00

formoose. Fewer sales means less cash

80:02

coming into Russia for the Kremlin

80:04

attacks. And if Putin isn't getting that

80:06

oil revenue, he can't spend money on

80:08

building more equipment and hiring the

80:10

soldiers that Russia needs to make the

80:12

gains in Ukraine. You can see how all of

80:14

this has added up to a nightmare

80:15

scenario for Russia. Ukraine has built

80:18

battlefield momentum by carefully

80:20

prioritizing its targets. All as

80:22

Russia's approach hasn't evolved from

80:24

the throw cannon foder at Ukraine

80:26

strategy that Putin has employed since

80:27

the beginning of his invasion. Clever

80:29

counterattacks in Ukraine's south have

80:31

disrupted Russia's offensive in the

80:33

east. Mid-range drones are taking out

80:35

military nodes in the east, causing even

80:37

more disruption. And in Russia itself,

80:39

Ukraine is hitting oil along with other

80:41

military targets with attacks that see

80:43

it throw constant spokes into the wheels

80:45

of the Russian war machine. This is

80:47

coordinating, calculate. It's Ukraine at

80:50

its best, and it's making Putin very

80:52

desperate to cling to the narrative that

80:54

Russia's victory is inevitable. We've

80:56

mentioned this desperation already.

80:58

We're starting to see obvious signs of

80:59

it in the demands that Putin is making

81:01

of Ukraine as Russia's leader pushes for

81:03

a version of peace that his troops can't

81:05

earn on the battlefield. On March 31st,

81:08

Ukrainian President Vladimir Zalinski

81:10

revealed that Russia has demanded that

81:12

Ukraine withdraw from the entire Donbass

81:14

region within the next 2 months. So the

81:16

end of May then, unquincidentally, the

81:18

Dombas is the eastern region that is the

81:20

focus of Russia's spring offensive, the

81:22

home of the fortress built and the place

81:24

where Russia's gains have been slowing

81:26

down. A day after this news broke, Keven

81:28

Independent reported that Putin took

81:30

things a step further. April 1st saw

81:32

Putin's favorite mouthpiece, Dmitri

81:34

Pescov, claim, "As for the two months,

81:36

that's not the point here. Zilinski must

81:38

make a decision already today to

81:40

withdraw Ukrainian troops beyond the

81:42

administrative borders of the Dombas.

81:44

This has been said repeatedly and in

81:45

theory Zalinsky should have made this

81:47

decision yesterday. He needs to take

81:49

responsibility and make this difficult

81:51

decision. This is pressure from Putin

81:53

being placed on Ukraine. But it's not

81:55

the sort of pressure that's going to

81:56

cause Ukraine to wilt. Keev has

81:58

repeatedly said that it will not even

82:00

consider seeding the Dombas as part of a

82:02

peace agreement. Russia knows this, but

82:05

it's making the latest set of demands

82:06

now because it knows that the crawling

82:08

pace of its advance over the last 6

82:09

months is nowhere near what it needs to

82:12

be for it to achieve its target of

82:13

capturing Donetsk, which would in turn

82:15

mean the fall of the Dombas by the end

82:17

of 2026. Again, this is Putin attempting

82:20

to project power at a time when the

82:21

momentum is in Ukraine's favor.

82:23

Territory is being liberated in

82:25

Ukraine's south and Russia's spring

82:26

offensive has gotten off to the worst

82:28

start that it possibly could. There is

82:31

no reason for Ukraine to acquies to

82:32

these desperate demands. The president

82:35

of the Keev School of Economics, Timothy

82:37

Milovanov, revealed on March 31st that

82:40

March 2026 is on track to be a record

82:42

month for Russian losses as the casualty

82:44

toll looks set to exceed 30,000. Again,

82:48

on the front lines, Putin's desperation

82:50

for a deal that hides how poorly Russia

82:52

is doing is being reflected in the

82:53

despair felt by the soldiers Russia is

82:55

sending to the front line. A March 30th

82:58

United 24 media report reveals that

83:00

increasing numbers of Russian soldiers

83:02

are taking their own lives rather than

83:04

face the terrifying drone swarms that

83:06

Ukraine has deployed in its kill zones.

83:08

Ukraine's defense minister, Mikyo

83:10

Federov, say that Ukraine's forces are

83:11

receiving so much video evidence of this

83:13

spate of suicides that they can conclude

83:15

that they are a daily occurrence among

83:17

the Russian rank and file. Russia's

83:19

soldiers typically take their own lives

83:21

if they've been wounded or surrounded by

83:23

Ukraine's drones. And it's because

83:25

Russia's propaganda tells them that it's

83:27

better to die immediately than to be

83:29

taken prisoner by Ukraine. Lies upon

83:32

lies. That's what the entire Ukraine

83:34

invasion has been built on. Putin's

83:36

soldiers are getting the dose of reality

83:38

that their leader has been trying to

83:39

hide from them. The spring offensive

83:41

that was supposed to lead to the end of

83:43

Ukraine is already failing. Thousands

83:45

upon thousands of Russian soldiers are

83:47

dying to Ukraine's defenses, and more

83:49

are killing themselves before they have

83:51

the chance to die. The Kremlin has set

83:54

impossible targets that will not be

83:55

achieved at the rate of advance that

83:57

we've seen from Russia over the last 6

83:58

months. As for Ukraine, it's

84:00

counterattacking. It's whittling away at

84:02

Russia's rear. All signs point to a

84:04

shift in momentum so enormous that

84:06

Ukraine is coming closer to winning the

84:08

war than Russia is to executing any of

84:10

the plans that Putin has tried to put in

84:12

motion. Russia's narrative has crumbled.

84:15

Ukraine pushes forward as Russia slows

84:17

down. And in the Baltic region, oil

84:20

terminals are burning. We touched on

84:22

Ukraine's long-range strikes in the

84:24

Baltic region earlier, and they are

84:25

devastating. For Putin, the spring of

84:28

2026 was supposed to be the start of a

84:30

major offensive that would have finally

84:32

allowed him to claim that his so-called

84:34

special military operation was a

84:36

success, but it isn't working out that

84:38

way. Ukraine's counteroffensive is

84:40

steamrolling Russian forces. Putin's war

84:42

is collapsing after Ukraine blinded the

84:45

Russian army and then pulled off a

84:46

massive shift the likes of which nobody

84:49

expected. This is liberation. It's

84:52

dusification. And it has led to Ukraine

84:55

breaking records all over the place.

84:57

Starting with the largest liberation of

84:59

Ukrainian territory that we've seen

85:01

since the 2023 counter offensive. Over

85:04

the first 2 months of 2026, Ukraine has

85:06

managed to reclaim a startling 100

85:09

square miles of its territory, much of

85:11

which is in the Zaparisia region along

85:13

with other southern regions of the

85:14

country from Russia. That's according to

85:16

United 24 media, which says that this

85:19

derusification of so much territory

85:21

represents not only the most land that

85:23

Ukraine has liberated since 2023, but

85:26

also the first time since the

85:27

counteroffensive launched in that year

85:29

that Ukraine has managed to gain more

85:31

ground than it has lost to Putin's

85:33

forces. Now, this marks a significant

85:35

shift in the Ukraine war and its

85:37

battlefield dynamics, indicating that

85:39

for the first time in almost 3 years,

85:42

Ukraine has finally gained momentum on

85:44

the ground. The slow push of Russia's

85:46

forces has been halted across most of

85:48

the front lines, and Ukraine has taken

85:50

advantage of its new position to push

85:52

back into territory that Putin thought

85:54

was safe. That push has had more than a

85:56

small helping hand from SpaceX and Elon

85:59

Musk's decision to finally cut off

86:00

Russian access to the Starlink network

86:02

that Russia had previously been able to

86:04

access via elicit terminals that it was

86:07

providing to its soldiers. In a move

86:08

that some would argue was a long time

86:10

coming, SpaceX created a white list for

86:13

Ukraine Starink terminals that

86:15

simultaneously served as an automatic

86:17

shutdown for the illicit Russian

86:19

terminals being used in Ukraine. The

86:21

result was chaos throughout the Russian

86:23

lines. And this is where things started

86:25

to shift in Ukraine's favor. The

86:27

Ukrainian advance into Zaparasia was

86:29

triggered by the complete communications

86:31

breakdown that occurred in the wake of

86:33

the Starlink shutdown. In an instant,

86:35

Russian infiltrators that had snuck into

86:37

Ukrainian territory embedded down as

86:39

they waited for reinforcements were no

86:41

longer getting any information. Isolated

86:44

and with no idea what is going on, those

86:46

infiltrators have been getting picked

86:48

off by Ukraine's search and destroy

86:50

squads, which in turn has forced Putin's

86:52

already tenuous grip on vast swavthes of

86:55

Ukraine's southern territory to loosen.

86:57

Russia is still very much in a weakened

86:59

position when it comes to its command

87:00

and control, even as it desperately

87:02

scrambles to find alternatives to the

87:04

shutdown Starink terminals that it can

87:06

no longer use. This couldn't have come

87:09

at a worse time for Putin, as he has for

87:11

the last few years. Putin and his

87:13

Kremlin cronies were preparing for a

87:15

spring offensive that would likely drag

87:17

deep into the summer and perhaps even

87:18

the fall. Striking the fortress belt in

87:21

Donesk and taking more territory in

87:23

Ukraine's south were goals of this

87:24

offensive. But as Ukraine's forces

87:26

continue their advance, the Kremlin is

87:28

being forced to reassess those goals as

87:31

Russia's troops have been placed on an

87:32

unexpected defensive posture that is the

87:35

exact opposite of what they're supposed

87:37

to be doing this spring. United 24 media

87:39

reports that no less than Ukraine's

87:41

president Vladimir Zilinski has said

87:43

that the counteroffensive that is

87:44

yielding enormous results for Ukraine

87:46

was designed specifically to disrupt

87:48

that spring offensive. And even as

87:50

Russia tries to amass forces near key

87:52

targets, such as the settlement of

87:54

Julia, it is having to do so after two

87:57

months of constant losses that left

87:59

every plan the Kremlin had made in

88:01

tatters. This was supposed to be the

88:03

spring to set up Russia's victory.

88:06

Instead, all we've seen so far is a

88:08

sustained offensive by Ukraine as it

88:10

derifies more of its territory. What

88:12

seems to have started as a localized

88:14

counterattack sparked by Russia's loss

88:16

of Starink has evolved into something

88:18

much more. Even as the winter weather

88:20

clears in Ukraine, which should have set

88:22

the stage for the offensive that Russia

88:24

wants to launch, it's still Ukraine

88:26

making gains as it defends well against

88:28

the forces that Putin has amassed. This

88:30

isn't how it was supposed to go for

88:32

Russia. Putin wanted to spend the winter

88:34

bombing Ukraine's energy infrastructure

88:36

into the ground in the hope that he

88:37

could force an early submission. That

88:39

strategy failed. Ukraine withstood the

88:42

aerial assault, and it came back

88:44

stronger than Russia could have ever

88:45

expected during a winter that was

88:47

supposed to see it collapse. And as the

88:49

weather clears, the derusification has

88:52

continued. Russian military bloggers are

88:54

losing their minds right now. That's

88:56

according to the Institute for the Study

88:57

of War, or ISW, which reported in its

89:00

March 25th assessment of Putin's

89:02

invasion that military bloggers are now

89:04

poking holes in the infiltration

89:06

strategy that Russia relied upon for

89:08

much of 2025, and that it is still

89:11

attempting to leverage. Even as

89:12

Ukraine's search and destroy squads

89:14

eliminate those infiltrators, Russia

89:16

can't make any worthwhile advances with

89:18

these kinds of tactics. Its military

89:20

bloggers are declaring there can be no

89:22

fundamental victories achieved by Russia

89:24

unless there is a wholesale reformation

89:26

of the entire force structure that

89:28

includes a move away from infiltration

89:30

and back toward larger mechanized

89:32

assaults that batter Ukrainians

89:34

defenses. Milblogger stated that Russian

89:37

forces would take around 100 years to

89:39

seize the rest of Ukraine, similar to

89:41

ISW's assessment that Russian forces

89:43

would take 83 years to seize the

89:45

remainder of the country should they be

89:46

able to continue their pace of advance

89:48

from February 2025. The ISW reports an

89:52

entire century seems a long time to wait

89:54

for a victory that was supposed to be

89:55

coming at some point in 2026. And

89:58

somehow it has gotten even worse for

90:00

Putin as he attempts to respond to

90:02

Ukraine's dusification of so much of its

90:05

territory. Russia tried to escalate the

90:07

situation. It failed. According to a

90:10

March 22nd ISW report, the Russian

90:12

military command deployed Spettznat's

90:14

forces into southern Ukraine with the

90:16

goal of stopping the Ukrainian

90:18

counteroffensive in its tracks. Those

90:20

forces headed in the direction of

90:21

Alexandrifka, where Ukraine has made

90:23

some of its most impressive gains. But

90:26

these supposedly elite operatives have

90:28

managed to achieve the grand total of

90:30

nothing at all since their deployment.

90:32

Russia is still relying on the

90:33

infiltration tactics that Ukraine has

90:35

been countering so effectively. It's

90:37

also struggling to set up consistent

90:39

aerial reconnaissance, the ISW reports.

90:42

And we haven't seen a single reversal of

90:44

any of the gains that Ukraine has made

90:46

over the last couple of months. Putin

90:48

has sent his best only to discover that

90:50

not even they are good enough to stop

90:52

the sweeping derusification that is

90:54

happening throughout Ukraine's southern

90:56

regions. But here's where things get

90:58

really serious for Putin. Even as he can

91:00

see his defenses crumbling in the south,

91:02

Putin is a man who sticks to the plan no

91:04

matter how ridiculous it has become.

91:07

That's what he has done with the spring

91:08

offensive as he has ordered his already

91:10

weakened forces to march against

91:12

Ukraine's defenses even as they're

91:14

losing ground in the south. Daesk is

91:17

still the main target, though Zaparisia

91:19

isn't far behind, and Russia's attempts

91:21

to push in those directions are leading

91:22

to even more records being broken.

91:25

Skyigh casualties are now being recorded

91:27

among the weakened Russian forces. And

91:29

these losses are climbing so high that

91:31

both Silinski and the Ukrainian armed

91:33

forces commander-in-chief, General

91:35

Alexander Syski, are claiming that

91:37

Russia's recruitment efforts aren't

91:39

strong enough to match the losses. We

91:41

just mentioned another record being

91:43

broken. On March 19th, the Telegraph

91:45

reported that Russia had lost 1,710

91:48

soldiers 2 days ago, which is the

91:50

largest single day casualty rate that

91:52

Russia has experienced in 2026 so far.

91:55

Ukraine's unmanned system forces played

91:57

a big role in this achievement as they

91:59

took out 900 of Putin's psies in about a

92:03

day and a half, the outlet adds.

92:05

Devastatingly for Putin, these massive

92:07

losses are the shorefire sign to Ukraine

92:09

that the spring offensive has officially

92:11

started. Russia isn't gaining massive

92:13

chunks of territory or unleashing a new

92:15

strategy that Ukraine never saw coming.

92:18

It's just feeding more of its cannon

92:19

foder into the meat grinder than it has

92:22

been over the last few months. And

92:23

Ukraine is happily chewing those Russian

92:25

soldiers up and spitting their mangled

92:27

remains right back into Putin's face.

92:30

This is all that Russia has, a manpower

92:32

focused strategy in which it sacrifices

92:35

soldiers for poultry gains. Countering

92:37

that strategy is Ukraine's, which is all

92:39

about targeted and intelligent moves

92:41

against Russia's weak embedded forces.

92:44

Ukraine is getting more back than it's

92:46

putting in. While Russia is losing

92:47

soldiers by the bucketload for

92:49

practically no real returns. It's not

92:52

like the record-breaking day was a

92:53

one-off for Putin's forces. Now comes

92:56

attrition for Putin's forces after

92:57

Ukraine spent the last 2 months pushing

93:00

them back and tearing through Russia's

93:02

reserves. According to another ISW

93:04

report, this one from March 23rd, Russia

93:07

lost 6,090 of its soldiers during the

93:10

four days between March 17th and March

93:12

20th. That's an average casualty rate of

93:15

1,520

93:17

per day. And it was the precursor to a

93:19

week beginning March 17th that saw

93:21

Ukraine inflict 8,710

93:24

casualties on Russia. This isn't

93:27

sustainable for Russia, but it's the

93:29

reality of the spring offensive.

93:31

Ukraine's campaign of derusification in

93:33

the southern regions of its territory

93:35

has been remarkably effective. Still,

93:37

Russia is trying to respond both on the

93:39

battlefield and to the stling shutdown

93:41

that we discussed earlier. Putin hopes

93:43

that we'll change everything, but he's

93:45

wrong. However, before we get into that,

93:47

this is why we make the military show to

93:49

explain how power really moves on the

93:51

battlefield. If you want to see more,

93:53

remember to subscribe to the channel.

93:55

Now, how is Russia trying to respond?

93:58

Well, on the Starling front, Russia is

93:59

attempting to create its own version of

94:01

the satellite system that SpaceX has

94:03

yanked out of its grip. According to a

94:05

March 24th report by the Center for

94:07

Eastern Studies, that the previous day

94:09

saw a Russian Sawyer 21B launch vehicle

94:12

carry 16 satellites that will be part of

94:14

the Rasvet low Earth orbit broadband

94:17

communication system Russia is trying to

94:19

create and orbit. The coming years will

94:21

see hundreds of these satellites being

94:23

launched, says Bureau 1440, which is the

94:25

company behind the system. But this

94:27

initiative has been in development since

94:29

2020, and not even hundreds of

94:31

satellites, never mind the 16 that

94:33

Russia just sent into space, are a match

94:35

for what Starling provided to Russian

94:37

forces. SpaceX's satellite constellation

94:40

is over 10,000 units strong, giving it

94:43

global coverage. Russia may argue that

94:45

it only needs to have coverage over

94:47

Ukraine's territory, but what we see

94:49

here is a feeble attempt to mimic a

94:51

communication system that is vastly

94:53

superior to this nassent Russian version

94:55

in every single way. Still, some

94:58

satellites are better than none at all

95:00

for Russia. They won't help the fact

95:02

that the Kremlin is banning the use of

95:03

Telegram on the front lines, which is

95:05

only feeding into the communications

95:07

issue that the loss of Starink created.

95:09

But those satellites will be there

95:11

providing internet access to Russian

95:13

troops who can't use that access in the

95:15

way that they need if they're to stand

95:17

any chance of making Russia's spring

95:19

offensive a success. Russia is also

95:21

attempting to put the gains that Ukraine

95:23

has made to the test. As Ukraine

95:25

continues to push forward on the back of

95:27

the momentum that it has built since

95:28

late January. The New York Times reports

95:31

that Russia is amassing troops at

95:32

locations that it believes will be key

95:34

to the spring and summer offensive. It

95:37

carries comments from a Ukrainian

95:39

commander in Zaparasia, Lieutenant

95:41

Colonel Vitali Guac, who says they are

95:44

massing in these places and want to push

95:46

us again. Putin's goal, it seems, is to

95:48

retake the land that Russia just lost to

95:51

Ukraine's sweeping liberations, allowing

95:53

it to re-rousify what has just been

95:55

dusified. And we're seeing something

95:58

similar happen in the Julopola

96:00

direction, which we mentioned earlier is

96:02

a region where Russia is building up its

96:04

forces. Those forces are now attacking

96:06

in greater volume than they have at any

96:08

other point during 2026. Syski confirmed

96:11

this, stating on March 15th that the

96:13

intensity of offensive operations in the

96:15

Julia polia area is significantly higher

96:18

compared with that in other sectors.

96:20

Pravda also confirmed these comments,

96:22

noting that the intensity of the

96:24

offensive actions in that particular

96:26

direction is higher than anywhere else

96:28

across the front lines. Julia is in the

96:31

Zaparisia oblast, so it's clear what

96:33

Russia is trying to achieve here based

96:35

on where the majority of Ukraine's

96:36

counterattacks have taken place in

96:38

February and March. RBC Ukraine adds

96:41

that the first 10 days of March saw

96:43

Russia's forces launch 1,400 assaults.

96:46

That's another indicator that the spring

96:48

offensive has begun, as the monthly

96:50

average was 1,800 between September 2025

96:53

and February 2026. If Russia continues

96:56

at this sort of rate, it will have

96:57

launched more than 4,200 assaults by the

97:01

end of March. It's like we said before,

97:03

Putin's only strategy is to push more

97:06

meat into the grinder. It is these

97:08

attempts by Russia to counter Ukraine's

97:10

derification of its territory that have

97:12

led to the massive casualty counts we've

97:14

seen in the days that followed the

97:15

launch of this new offensive. But for as

97:18

much as Putin is trying to force his

97:20

2026 plans to come to fruition, they're

97:22

destined to fail. Although Ukraine's

97:24

counteroffensive is a big enough problem

97:26

for Putin to deal with, behind it lies

97:28

several larger issues for which Russia

97:30

has no solution. The first is the

97:33

tactics that Putin is being forced to

97:34

use on the battlefield. Despite Russian

97:36

military bloggers screaming out for

97:38

Russia to switch away from the

97:39

infiltration tactics that it used for

97:41

much of 2025, the 2026 spring offensive

97:44

is being characterized by yet more

97:46

attempts to sneak small units of Russian

97:49

soldiers behind Ukraine's lines. Russia

97:51

has to take this approach because

97:52

Ukraine has filled the battlefield with

97:54

so many FPV drones that attempting

97:57

armored assaults using tanks and armored

97:59

vehicles is out of the question along

98:01

large portions of the front lines. These

98:03

slowmoving vehicles make easy targets

98:05

for Ukraine's drone operators. And

98:07

Russia is already dealing with having

98:09

lost over 11,800 of its tanks and 38,800

98:13

of its armored vehicles per Ukraine's

98:16

Ministry of Finance. Putin's forces were

98:18

already running out of equipment, and

98:20

with even more drones in the skies,

98:22

using what they have left is a fool's

98:24

errand. Infiltration may work in the

98:26

sense that it creates confusion behind

98:28

the combat lines. But if Russia is to

98:30

make any significant gain in 2026, it

98:33

has to introduce some armor into the

98:34

mix. The handful of troops sneaking into

98:36

poorly defended hideyholes behind the

98:38

lines only goes so far. It's this very

98:42

tactic that Ukraine has so successfully

98:44

turned on its head during its

98:45

counteroffensive. Yet Putin seems to

98:47

think that something that hasn't worked

98:49

anywhere near the scale that he needs it

98:51

to work is going to be the answer in

98:52

2026. It isn't. Ukraine will make sure

98:56

of it. And it'll do it by deploying yet

98:59

more of the FPV drones that we mentioned

99:01

a moment ago. As the Kev Independent

99:03

reported on December the 24th, Ukraine's

99:05

armed forces were on track to receive a

99:07

total of 3 million FPV drones by the end

99:10

of 2025. That gives you an indicator of

99:13

the sheer scale of the FPV drone army

99:16

that Ukraine has amassed to deal with

99:18

Russia's attempts to advance. And it

99:20

doesn't account for the long range

99:21

drones Ukraine uses to hit Russia or the

99:24

mid-range drones that it has introduced

99:25

into its arsenal to attack the Russian

99:27

near rear in the occupied territories.

99:30

This army of FPV drones has been used to

99:32

create lethal kill zones all across the

99:35

front lines, especially in the regions

99:36

that Russia wants to target with its

99:38

spring campaign. And by the way, Ukraine

99:41

pushing Russia's forces back as much as

99:42

they have over the last months offers

99:44

the benefit of being able to create

99:46

these kill zones in territory that

99:48

Russia thought it would be holding when

99:50

it launched its spring offensive. What

99:52

Ukraine does with these FPV drones is

99:54

force Putin's hand when it comes to the

99:56

infiltration strategy that he will be

99:58

using in 2026. The small Russian units

100:01

are trying to sneak through these kill

100:03

zones. Those who make it through may be

100:05

waiting around for support, but they're

100:07

not going to get anything substantial.

100:09

The kill zones cut Russia's infiltrators

100:11

off from the front lines, choking them

100:13

off from supplies, reinforcements, and

100:15

everything else that they might need to

100:17

hold the weak positions that they gain.

100:19

In the early months of 2026, we've seen

100:22

the result of Russia's approach. Ukraine

100:24

has been systematically destroying these

100:26

infiltrators as it derifies throughout

100:28

the South. So, the fact that Putin is

100:30

going to be relying on the same strategy

100:32

again this spring tells Ukraine that

100:34

Russia's leader has no new ideas.

100:37

Ukraine knows how to counter this

100:39

strategy. Record-breaking days and weeks

100:41

of Russian casualties in 2026 prove it.

100:44

And what this all means is that Putin's

100:46

spring offensive is collapsing before

100:48

it's even gotten off the ground. The ISW

100:51

says that the offensive certainly isn't

100:52

going to achieve what Putin really wants

100:54

in 2026. The Fortress Belt is going to

100:57

survive the year. the ISW says. And the

101:00

best that Putin can hope for this year

101:02

is a handful of tactical gains that will

101:04

come at a high cost to the Russian

101:06

military. Again, we're seeing an early

101:08

sign of what those costs might be from

101:10

the casualty figures that are starting

101:11

to come through at the beginning of the

101:13

spring offensive. Those casualties are

101:15

already causing Putin to get desperate.

101:18

According to RBC Ukraine, Putin may be

101:20

forced to deploy mobilized troops from

101:22

Crimea into Ukraine as early as April.

101:25

That's already an issue in the sense

101:26

that losing those mobilized forces in

101:28

Crimea means that Russia weakens its

101:30

position in the illegally annexed

101:32

peninsula. What this also tells us is

101:35

that Ukraine's campaign of

101:36

derusification has worked in the sense

101:38

that it forced Russia to burn through

101:40

soldiers that it intended to use as part

101:43

of the spring offensive. Those soldiers

101:45

are now gone and the territory they held

101:47

is back in Ukraine's hands. Russia has

101:49

also lost thousands of soldiers in the

101:51

early stages of the spring offensive and

101:53

it may have even lost elite spetznaz

101:55

operatives in the south. Ukraine has

101:58

been steamrolling Russia's forces for 2

102:00

months. Now we're starting to see the

102:02

results of that play out as the Russian

102:04

spring offensive has gotten off to such

102:06

a stumbling start that it's not even out

102:08

of the blocks yet. Another huge

102:10

contributor to all of this is that

102:12

Ukraine has developed the ability to

102:13

strike deeper into the occupied

102:15

territories, which is wrecking Russia's

102:17

command centers and military nodes. The

102:19

middle strike drones are flying, and as

102:21

Russia's elite drone unit, Rubicon,

102:23

discovered, they're dangerous and

102:25

destructive. Find out more in our video.

102:27

And if you enjoyed this video, make sure

102:28

you're subscribed to the Military Show

102:30

so you catch more of our coverage of the

102:32

Ukraine war.

Interactive Summary

The video discusses Ukraine's successful "derussification" campaign, focusing on its strategic advances in the southeast and its impact on Russia's military capabilities. It highlights Ukraine's effective use of "gray zones" to reclaim territory and expel Russian influence, with key victories in settlements like Tanova. The analysis points to a significant communication breakdown within the Russian military, exacerbated by issues like the Starlink shutdown and restrictions on Telegram, leading to disarray and operational failures. The video also emphasizes Ukraine's innovative tactics, particularly the extensive use of drones and its growing capabilities in electronic warfare, which have resulted in high Russian casualties and a slowdown of their offensive operations. Furthermore, it touches upon Ukraine's broader efforts to shed Russian influence, both militarily and culturally, and its emerging role as a significant military power capable of assisting allies. The narrative culminates in portraying Ukraine as gaining momentum and effectively countering Russia's plans, turning what was meant to be a decisive year for Russia into one of significant setbacks.

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