HomeVideos

Thomas Laffont | All-In Summit 2024

Now Playing

Thomas Laffont | All-In Summit 2024

Transcript

1075 segments

0:00

kotou is one of the most successful

0:01

hedge funds of the last two

0:03

decades the largest startup Fund in the

0:06

world right

0:07

now they are very

0:10

discreet started with $50 million and

0:12

now you're managing roughly 50 billion

0:14

from C to Thomas

0:18

leant what separates the truly

0:20

exceptional companies is to realize that

0:22

actually sales and product are different

0:24

sides of the same coin there was a

0:26

Confluence of trends that made us feel

0:28

like we needed to be president the

0:30

valley the reason we decided to kind of

0:32

get into this business is to find great

0:35

entrepreneurs and find great

0:36

[Music]

0:43

companies all right thank you everybody

0:46

um so my name is Thomas I work at CO2

0:50

I've been a day one listener of the

0:51

all-in podcast so when they called me

0:54

and they said would you be willing to

0:55

present I said you know absolutely tell

0:57

me

0:58

when then they told me well you're going

1:00

to have the graveyard shift the absolute

1:02

last slot I said I can handle it no

1:07

problem then they said by the way we are

1:09

going to put Mark Benny off the goat of

1:11

enterprise software right before

1:14

you the return of TK and some guy who

1:18

figured out how to fix

1:25

aging I still got

1:28

it and the reason is because what I know

1:31

is that to me the besties are a

1:33

band and they have what all great bands

1:36

have which is number one is they have

1:39

talent but number two they have

1:41

chemistry and you can't teach either but

1:43

you need both to be great and they're

1:46

great but also like all bands we know

1:49

they like to have new albums and

1:52

experiment with new producers in a new

1:55

sound so I think we've heard a lot about

1:57

the new sound it could be geopolitics or

2:00

free speech and look I know those are

2:02

important

2:03

issues but being a day one listener I

2:06

love the old album the first tracks we

2:09

ever

2:10

heard to me those are the ones that Will

2:12

Go On The Greatest Hit album and so I

2:16

knew that if I came I would bring you

2:18

back to the old days and to me

2:26

um I love the new stuff too don't get me

2:29

wrong but it's fun to play some of the

2:30

classics and what I love so much is

2:34

listening to each bestie give their

2:36

point of view about Venture Capital

2:38

about IPOs about technology and

2:44

so what I aim to do here is a bit kind

2:47

of level set on the conversation and

2:49

they'll join me afterwards and lucky me

2:52

I get to jam with the band for a bit so

2:54

um all right so let's dive in I hope

2:56

that this presentation kind of informs a

2:58

little bit about what we see in the

3:01

Unicorn economy so let's start at the

3:05

top let's just look kind of at funding

3:07

and what we can see in this slide is

3:09

that funding is still actually pretty

3:11

healthy now it's normalized post a covid

3:14

bubble but it's still if you compare it

3:16

to historical averages it's still quite

3:20

healthy but if we look at exits which is

3:23

Define of the cash that's returned we

3:25

see a bit of a different story where

3:28

actually we're at pre

3:30

levels Without Really any substantial

3:33

increases since all of the capital that

3:36

went into during

3:39

Co and one of the main reasons for that

3:42

is that the three kind of traditional

3:44

exits for companies are blocked

3:47

today so if you look at private equity

3:50

for example very um sensitive to

3:53

interest rates and so there's been kind

3:55

of fewer buyouts despite record amounts

3:57

of dry powder for that asset

4:01

class if we look at IPOs well we're

4:03

going to dig deeper into that peel the

4:05

onion a little bit so I'll talk about

4:06

IPOs in a minute and since um your know

4:10

political issues have been so present

4:11

here we know that regulator has had a

4:14

major impact on company's ability to buy

4:18

other

4:19

companies ironically and I think

4:21

somewhat perversely one of the

4:24

byproducts of constraining big companies

4:26

from buying small companies is it hurts

4:28

small companies

4:31

first of all it makes them less valuable

4:33

because if an investor you think that

4:34

big companies can't buy small companies

4:36

anymore you may adjust what you think

4:38

that company's

4:39

worth but to me even more importantly

4:42

small companies can create a true sense

4:44

of urgency in big companies if you're

4:47

sitting at Amazon or Google and you're

4:49

meeting these small companies now you

4:52

don't have to worry about your

4:53

competitor buying that company because

4:55

you know that the government will make

4:56

it really hard that gives you time

5:00

and we think that urgency is really

5:02

important so we certainly hope that

5:05

whoever wins uh the election they will

5:07

rethink this strategy because we think

5:10

it's really important to have a healthy

5:12

ecosystem and m&a is a really big part

5:15

of

5:17

that so if you put all of that together

5:20

you see that in fact you wouldn't be

5:22

surprised by this chart which shows that

5:24

the distributions from VCS back to their

5:27

investors are essentially at alltime

5:29

lows

5:30

almost back to um Financial kind of

5:32

Crisis

5:35

levels so if you think about our

5:37

industry is a business now and we looked

5:39

at the cash flow statement of the

5:41

Venture Capital industry it probably

5:43

wouldn't look too

5:44

good we've raised a lot of

5:47

money and we've given very little back

5:49

we are bleeding cash as an industry and

5:52

it's ironic because many of us as

5:54

investors have told on companies they

5:56

need to get fit they need to generate

5:58

cash

6:00

but we as an industry haven't done that

6:05

yet so what's left well what's left

6:08

actually is still a very substantial

6:11

economy what we call kind of the Unicorn

6:14

economy there's about 1,500

6:17

companies by our count that are private

6:21

companies with a last round of greater

6:24

than a

6:25

billion Gavin Baker who's another great

6:28

investor who I follow actually came out

6:30

with a statistic that said there's more

6:32

private companies in

6:34

Tech that are worth more than a billion

6:37

than public

6:38

ones which is kind of an incredible

6:40

statement to kind of think

6:44

about on top of that if we just kind of

6:47

look at um employee growth which I kind

6:51

of think is a decent proxy for how this

6:53

ecosystem is doing we can see that there

6:56

has been a significant slowdown post

7:00

the digital uh transformation of Co and

7:04

you can see that employee growth and by

7:06

the way this is

7:07

xai um which is an important statement

7:10

and we'll get to AI in a bit but you can

7:12

see that basically the lowest levels of

7:13

employee growth for this cohort um you

7:17

know in almost 15

7:21

years that obviously also impacts their

7:25

financing so if you look at the average

7:27

company in kind of a um preco era they

7:31

would tend to raise around generally

7:34

less than 600 days and Bridge rounds and

7:38

down rounds were about 30% of the total

7:41

rounds well in today's market you can

7:43

see something very different you can see

7:45

that it's now greater than 100 days and

7:49

you can see that the mix of down rounds

7:51

and Bridge rounds as a percent of total

7:52

rounds is up to almost

7:56

63% so even when they do get a financing

7:58

the financing

8:00

look very

8:03

different and so if you look at what

8:05

that means on a cohort basis and this is

8:07

one of my favorite charts because I

8:09

think it kind of tells the story of this

8:11

era in one slide you can see that the

8:14

2016 cohort the way to interpret this is

8:16

the 2016 cohort which is the top slide

8:20

the green line after about 13 quarters

8:24

80% had either raised the new round or

8:27

exited

8:29

so

8:31

80% you can see that in the 2021 cohort

8:34

that number is down almost in

8:36

half so significantly below and if you

8:40

see at the 22 cohort which is the most

8:43

recent cohort that we track because

8:44

obviously you need to give companies at

8:46

least a year to make the analysis useful

8:49

you can see that those companies are

8:50

tracking even below the 21

8:56

cohort now we can't BL blame the public

9:00

markets you know the NASDAQ is at almost

9:02

an all-time

9:04

high the NASDAQ has had a

9:07

massive uh

9:11

performance but the index doesn't tell

9:14

the whole story and I think we need to

9:16

kind of go one layer below to really

9:18

kind of understand what's going

9:20

on so if you look at the recovery which

9:23

is the piece that I kind of focus on

9:25

since Co you can see that the index

9:26

actually had very strong performance

9:29

right up almost

9:31

122% right since

9:35

2019 but if you look at the two buckets

9:37

that I've

9:38

highlighted which I've kind of created

9:40

two unprofitable Tech is one and SAS is

9:43

the other the reason that I chose those

9:45

two is I think that they best mirror

9:47

potentially the Unicorn economy in the

9:49

private markets you can see actually

9:52

that those are down the most from the co

9:55

high and have recovered the least since

9:59

20

10:00

2019 significantly kind of trailing the

10:04

index now you might say look this is a

10:06

bunch of really bad companies so it

10:08

makes sense my argument to you was be

10:10

there's incredible companies in this

10:12

cohort and I've just picked

10:14

three but let's look at these three door

10:16

Dash block and Shopify three incredible

10:19

entrepreneurs Tony from door Dash Jack

10:22

from block and Toby from Shopify you can

10:25

see that these companies have incredible

10:28

scale if you just look at the um the gmv

10:32

and the

10:32

revenues you can see that over this

10:35

period of time they got significantly

10:36

more

10:38

profitable but you can see that on a PE

10:41

basis the multiple shrank

10:44

significantly and the growth just wasn't

10:46

fast

10:47

enough to kind of offset the lower

10:53

multiple now if we look at IPOs this

10:55

chart basically one way to look at it is

10:59

of all of the IPOs since

11:02

2020 if you look at the value created or

11:05

destroyed from their IPO price you can

11:07

see it as as a

11:09

cohort we've destroyed almost 225

11:12

billion in market cap offset by the

11:15

value creation of 84 so net negative as

11:19

a

11:22

cohort this slide every time I look at

11:25

it I still quite can't believe what it

11:27

says so we had to quadruple

11:30

the facts but it is the fact is that

11:32

since

11:33

2022 both in 22 23 and 24 we had fewer

11:39

IPOs than in 2008 and 2009 the depths of

11:43

the financial crisis in 2001 and 2002

11:46

post the

11:48

greatest bubble in history in

11:51

Tech I mean I remember in 2008 you know

11:55

sitting at my desk and we would get

11:57

reports that Morgan Stanley and Goldman

11:58

Sachs were going out of business that's

12:00

how dire those times were there were

12:02

still more IPOs in that environment than

12:04

in today's

12:11

environment so I was talking yesterday

12:13

to um a late stage uh

12:17

founder very large valuation a very kind

12:20

of well-known company and he was asking

12:22

for the difference between private

12:24

investors and public investors and what

12:27

I told them is I said by and large your

12:29

private investors only compare you to

12:32

companies that are very similar to Yours

12:34

by which I mean if you're a venture

12:35

investor you look at a Silicon Valley um

12:39

uh named fund back company and you

12:41

compare it probably to another company

12:44

backed by another Silicon Valley fund

12:46

Etc and you try and pick the best as you

12:49

see fit from those types of

12:51

companies very similar to

12:54

yours but the public markets work really

12:57

differently and it's really important to

12:59

understand for CEOs that public markets

13:01

have

13:04

options those investors may look at the

13:06

risk-free rate 5% to be able to earn

13:09

with literally no risk

13:12

whatsoever they may look at depending on

13:15

how you want to bucket it the

13:17

Magnificent 6 or seven these are the

13:19

largest companies in the world

13:21

incredible businesses with cosos like

13:24

Mark Zuckerberg and you get to own that

13:26

cohort at a pretty cheap earnings

13:29

multiple for companies that even at the

13:32

trillion dollar scale are growing in

13:35

excess of

13:36

15% pretty

13:38

amazing oh and on top of that there's a

13:40

new type of company the AI

13:44

company and those companies are growing

13:46

at incredible scale and they're growing

13:48

sometimes at 50 60 or

13:51

100% And you get to back a Founder like

13:54

Jensen at Nvidia who many people don't

13:56

know but is the longest tenear founder

13:58

CEO in Silicon

14:01

Valley and I can also buy those

14:03

companies at pretty reasonable earnings

14:07

multiples and finally just in case you

14:09

think oh I'm only talking about big

14:11

companies you actually get to buy also

14:14

an incredible set of smaller companies

14:17

we just had Travis on from Uber but

14:19

whether it's door Das or instacart or

14:21

block you can see that even great new

14:23

companies like those are available at

14:26

pretty reasonable multiples

14:30

so it's really important for CEOs to

14:32

understand who is the competition for

14:34

the capital that you're trying to

14:39

raise and the public market can be tough

14:42

and this is one of those moments where

14:44

the public market is tough because what

14:45

essentially the public market is telling

14:48

you is that we want it

14:51

all we want you to be profitable we

14:53

talked about that

14:55

already we want you to grow so you have

14:58

to be in a big market and have a big

15:00

Trend but by the way we also want you to

15:02

have

15:05

scale that's a lot to ask

15:09

for but the good news is within this

15:12

cohort of unicorns we've already

15:14

identified a good list of companies

15:16

we're lucky to be investors I think in

15:18

about eight or nine of them that match

15:21

that

15:22

criteria and I think all of these

15:25

companies on this slide will one day

15:27

make for incredible public

15:36

companies so what it make of all this

15:39

well I kind of wanted to end uh I only

15:42

have two charts left but I wanted to

15:43

kind of end on this chart um this chart

15:47

is from Andrew McAfee who has an

15:49

incredible substack which I encourage

15:51

all of you to

15:54

follow what this chart looks at is it

15:57

looks at the average

16:00

age of the top 50 US public

16:04

companies weighted by market

16:07

cap okay so average age of the top 50 US

16:12

companies by market cap so what do we

16:14

see in this chart and by the way he goes

16:17

back to 1926 it's hard to get data that

16:19

goes back to 1926 believe me we

16:22

tried so what this shows actually is you

16:25

can look from 1926 through to almost the

16:27

late 80s

16:29

the biggest companies are the oldest

16:32

companies and they keep getting older

16:34

which means that the biggest chance of

16:36

you becoming a big company was to have

16:38

been a big company in the

16:40

past so you can see that that kind of

16:43

can

16:44

atrophy but it doesn't take a

16:47

mathematician which I'm not to see that

16:49

something kind of happens in the let's

16:51

call it mid

16:53

90s the average age starts to reverse

16:57

what happened

16:59

technology

17:01

happened technology is the great

17:04

resetter of the business World it can

17:07

take an incredible company and turn it

17:09

into dust just ask Blackberry or Nokia

17:13

or other companies that have been on the

17:14

wrong side of a

17:16

trend and what you see in this chart is

17:19

you can see that actually the past 25

17:20

years have been really good for young

17:23

companies which is why another inverse

17:26

way of looking at it is what is the

17:28

average founder year of that cohort of

17:30

companies and you can see that that

17:31

cohort of companies is getting

17:33

younger so the reason why I'm still an

17:35

incredible optimist about our industry

17:38

and about technology is because

17:40

technology is still the most disruptive

17:43

force and we haven't even talked about

17:45

Ai and robots and all of the incredible

17:48

things that are kind of

17:51

happening so I kind of wanted to put it

17:53

all together and kind of use the

17:55

concrete examples um this is one of my

17:58

favorite charts what this shows is the

18:00

valuation of two companies that are kind

18:02

of competing with each

18:04

other um their Enterprise data companies

18:07

they make essentially a way to store

18:08

data in the

18:10

cloud so you can see the blue line is

18:12

snowflake it's a public company today

18:14

and you can see that the red line is

18:16

data

18:17

bricks and it's kind of interesting to

18:19

see what do we take from this chart

18:22

while we can see okay a lot of

18:23

volatility in the public markets

18:25

valuation going up then down kind of a

18:29

rise in the private

18:31

Market but there's other ways to kind of

18:33

look at this you can see that data

18:34

bricks there's been a lot of talk of

18:36

founder mode right the the besties

18:37

talked about it on the podcast last week

18:40

data bricks is a founder-led company

18:42

snowflake was more of a managerial Le

18:45

company maybe that's one way to kind of

18:47

interpret what happened maybe another is

18:49

to say if you're a public company and

18:51

you need to be profitable for your

18:53

shareholders and your biggest competitor

18:55

is private and can incinerate and burn a

18:57

lot of money maybe makes a difference

19:00

though when I mentioned to Ali the co of

19:02

data breaks that I was um using this

19:05

chart he told me please remind the

19:07

audience that I'm growing in excess of

19:09

60% so I put

19:11

that that while I'm burning money I'm

19:14

actually getting much more efficient so

19:16

I said that I would obviously say that

19:18

and he also gave me a a non-public data

19:20

point around his Cloud business which is

19:22

now 500 million of a RR which was almost

19:25

zero a few years

19:27

ago so I kind of Lent to in on that

19:30

because I think that um what I love the

19:32

most about technology and markets is you

19:35

can't be

19:37

complacent you always have to stay on

19:40

the um on your toes and part of why I

19:43

love the podcast so much is it always

19:44

makes me rethink my assumptions and I'm

19:46

really grateful um to the besties for

19:49

that so with that I think they'll come

19:51

on and we'll chat about this and I think

19:54

all the other topics that you guys want

19:56

to talk

19:57

about wow

19:59

thank you so much for that that was

20:00

amazing than con gra you thanks brother

20:03

that was great thank you J moth uh sent

20:06

someone to Sax's house to steal

20:09

Wine Not Ste did you go to which seller

20:12

did you go to the secret seller or the

20:14

the seller the main seller the main

20:17

seller or the house seller which one

20:18

they they know not to go to any other

20:20

seller but the the Reser the real seller

20:22

the real seller I think probably the

20:24

best moment that you and sax had around

20:27

wine was

20:28

he poured a wine at a poker game that

20:31

you did not like and I kid you not Troth

20:34

took his

20:36

glass it and went like this and poured

20:41

it on the floor in David Sax's house

20:44

when was that really we weren't outside

20:47

on the lawn this was in Sax's living

20:50

room honestly stop stop the that

20:52

happen or not I'm going to get from Nat

20:54

for that story it was in my basement

20:57

poker basement and it was not we're it

20:59

was not an in is not a typical basement

21:02

you shouldn't use that term but there

21:03

was no rug this was a marble floor to be

21:05

clear not true wherever m is it could be

21:08

clean it was more like okay Thomas let

21:10

me ask you a question

21:12

um actually after that oh my God stop

21:15

thas what happened after guys we got we

21:17

got on Jam raided my wine seller and

21:20

found all the latash oh he did that's

21:22

right oh my God that is true and then I

21:24

yeah CU you hit it I think they went

21:26

through uh a case lash yeah start to

21:29

come out don't stop on my behalf sit

21:31

here all day let's talk let's talk to

21:34

Tom just so if you invested in the cues

21:37

in the NASDAQ and held it for 10 years

21:40

you make

21:41

7.5x um this is a couple months old if

21:44

you invest in the top 10 by market cap

21:46

companies in the queue you make 8.7 so

21:49

9x if you invest in the S&P over 10

21:51

years you make

21:53

3.2x um and sorry sorry if you invested

21:57

in the um yeah I'm sorry that was

21:59

incorrect if you invest in the top 10 of

22:00

the cues you make 8.7x and if you invest

22:02

in the cues you make 5.2 so 5x 9x why

22:06

would I invest in Venture at all as an

22:08

Institutional Investor is and is that

22:11

going to shift because you have to be in

22:13

basically the

22:14

top two funds five funds to beat the

22:18

returns you make just by buying an index

22:20

of the NASDAQ and how how do

22:23

institutional investors rationalize

22:25

investing in Venture funds at all given

22:28

how much much value is acing to public

22:30

companies in technology versus the

22:32

private companies have you tried the

22:33

mtet

22:35

Thomas just te up a softy for me right

22:37

to to te me off

22:39

um first I ask myself that question all

22:42

the time right and because we sit in

22:45

both public and private markets we bit

22:46

have this unique ability to kind of look

22:48

at both and try and use one to make

22:51

better decisions than the other I think

22:53

what's implicit in your question is is

22:55

what happen has happened over the next

22:57

decade going to happen over the next one

22:59

yes right because I also remember a time

23:02

where um and I think this was roughly

23:05

call it the 2010 period where Google was

23:08

like flat for seven or eight years right

23:10

um from like 07 to I think the next

23:13

seven or eight years right and that's

23:15

how the market was digesting Facebook

23:17

and kind of things like that so I think

23:19

the question you have to ask yourself is

23:21

we have now multiple multi-trillion doll

23:24

companies right um three trillion doll

23:27

companies with app and Nvidia are those

23:30

companies going to 10

23:32

trillion um and so you know to me it's

23:35

not necess as obvious maybe it was

23:37

obvious you know 10 years ago and we all

23:40

should not have invested in Venture 10

23:42

years ago because we should have just

23:43

owned Apple and Google and meta and

23:47

others you know the question is as

23:49

investors we get paid to think about the

23:50

next decade right and so I think the

23:53

question for you know all of us and is

23:56

well what do we think's going to happen

23:57

in the next decade

23:58

and to me it's not as clear just because

24:01

those big companies are so big now right

24:05

um is are we going to see the same

24:06

pattern occur I mean sometimes law of

24:08

large numbers and other things like that

24:10

would say no there's another I think

24:12

part of this which is when you

24:15

invest you have to get some risk premium

24:18

for where you're investing and you know

24:21

the the complicated thing with Ventures

24:23

when I started my business I think when

24:25

David and Jason started his actually

24:27

also when you started

24:29

um your investment

24:32

business we typically thought 7 to 10

24:34

years were going to get out of these

24:35

businesses and return Capital to

24:37

shareholders and then all of a sudden

24:38

it's doubled and now to your point you

24:42

have wars in Europe you have wars in the

24:45

Middle East you have this potential

24:47

thing sort of Damocles hanging over us

24:49

in China and Taiwan there's risk

24:52

everywhere and theoretically what is

24:55

supposed to happen is you're supposed to

24:57

get paid a risk premium to be IL liquid

24:59

and not be able to get out over periods

25:02

of time where any of that stuff could

25:03

happen right so how does that start to

25:06

play into the mindset of the investor

25:07

that was giving all this money in the

25:09

first place how does that change you

25:11

know it's a great question I was talking

25:13

to one of the partners of a leading

25:15

seriesa firm a brand name that that all

25:17

of you would know and what was

25:19

interesting about their business is that

25:21

buying large their average funds were

25:23

were doing the same but the problem is

25:25

at the time liquidity had doubled and so

25:28

if if you just think about it on an irr

25:29

basis all of a sudden I'm down half half

25:32

right yeah so that's a huge problem and

25:36

I think part of the reason I kind of

25:39

wanted to to to bring this up is I do

25:41

think it's a problem that we need to

25:44

kind of address as an industry and I

25:45

think it starts with boards and it

25:46

starts with Founders right and investors

25:50

I was chatting with Bill Gurley um you

25:52

know in the green room before and he he

25:55

told me he said well look Thomas you

25:56

know you're you guys are part of the

25:57

problem kind of doing this and I said

26:00

you're right you're absolutely right we

26:02

contributed to it interrupt what what

26:03

did he mean by that that we were giving

26:05

liquidity to uh secondaries and Founders

26:09

and you know companies that should be

26:12

public by giving them private Capital we

26:14

were essentially enabling them to stay

26:16

private longer making the problem worse

26:18

correct is that true yes but if that

26:21

were true wouldn't wouldn't value

26:23

creation acre to those private companies

26:25

and the performance of can I just go

26:27

back and just add a Nuance to that but I

26:30

said Bill realize that also you guys are

26:32

also part of the problem because you're

26:34

on the boards that are also letting this

26:35

kind of happen right so we have as an

26:39

ecosystem right I don't think like to me

26:42

the IPO chart is kind of an existential

26:45

one for our industry right I mean if we

26:47

don't get these companies to go

26:49

public um in my

26:52

opinion we are um as an industry going

26:55

to have to face really hard questions

26:56

with the ultimate funders of of our

26:58

industry who by the way are not our

27:00

funds but are the investors in our funds

27:03

right and eventually they are going to

27:05

demand from us right um Capital back

27:08

well sorry Tom and Thomas just to build

27:10

on your point it's actually not even

27:12

those nameless faceless people because

27:13

so much of that money for example in

27:15

Sovereign wealth funds and Pension funds

27:17

theoretically come from these citizens

27:19

who will at some point need the money

27:21

because all of these other existential

27:23

issues that they're dealing with and so

27:25

these these pension systems and others

27:27

will really have to just

27:28

justify um while you know they say I'm

27:31

going to swing for the fences here to

27:32

make up for my deficits but with those

27:34

deficits aren't actually made up and

27:36

you've paid 2% a year for 13 years and

27:39

you burned through a quarter of your

27:41

capital in fees and you have nothing to

27:42

show for it the jig is going to be up I

27:45

think I mean that's totally right and

27:48

look I think it's going to be um my

27:51

biggest other fear you guys can tell I

27:53

have a lot of fears so um but my other

27:56

one good investor yes

27:58

is that we're creating a worst cohort of

28:00

companies because of this right because

28:02

at the end of the day I do believe that

28:05

you guys all sit on a tons of boards

28:07

right I do think that it can be I think

28:10

part of why the all-in podcast got so

28:12

popular is there was a sense that you

28:14

guys were saying to uh the public what

28:17

people were afraid to say in public or

28:20

what actually you were saying Behind

28:22

Closed do right and I think it can be

28:24

very difficult in boards to go against a

28:27

founder or a CEO even just propose

28:31

something a different path right you

28:33

know the high school I went to San high

28:35

school in Brooklyn had a a sign above

28:37

the the door when we walked in every

28:39

morning the truth shall make you free

28:42

and I think a big part of what we have

28:44

to realize in an industry is staying

28:46

private and giving the founders massive

28:49

amounts of secondary not modest modest

28:51

we all agree um and keeping these P

28:54

companies public too long um and then

28:56

private too long uh

28:58

you know it's just bad hygiene and bad

29:00

discipline allowing Founders or telling

29:03

Founders the VCS are the enemies like

29:06

Paul Graham essentially does um saying

29:09

governance isn't cool um you know most

29:12

of the companies I've invested when they

29:13

fail and they don't have governance say

29:15

to me if only somebody cared enough to

29:18

help us solve our problems and I say

29:20

well remember I said would you like to

29:22

start board meetings quarterly for one

29:24

hour and I'll come to it and they said

29:26

yeah and we got advice from people don't

29:27

have board Mee me ings you know at some

29:29

point we have to have discipline and we

29:32

have to accept the truth and the truth

29:34

is you know on a on a societal level 40%

29:38

of the country does not own equities and

29:40

they believe that everybody's getting

29:42

rich but them and they're voting for

29:44

socialism and they're voting to not let

29:46

these companies merge and grow which is

29:48

now going to freeze the system and if

29:50

the system freezes because of Lina KH

29:52

who was picked on a strictly political

29:55

basis because she's anti-tech and

29:57

because that gets votes from a bunch of

29:59

socialist voters uh who feel

30:01

disenfranchised now we got to solve the

30:03

disenfranchised problem um but we also

30:06

have to create jobs and we have to

30:08

create the next companies and I I

30:10

encourage people who maybe who are

30:13

anti-tech who are anti- capitalism to

30:14

imagine a world in which we didn't have

30:17

Google Apple Tesla Facebook Microsoft

30:21

Uber door Dash as our companies in our

30:25

country and you know what that looks

30:26

like that looks like Europe and that

30:28

looks incredibly slow growth and and it

30:30

looks like all the growth comes from

30:31

government ask question yeah and I know

30:34

but I mean we have to be adults in the

30:35

room here and tell the truth age I'd

30:37

like to ask Thomas a question

30:39

before I'm sorry it's the montet talking

30:43

clearly I mean it's amazing I think you

30:46

bring up something that again is

30:47

something that it's the quiet part said

30:49

out loud which is maybe we have this

30:50

cultural issue and I actually have a lot

30:53

of empathy for where this cultural issue

30:55

came from your seoa and you've done it a

30:59

certain way but then now you're andreon

31:01

or your Social Capital your craft you

31:03

have to decide how you're going to

31:04

disrupt and you say the thing that the

31:06

other person is not

31:08

saying but then it the it just gets out

31:10

of

31:11

control what do we do to fix the problem

31:15

um how do we collectively identify a set

31:19

of solutions what do we do I I think to

31:22

me the the most obvious is we have to

31:24

take our companies public because to

31:26

your point Jason the public market is

31:29

the great

31:30

disinfectant the public market doesn't

31:33

care that you're a CEO and you're going

31:34

to give a referral to the other investor

31:36

and so you have to become friends and

31:38

you know that whole thing or the brand

31:40

of your investor is X or your prior

31:42

company did y you know at the end of the

31:44

day the public market will look at your

31:46

business and so I think encouraging

31:50

entrepreneurs to go public is really

31:52

important right let me ask you a

31:54

question the traditional go model is an

31:56

IPO you raise capital and you list your

32:00

shares at the same time those are two

32:02

separate activities people don't realize

32:04

they're actually separate your Shares

32:05

are available for sale on a public

32:07

market and you're raising capital in the

32:09

process and you create demand through

32:11

the capital raising process such that

32:12

your shares will go up as they start to

32:14

trade the model of the direct listing is

32:16

you just list your shares they start

32:18

trading they're going to go up they're

32:20

going to go down we've seen a couple of

32:21

these in the past few years they're like

32:23

as soon as it hits the market it goes

32:24

down it goes up and but the market

32:26

values the company once the company's

32:28

been valued and the market stable maybe

32:30

then you raise Capital at whatever the

32:32

market tells you the valuation is

32:33

however there is a very big aversion to

32:36

direct listings in Silicon Valley and it

32:39

seems like there's either a failure of

32:40

the business or it's one of these

32:41

businesses that are such an outlier of

32:43

success that it doesn't matter they're

32:44

like I don't care I'll just direct list

32:46

should direct listings become the kind

32:48

of deao model because otherwise everyone

32:50

talks about the IPO window being closed

32:52

the big institutional investors that

32:53

build the IPO book are all sitting on

32:55

the sidelines right now they're like I'm

32:56

not investing in any new stuff for a

32:58

quarter or two quarters so the IPO

32:59

windows closed and you can't go public

33:01

should we not kind of push all up

33:03

Silicon Valley that like this direct

33:05

listing might be a better model and I

33:07

know some have tried to motivate this

33:10

this transition but it's why isn't it

33:11

gotten legs and is it a better way so

33:15

what I would say to that and trath you

33:16

you kind of hit on this with some of the

33:19

work that you've done here but I do

33:21

think that the recipy to go public is

33:22

different first of all I can tell you is

33:24

i' you know we've looked at buying IPOs

33:26

over 20 years I mean probably thousands

33:29

of them we couldn't care less whether

33:30

it's a traditional IPO or whether it's

33:34

um a direct listing like we care about

33:36

the business and the price and the

33:38

mechanics are completely irrelevant to

33:39

us right um so that's kind of number one

33:42

but I do think Founders have to

33:44

understand that the public market itself

33:45

has changed okay being an active

33:48

investor in the public market over 20

33:50

years has been a really bad business we

33:53

are fighting the machines first of all

33:56

right so uh Ken Griff Citadel

33:59

Renaissance you know all of these you

34:01

know quants and algorithms and that's

34:03

number one we're fighting the indices

34:06

right massive move away from active

34:08

investing to passive so being in the

34:11

quote money management business I mean

34:13

just look at the chart of tro price and

34:15

others it's not been a great business so

34:18

the public business has changed and I

34:21

think why is this relevant to Founders

34:23

because I think there's another big

34:24

constituency that's really important as

34:26

an example retail

34:28

right and so if you can tap into a

34:30

retail investor base and convince a

34:32

retail base that your business is

34:34

worthwhile that's maybe something that

34:36

20 years ago you might have said I don't

34:37

think that's a good use of time I think

34:39

this year is a really good use of time

34:42

so going on podcasts right going on CNBC

34:45

going out and educating the public about

34:47

your business so that you're not just

34:49

relying on a frankly shrinking pool of

34:52

investors in the public market I

34:54

remember when I started in the late '

34:57

90s early 2000s you had small cap mutual

34:59

funds in Kansas City and other places

35:02

their whole business you may remember

35:04

was taking small companies and bringing

35:06

them to the public market those they're

35:08

gone today they're gone today there

35:10

there's none left right so we need to

35:14

adapt and I think those are the

35:15

conversations that we need to be having

35:17

I hope that some of the companies that

35:18

we listed right you guys know these

35:20

companies you're investors in a bunch of

35:22

them they're generational opportunities

35:24

I hope some of those kind of go public

35:27

right and that we kind of get the do

35:29

think I just want to build on this um it

35:32

is one of the most systematically broken

35:34

things and just even be more specific

35:36

what happens in Silicon Valley

35:38

boardrooms is you have folks that are

35:42

playing a very establishment Insider

35:44

game and whenever I see that I I just

35:47

get offended just at at a core level and

35:50

it's about a certain set of Banks and

35:53

it's about a certain set of Privileges

35:55

and conferences and it's a cabal of

35:57

and this is what convinces

36:00

these very impressionable people all

36:03

kinds of spirous data to say what it is

36:07

that they want which is not that the

36:09

company goes public or not public but

36:12

that they have ball control to help them

36:15

influence that decision and that's the

36:17

game and you can look at all the major

36:19

investment Banks and that's how the game

36:20

was played and every time there's been

36:23

an attempt at an innovation people push

36:26

back severely the the most impressive

36:28

one that I remember I mean I was part of

36:30

one version of that just a few years ago

36:33

with these backs they had a very

36:34

checkered obviously set of outcomes um

36:38

but it was courageous to try and the and

36:40

when I remember I worked with credit s

36:43

when I was launching this first one the

36:45

reason I picked credit s you know why

36:47

because they were the ones that were

36:48

totally blackballed in 2004 for doing

36:51

the Google listing and do you know why

36:52

what Google did they completely pushed

36:54

back on the IPO they completely restruct

36:57

red it from first principles they

36:59

decided how to do it and when I looked

37:01

at it and I read the filing documents I

37:03

was like this is courageous and

37:05

incredible because if other people

37:07

follow this it'll unlock money but what

37:10

happened to that whole model people put

37:12

it on the side and they were like if you

37:14

go to credit s this will happen that

37:16

will happen so the infrastructure pushes

37:19

back on you so I think part of what we

37:21

need to do is make people open to

37:24

realize direct listings work now for

37:26

example I went through a direct listing

37:28

with

37:28

slack what we did not learn is that the

37:32

best price is the day one price so if

37:34

you have investor pressure the thing

37:36

that I should have done it was a

37:37

probably a$ 1.2 billion $1.24 billion

37:41

mistake I know it because I distributed

37:43

too late I should have sold every

37:46

share I didn't know that it was very

37:48

hard to know that so I think the point

37:51

is that there is this system of weird

37:53

incentives that have everything to do

37:55

with what Barry Weiss yesterday called

37:57

prestige

37:58

and nothing to do with what you said

37:59

which is disinfecting a business and

38:01

just let it win or lose yeah

38:08

so very well said and then I I know you

38:11

um we'll move on after this but to me

38:14

Jason there's one other big thing which

38:16

is cosos need to understand that it's

38:18

okay for their valuation to go down

38:21

right there you know it's like this bet

38:24

Noir in the valley that my God if for

38:26

some reason your valuation goes down 10

38:27

or 15% it's the end of the world guess

38:31

what it isn't it's the craziest concept

38:33

I I public stock only goes up right it

38:36

doesn't like it's like so in Silicon

38:38

Valley if your Stock's not always going

38:40

up it's like it's a imature yeah it's so

38:42

immature yeah and there's these people

38:45

that perpetuate that because then they

38:47

have ball control and it's just

38:50

not who's in a relation who's married

38:52

okay we'll give it the final question

38:53

just okay how many have you been in a in

38:55

a marriage where at some point the

38:57

marriage was not always the best you

38:59

can't ask that and then ask people to

39:00

raise their

39:01

hands my point is relationships go up

39:04

and down correct friendships go up and

39:06

down businesses go up and down I mean

39:08

like this is real life well so just this

39:12

will be our last question yeah just just

39:13

to wrap things up so I really wanted

39:15

Thomas to give this speech because I

39:16

thought this is the nitty-gritty of what

39:18

we deal with in the Venture your slides

39:20

are incredible by the way we'll make

39:22

them available by the way to everyone so

39:24

so

39:28

this is really the Straight Dope on what

39:31

the Venture Capital industry is dealing

39:33

with because we had this massive bubble

39:35

in 2020 and 2021 especially the second

39:39

half of 2021 where you know we all know

39:42

that the FED cut interest rates to zero

39:44

and the federal government air dropped

39:46

trillions of dollars on the economy and

39:48

the way that affected the tech ecosystem

39:51

is we had a bubble like probably the

39:53

biggest bubble in 2021 that we had since

39:55

the do bubble and and since then 2022 23

39:59

24 we've been dealing with the Fallout

40:02

and The Hangover from that and I think

40:05

that's what your if I was to kind of TDR

40:07

your slides it's basically we had this

40:09

incredible bubble now we're in this sort

40:12

of workout period there's a lot of

40:14

facets that we double the payback period

40:16

that's a real problem yeah so that's so

40:20

and so there's more to work out at the

40:22

same time I think that we've heard at

40:24

this conference that some of these

40:26

emerging Tech Trends are are going to be

40:27

the biggest we've ever seen Benny off

40:29

talked about agents of the Enterprise

40:31

Elon talked about robots so at the same

40:34

time that I think the tech industry is

40:36

feeling this huge hangover and it's you

40:39

know frankly if you're like doing all

40:40

these workouts with the companies it's

40:42

pretty miserable but we're seeing these

40:43

upward trends that could be the biggest

40:46

yet D David and I said something

40:48

backstage I just curious what you think

40:49

of this we were looking at your slides

40:51

the one that said the 2022 cohort was

40:53

below the and uh the comment was and you

40:57

can just say yes or no but um that's

41:01

probably where the best companies are

41:03

going to emerge because they will have

41:05

the most darwinian risk of demise yeah

41:09

does that kind of counterintuitively

41:10

make sense to you or it's not and look

41:12

it fits within a framework that I really

41:14

believe which someone kind of told me in

41:16

the context of China but I think it's

41:17

appropriate which is you know um

41:20

dictatorships double down and democrac

41:22

is self-correct you know markets

41:25

self-correct right so I'm a big believer

41:27

in our ability as a market to kind of

41:29

self-correct it's kind of why I wanted

41:31

to show the the slide about the age of

41:33

companies right because it kind of

41:34

crystalized what we all believe which is

41:36

that technology is fundamentally

41:37

changing the world of of business and

41:39

markets and kind of I still really

41:41

believe that so David I 100% agree I

41:46

just hope like take the AI um Trend as

41:49

an example right part of also why like

41:51

talking about this stuff is so we don't

41:53

just repeat some of the same mistakes

41:54

right because I always you my role as an

41:58

investor first and foremost is a version

42:00

of the hypocritic oath just Do no harm

42:02

don't make things worse right um maybe

42:06

you can't help but at the very least

42:08

don't like make things worse right and

42:11

my one worry I kind of said it a little

42:13

bit before is that some of this stuff is

42:15

actually making things worse so let's

42:17

kind of stop doing what we think makes

42:18

things worse and let's try to focus on

42:21

again the incredible value creation that

42:24

will come we have the chart that shows

42:26

it over 30 years we know that technology

42:29

creates incredible new companies let's

42:31

just kind of let that process play out

42:33

ladies and gentlemen very much thank you

42:35

Thomas F thank you that awesome thank

42:39

you thank you

Interactive Summary

In this presentation, Thomas from Coatue provides an analytical overview of the current 'Unicorn economy' and the broader venture capital landscape. He highlights the challenges facing the industry, such as a significant slowdown in IPOs, a difficult exit environment for private companies, and the impact of regulatory constraints on M&A. Thomas discusses how the venture model needs to adapt to a changing public market where investors prioritize profitability and scale. He also touches on the importance of founder discipline, the negative effects of delaying IPOs, and the potential for new technology trends like AI to drive the next wave of value creation.

Suggested questions

4 ready-made prompts