[music]

Hello listeners and welcome to a very

special episode of Geopolitical Cousins.

Uh joining me on this episode of the

podcast besides cousin Marggo and myself

is Peter Zion and Matt Gerkin. Part two

of the podcast uh we decided to let our

hair down a little bit. I don't have any

here to speak of, but we talked a little

bit about geopolitics as a discipline,

some of the greatest intellectual forces

in our lives and really just talked u

back and forth about a lot of things in

our field and in the world and things

like that. Um, if you haven't checked

out our YouTube page, by the way, you

can find this video on YouTube. Uh, the

audio content will be the same, but

since we were all in person, I think it

actually does add something. So, thank

you to Peter, thank you to Matt, uh,

thank you to Marco, thank you to the

video editors and the audio editors that

helped us out here. Without further ado,

uh we hope you enjoy these episodes.

Cheers, and we will see you out. [music]

>> All right, so for round two, I mean,

y'all have better hair than I do. I was

going to say we're going to let our hair

down a little bit, but I'm barely

>> shortest hair I've had in 5 years.

>> Matt's let his hair down. We're already

let our hair down in other ways.

>> Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. And we're also

drinking rye whiskey, which is, you

know, we're good to be by. There we go.

Being all come about with the eyes.

So, let's get started. Uh, it's good

that we're drinking because, uh, the

first question that we were going to ask

here, and this is going to be much

looser than our first one. I'm just

going to throw it out and then we'll

just talk

>> because the first one was so structured.

>> Structure. Yeah.

>> It was relatively structured. I I was

sitting here thinking about structure. I

will not be sitting here thinking about

structure this time. Uh, most formative

moment in your life as a geopolitical

strategist. This is also an opportunity

for us to talk about Strat 4 if we so

choose.

Uh [laughter] and and [clears throat]

you can choose not but uh take take

that.

>> So I mean we should mention that all of

us worked at strap for and Peter hired

the two of us. We have mentioned that.

When did you join Jacob? That was in

2007 for us.

>> I I was a George nepotism. Uh well not

even hire like my dad and George went to

graduate school and after

>> uh yeah and I was waiting tables and I

had nothing to do and George was like

you can come be an intern. That's fine.

We'll give you $200 a month. And I was

like okay. But you ended up being like

one of the top strategists.

>> Uh I mean it was a long because the

first year I spent pestering people

about timelines. The second year I was

head of the watch officers. Um but I

mean and this this is not my moment but

I'll share this moment when one of my

most memorable moments when people

actually started taking me seriously. It

was the Arab Spring.

>> Um and the protests were crescendoing in

Egypt. Um, and I think it it was either

Thursday or Friday at like 5:00 p.m. and

Hosni Mubarak was supposed to come and

give a speech and everybody in the

office was like, "He's going to step

down. He's going to announce that this

is done. He's going to hand over control

to the military. That's a wrap." Uh, and

I'm fresh out of college and like I did

my degree in Middle Eastern studies and

I was like, "There is no way Hassi

Mubarak is stepping down. I'm telling

you right now that's not what he's

coming." Everybody was like, "Shut up

intern. Go get some more coffee. Like

we're going to be here for a while for

the reaction piece." And then he I wish

I could do the Arabic and his like low

guttural growth, but he gets on TV and

the translation is basically like I am

the father of the Egyptian people. I

will not be stepping down from this

thing. And then nobody said thank you.

Nobody was like the call. Everybody just

like scured away and started writing.

And I was like okay fine like

>> but you won some cred. You had to have

won some credit.

>> Maybe a little.

>> By the way, that was one of your really

nice pieces was when Mubarak stepped

down. [laughter]

you like in five minutes wrote this

thing that's like what does this mean?

What happens next? You know,

>> I'll have to take your word for it.

>> Oh, I mean I'm sure from like it wasn't

like one of those long-term structural

forecast. It was just like a but the

fact that you wrote it in literally five

minutes was I remember being very

impressed.

>> Well, thank you.

>> Yeah. I I also have a something I' I

make this joke um often in audiences

when people ask me what is Straf 4, what

is geopolitical analysis and I say well

you know there's basically two schools

of geopolitical analysis. There is

Eurasia Group which is basically the

Marvel Avengers version and then there

is uh you know Stratbore which was

George and DC com

>> DC

>> right on down to the success of both

franchises right like the the SN cut was

not good we had all this good material

to work with and we just could not get

out of our own way

>> cut was amazing

>> I liked it but the the market did not

you know

>> but look I just want to say like I mean

you know you can say whatever you want

but all four of for sitting here.

>> That's true.

>> Uh Matt and I have been linked together

in our careers, but I did leave BCA and

he became top geopolitical strategist in

finance on his own. Uh so I just think

the coaching tree is really good.

>> Yeah. And I think you know like here we

are all sitting here having some whiskey

and like making fun of those days. But

the fact that you know like that moment

in history that like there was almost

something in the water in Austin between

200 like 8 and 2012.

>> Mhm.

>> Well, it was a booming

>> for you too.

>> Yeah.

>> No, I mean [laughter]

>> well you too but I mean like you were

you as well. I mean obviously you're

part of you're the coach, right? Like I

mean you know you went George I mean you

got the coaches but the coaching tree I

think look all I'm saying is that

>> when all is said and done at the end of

the day when all is said and done all we

want to look back on is did I like

contribute to other people's lives and

did they like take a kernel of something

I passed on and and and make it even

better and or or take it in a different

direction and and and and were were they

inspired you know and I think that's I

think that's I mean you certainly can

say that Um, but yeah, that moment in

time was successful.

>> I mean, you know, I would take issue

with what you said where what little

success I have had as a geopolitical

strategist. I've made a career out of

it. At least there's that.

>> It definitely wasn't by myself. I mean,

Peter, you were like a massive mentor,

like for sure. And to all of us, but

like we had a whole cohort.

>> My favorites.

>> Yeah. Well, okay, that's good to know.

But um but then but Marco, the weird

thing about you, we were the same age.

We started on the same day, but I mean

like I learned so much and then of

course that carried on into the

>> It goes both ways and um and then Jacob

like you always held your own. You were

a younger cohort than we were, but you

were always like at the top of the

younger group.

>> That's nice. I mean I I feel like Peter,

you were probably there for battles that

none of us saw. And I feel like I was I

was there at the like I was at the end

of the golden age. Like I could I could

feel the the magic

>> like starting to dissipate and people go

their going their own directions. And I

I also have the advantage of being

youngest was one here. So, like I

remember the first time you did a blue

sky and I'd never heard your shtick

before and I was like I walked out of

there like holy [ __ ] Like how am I

going to do this and I remember like you

know being in the office late and you

thundering away on some language I

couldn't recognize on your phone and I

was like I don't know I'm going to do

that and then you were my you were my

you know across the the cubicle person

uh sitting under that Japanese imperial

flag and you were using terms about the

Chinese. I had no clue. I'm sitting

there doing data entry that's probably

done by AI right now and you know Kevin

Stack yelling at me because I didn't do

it correctly.

>> Yeah.

>> Um but like yeah I mean to your point

like I looked up to all of you. I

wouldn't be where I am without all of

you. I I took kernels from all of you.

>> I think the thing to explain maybe is

that it was a bit of a battle zone. Like

when you walked into that company it

wasn't like you were walking into a

normal place where people treated each

other in a normal it was more like a

competition a controlled competition.

>> Chaos. Yeah. chaos and intellectual

competition and long hours, but there

was a sense of mission, which you know,

I don't know if you guys were doing that

deliberately, you know, the management,

but the point was that like there was a

sense that like no one else was really

doing real geopolitics covering all the

crazy [ __ ] that was happening around the

world. And so that was pretty

motivating.

>> I don't want to talk too much about the

internal of Stratport because apparently

my memories of it are not nearly as

positive as yours and I don't want to

ruin that. Um but I can speak to that.

Uh Strafer started in 989 with the COVID

war just before I joined. And one of the

things that happened in Washington

around then is every think tank that did

international affairs as its primary

business closed.

>> And so at the end of the Soviet Union,

we had about 20 of them and by 2000 they

were gone.

>> I mean there were groups like CSIS where

that was like one thing they did was

foreign affairs but that was it. We'll

look Rand.

>> Yeah. Exactly. Exactly. And so what we

saw in policym is that the ingest

pipeline for talent into the agency and

to DoD into state um went almost to zero

>> and then 9/11 happened and whatever

started up was based on terrorism and

the Arab world

>> and nothing else.

>> Nothing else.

>> And uh see until your Asia group got a

little bit bigger and it's still not

very big. there really wasn't anyone

else out there doing any of it. So there

was always this space where if you could

get a job at Stratford, you were the

only one who could do foreign affairs

who was under 55

>> in the country.

>> And the magnet um generated a talent and

flow that was fantastic.

>> Well, I mean there we have to admit that

Austin at that mo Austin was having a

moment. Dawson was having a moment for

different reasons,

>> you know, and that helped to create what

was also a struggle.

>> You know, I hear what you're saying, but

you almost downplay your role.

>> Oh, I benefited from it hugely. And I

role as a mentor and I think

>> the fact that you guys like me, that's

great. [laughter]

>> But but you but even if we didn't like

you, you would coach. The point is that

you would coach and and actually George

Freeman would coach. I mean,

>> Roger Baker, too, like let's just like

shout out. Look, everybody had different

management styles and everything and

like I obviously like, you know, shook

my fist in private many times like you

you included. But like look, the truth

is um I know what you're referring to

and I'm so sorry.

>> No, if it's just if it was just the in

the pipeline, if it was just the

pipeline, you know,

>> but look at the three of us here

>> off the pipeline. I would say the three

of us were maybe in the lowest 10%. No

offense. I mean like you did go to

Cornell to find

>> diversity that was a joke by the way

>> any person any look what what I'm trying

to say is like

>> the three of us happened to be in Austin

randomly okay you were kind of you

brought in as an apple baby

>> but me and Matt we were we were randomly

like we walked into this firm randomly

we weren't one of the

>> I moved from DC

>> for the job

>> right for the job

>> which when I got there found out there

had not been an offer

>> huh

>> that was a different story

>> that's a different [laughter] Sorry, we

won't have to go into that. But like my

point about all of this is that I think

if you just said like, hey, the success

was just great talent didn't know where

else to go, so they went and they worked

under me. Um the, you know, like that

that's kind of what you could have, you

know, said, but like the truth is

>> absolutely not what I meant.

>> Yeah. But there was like a lot of like I

think also um I I think what it was is

this and this is what I would say to

everyone listening to this because I I

you know like we all get a lot of

inbound and LinkedIn from young people

um

>> more and more

>> more and more obviously and uh trend

>> the the issue is that it was one of the

only places on the planet that taught

you how to do geopolitical analysis with

a commercial purpose.

>> Yeah.

>> You know and that

>> I think you could say that first part

independently. Yes. Yeah.

>> The second part just made it more

viable.

>> Yes. But that's that's what it was.

>> And and I mean me personally like what I

would say about you and specifically um

what I think you taught me more than

than anyone in my career is that cool

every every you know like you obviously

got to do the research and the analysis

has to be good. But like if you're not

telling a story that someone wants to

listen,

>> you're not going to get through.

>> Yeah. And I gotta tell you, so many

people in the financial industry, in the

geopolitical analysis industry, whatever

industry you're in, they just don't

understand.

>> So boring.

>> Thank you. And like the the truth is, no

matter how good your analysis is, if

nobody reads it,

>> Yeah.

>> you know, like and I think uh number

one, like style of writing,

>> uh your presentation skills, that's what

I would say. Like first time I saw Peter

present,

>> I was like,

>> it was like god damn like that's that's

where you want to go, you know? Like

that's I mean that's like

>> that was also unplanned.

>> I was the kid in third grade who wet his

pants in speech class.

>> Like swel I was never let that happen

again. I may have overcompensated

thirsty.

>> All right. So like

>> wait I wanted to ask Peter a question

because you said that at the time in '

989 there was no pipeline. Do you think

that's true again because there there

has been such a deterioration I feel

like of the pipeline of organizations.

>> Yeah. It never really recovered. So, you

know, the United States really has a

hard time focusing on more than one

thing at a time, and that that's

societal, that's government. Uh, and so

when the war on terror had been going on

for so long,

>> uh, what we saw was a change within the

structure of the government and the

intelligence agencies itself because

what's the best example I can give you?

Okay. Uh, there's two types of

intelligence. There's strategic where

you're looking over the horizon and

trying to figure out what the world of

tomorrow is going to be and how to get

ready for that. So like who's our enemy

going to be in 2050? It's going to be

Slovakia for whatever reason. Um what

kind of tanks are they going to be

using? Well, these hover tanks with two

barrels. Okay. Where's the weak point in

that armor? What sort of anti-hover tank

weapons do we need to fight Slovakia in

2015? That's strategic intelligence. For

example, tactical intelligence. We have

people on the ground in Rammani about to

kick in the front door of this building.

The bad guys on the third floor at the

end of the hall, the blue door. Which

side of the door are the hinges on?

>> Do they need to bring something to bust

it open or do they need to bring

explosives because the hinges are on the

wrong side?

>> They're both intelligence. They're both

important. But for 20 years, we were

supporting the military in the field.

And that took precedence. And after 20

years, it's not that we lost the people

who knew how to look for the next

Slovakia. We lost the people who trained

the people

>> to look for Slovakia. And so we're now

in this moment that let's put Trump to

the side for for now. Um where they're

trying to rebuild the training cadre

that can look forward

and that's not something you do in two

or three or five years. Well, and I

think uh [clears throat]

as I think the only one here that like

pursued political science at a graduate

school level and contemplate being a

professor, I can tell you that it's not

just the government's failing, it's

academia's failing, too,

>> you know,

>> it's a long conversation.

>> Oh, yeah.

>> I mean, I guess [laughter] I know

everybody here agrees with that, but I

can go very specific.

>> You know, being

>> Well, and I mean to be sure we can too.

>> No, I mean Peter, why was I a Middle

Eastern studies major? Because I went to

college in 2006 and that was where they

pushed me. I wanted to do polyai and

they pushed me into not do the Arabic

program and we need guys who speak

Arabic and that's what you're going to

do.

>> What I'm trying to say is that the word

geopolitics was a dirty word in a

political.

>> Oh definitely.

>> It was considered deeply deeply racist.

I was in a PhD PhD program uh at

University of Texas where I was in a

class called international organizations

taught by a NATO expert and a guy who

wrote a book on NATO and it was all

about how to analyze the de dependent

and independent variables in the

statistical elegance of the modeling

used.

>> Behavioralism,

>> not even behavioralism, honestly. Not

even behavior.

>> Not even that.

>> Not even that. No, it was just like you

know how do you do a study on this? is

how do you create a data set out of

[ __ ] thin air? Most of the variables

in there are garbage.

>> Yeah, that's behavioralism.

>> No, part of it is but like there's other

things too. Just rational choice

theories like random stuff

>> behavioralism.

>> But here's what I'm getting at. Here's

what I'm getting at. There was a there's

a whole week when we had NATO. NATO was

the weak.

>> And you know, I was always bored in this

class and one of my colleagues raises

her hand and says, "Hey, just out of

curiosity, how does NATO make

decisions?"

And the professor, the guy who wrote the

book on NATO,

>> didn't know how to answer the question

of what is the decision-making process?

Yeah. Because he's not actually an

expert in anything other than

statistical methodology.

>> Yeah.

>> Because behavioralism

>> it wasn't just it was like it was u it

was quantitative.

It was obsession by political scientists

that they were not economists. It was

obsession with economists. Scientists

are scientists.

>> Yes.

>> Yeah. And and I think the problem with

what we do and that I think the four of

us in this room understand uh more than

maybe anything else. I mean we make

wrong forecasts all the time but I think

what we understand is that the what

we're operating with is a lot of grace

>> you know a lot of uncertainty and you

there needs to be a little bit of voodoo

there like that is the that's

unfortunately what we do for a living

>> should be called political science

should be called political art. art.

Yeah.

>> Well, I I I also think so was one of the

I think it was one of the real virtues

of Strat for in that it and maybe why it

produced a coaching tree that was deeper

um despite some of its flaws which was

like you got thrown into the deep end

like you were just given a huge amount

>> there was no tolerance for people who

couldn't keep up. That's true.

>> You were given a huge amount of

responsibility as a 24 something fresh

out of college and it was either either

you figure it out or you don't figure it

out and that has a way of weeding out

the people who can't do it. I people

often ask me like what does it take to

be an analyst? And it's like most people

are smart enough to be an analyst. The

hard part is to your point is to have

the courage to say the thing that nobody

else thinks or which is going to make

people look at you like you're crazy and

then the courage to keep doing it after

you're wrong because you're going to be

wrong half the time, more than half the

time. Even, you know, the best of us are

wrong more than half the time. And it's

that ability to like have simultaneously

incredible arrogance about like your

ability to predict these things and also

incredible humility to know how little

you know um that like breeds our

personality type and Strathfor nurtured

that because it said go do this like you

are going to do this thing or you're not

fit for this and and I think that's what

it like it it winnowed out at least to

me.

>> Yeah. I mean uh m we always joke about

mount intelligence operation because one

time I was instructed by uh the head of

the company to mount an intelligence

operation to figure out

>> oh m o u n t space okay I heard mountain

like mount and

>> I was actually by the way Matt Matt I

was here in tal because it was Christmas

>> when that happened

>> it was Christmas I'm in I'm Matt and I

have many weird connections that are

cosmic in nature but one of them is we

both have a connection to this place

>> house And uh yeah, I was in my my place,

not this one, but you know, and I

remember like just

>> laughing my ass off and being like

>> sucks to be mad right now.

>> Well, but [laughter] think but think

okay, so it did but here and of course

it was in a high high pressure type

meeting with a whole company looking at

you.

>> But the question was interesting. The

question was what are the profit margins

of Western companies working in China?

Are they starting to erode because of

the rising wage in China? Is that going

to drive companies outside of China? So

to think that we were working on that

back in 2011 and that the attitude was

you go figure this out like don't think

that you can just go download some

>> don't Google it.

>> Yeah. Don't Google it. Don't think you

can find some report that already did

the work but you actually need to find

the people who can explain to you

exactly what's going on. And then I

ended up talking to a whole bunch of

American companies a lot of them

textiles and they were offended. you

know, if you called and asked them what

their pro because they thought you were

probably some kind of like um human

rights activist trying to find out about

sweat shops in China.

>> In the best case scenario.

>> Yeah. In the best case scenar but there

were tons of questions like that. Like

one time I remember asking a guy in

Pacific Command whether the US had

changed the rules of engagement in the

South China Sea that maybe had led to a

confrontation with a Chinese ship. And

the guy was like, "You're digging pretty

deep there, buddy." You know, it was

those kinds of responses you'd get from

officials, whatever. But the whole

attitude was like you take

responsibility for the question, go find

the answer and then you plug that into

your analysis. But like you said, you

had to actually defend your analysis.

>> By the way, anybody young listening to

this like learn how to uh operate uh I

know it's

>> difficult like it's called a telephone,

>> you know, but but by the way, okay, so

let's

>> country codes.

>> Let's come back to your question because

one of the questions here is the future

of this industry.

>> Uh yeah, so uh

>> so we're we're we're skirting that more

than our formative moment as Drupal.

Maybe we can come back to the for most

formative.

>> Okay, we'll come back to form.

>> We'll come back to that.

>> But the so the second question we said

we talked about is should the should the

corporate world create a chief

geopolitical officer role or is this or

do we think this is too much voodoo? Is

it too nebulous? And to your point, I

mean I don't know if you've noticed

this. I mean on LinkedIn I have a job

tracker that just says anytime jobs with

geopolitics are open. And I mean the

last 12 months has been insane. Like you

couldn't find a job in geopolitics and

then suddenly Anthropic wants a chief

geopolitical officer. These guys want

the chief geopolit and everybody wants

the chief geopolitical officer.

>> So let's talk about this for because my

experience with this is that this is

where past expiration date policy makers

go to make their bank.

>> Yeah.

>> And I think they're woefully unprepared.

They don't know how the corporate world

works. Many of them have been in

government their whole lives.

>> Um asset markets

>> like not to mention finance. I was being

light by saying they don't know how the

corporate world works. But the other

thing is like are you going to hire a

former CEO of a tech company to be a

tech analyst for equities? No. There's

like a method to it like like oh I I I

led a SAS company as a CEO. Okay, cool.

Well, can you do an analysis of the

valuation of this particular stock

versus the other one? No, not

necessarily. Like the methodology and

the senus of analysis don't come from

necessarily an experience of being in

positions of power. they require you to

be like bred as an analyst from a very

young age. And so, um, I think there's a

mismatch in demand and supply. I just

don't think that we've been producing

the supply for this at all. And so, and

and I'm not sure that the world

necessarily needs a chief geopolitical

officer. I think that every single

person needs to start think taking these

things into consideration.

>> Yeah. I think it goes back to something

that Matt said. And Peter, I'd be really

curious to know what you think of this

because I think everybody's wanting a

silver bullet. like I'm just gonna find

the geopolitical guy.

>> Love summer.

>> Yeah. And I'm just gonna plug him in and

I'm gonna have geopolitics covered. And

that's not the way any of us were

trained or learned. Like we had to be

part of a small. It couldn't be too big.

Like it needs to be a small enough team

that everybody has responsibility and

not too small that you aren't developing

some level of expertise. And then you

have to be ruthless with each other.

>> Yeah.

>> And fight each other. So if you want a

geopolitical capability in your company,

what you have to do is stand up a small

team, a small dedicated team that is

allowed to roam across your organization

and understand what's going on and pick

at things and poke at things. And you

have to empower it to do those things

and give them the resources that they

need. You probably need some young, you

know, people who have are trying to get

PhDs in in political science at UT

Austin and lighting their hair on fire

because nobody knows what's going on

with NATO. But nobody's trying to build

it.

>> I would say two things. Number one,

that's the path. Yes.

>> 99% of people you put in that position

are going to fail horribly.

>> Y

>> uh two,

>> wait, why? Why?

>> You're going to give somebody new access

to everything

>> from a security point of view. That

that's a really bad idea. So, the person

has to come in

>> aware and vested and experienced. And

getting all three of those for any

company as a fresh hire just doesn't

happen. It can't happen. That's problem

one. Problem two, the pipeline to train

people who do this is minuscule to none.

Now, um I'm going to bring up Ian

Bremer's shop, Eurasia Group, which is

kind of like the counterpoint. So, I

help people get ready for what's coming.

That's one of the reasons why I'm

getting out because we're now at the

point, the inflection point where

everything turns to churn and my value

ad from my point of view is starting to

fall. So, this is my last year.

>> Bremer's operation doesn't look at the

big issues in the same way that I do.

I'm the long reach horizon guy. Bremers,

folks, is we talk to every minister we

possibly can to tell you what's going to

happen next Tuesday.

>> I don't care what happens on Tuesday. I

care about the rise and fall of nations,

the change of technologies, the trends

that will determine what the next

century is like. And it's not that

Bremer doesn't like those things, but

he's worried about what's going to

happen corporate and government

decision-m right now. And it's a very

different skill set with a very

different training regimen. And to the

degree that companies need operations

for today, this week, this month, this

quarter, that's the way to go, that's a

very different sort of geopolitics.

>> It's not that one is better than the

other. They do two very different

things. Well, if so, let's say a company

comes to you though and says they want

to build this geopolitical capability.

To your point, you can't have all three

of these things. My guess would be that

you pick somebody young and try and mold

them into what you want and slowly work.

>> If you knew how to do that,

>> you don't have I mean I think all of us

are evidence that there's a coaching

tree like the term we're using it takes

years.

>> Yeah, it takes years. So it's a trade

craft and there's mentorship and all

these things. So in other words, you'd

be better to provide research and buy

the research, have the risk officer buy

the research rather than build I mean I

don't know, but I'm just saying if you

build an internal geopolitical unit, you

have to have a high level of confidence

that the person who's founding it and

and commanding it is a geopolitical

practitioner. The big problem is that

the model to develop that takes years to

run before it can produce anything

useful

>> and it has to be at a price point to

justify the expense. And from a

financial point of view, Strive for

proved that didn't work.

>> So here's what I would say. I think

there is a way to to solve this problem.

I mean, universities have to step up.

>> Yeah.

>> And I think the the MBA program has to

be massively changed. First of all, I

would say that 50% of what you learn in

an MBA can be replaced by AI.

Like you know AI is really really good

at doing market analysis, doing scenario

analysis for business practices. I think

what universities have to understand is

that their MBA curriculum curriculum is

what needs to start changing because um

you know and by the way it makes sense

in the 1990s 2000s NBA became focused on

the world that you were describing is

ending the world of globalization just

in time inventories this is what became

look Davos by the way you know why Davos

became what it was because originally it

was all about you uh business

practitioners

coming in and dealing with this new like

supply chain revolution. That's why

that's why Davos stands as like a um a

term you use as a shorthand for

globalization because that's what it

was. I mean it was just people talking

about supply chains,

>> how to operationalize.

>> Yeah. And how to operate like oh you

want to go global like that's what you

need to do. You need to make your

manufacturing go global. So what am I

getting at? I'm getting at the fact that

it really starts at the university level

because we need to start imbuing people

in the corporate world with a sense of

like well you need to start thinking

about geopolitical trends you need to

start thinking about your products in

terms of where the vulnerabilities are

whether it's a supply chain

vulnerability whether it's vulnerability

in terms of the products you're creating

uh they there might be a backlash based

on ideology culture whatever um and we

just haven't had that you know we

haven't had that

>> what does it take to get an MBA Yeah,

>> two pairs.

>> Two.

>> Yeah, you could probably do it quick.

>> Yeah. C

>> can I ask I mean I guess I should know

the answer to this question. I mean

we're very Americaentric right now. Are

there other like I know there's a small

uh like organization in Italy that

trains geopolitical analysts. Like are

there international sources?

>> One thing that has this is not on the

corporate side but on the academic side

and I think this goes for US

universities but also

definitely British and US universities.

I can't really speak to continental but

I don't think continental universities

were driving the ship over the past 40

years anyway.

>> No.

>> Yeah. So point was that there was a lack

of ideological diversity or

>> true

>> you know what I mean? So like and what

we saw is that some of the mediumsiz or

se maybe not even medium like second

tier universities they were the ones

that maybe needed an edge and would

actually maybe hire a political realist

or something like that. But this was

usually someone who's a little bit

offbeat but had enough of a success in

the in the field like with their

articles and their books that they just

couldn't be denied. Um or at the top

echelons like at Harvard or Chicago you

might have one or two realists.

>> But the point is

>> they'd be drowned and everything else

>> and they were literally per I mean they

were virtually persecuted these people

were. So the point I'm making is that

like there's the corporate side that

you're referring to and maybe much more

practical, but also there's this this

you needed to explode this suffocating

consensus in the universities that the

only way to approach human problems was

through um I guess social constructivism

or whatever you want to call it or

critical theory or whatever you want to

call it.

>> Constructivists were also a minority.

Like let's not let's not make a bigger

like liberal internationalism.

>> There you go. That was dominant. That

was the dominator.

>> Well, but I think you could group it all

under idealism versus realism. There

were idealist trends. But the point was

that you needed to have a battle of

ideas in universities in order to create

students who came out of the programs

and were willing to entertain out of

consensus options for what scenarios

would transpire in the world. And that

didn't happen for a long time. And it it

obviously had created a bunch of group

think in Washington. But I think it

created group think in general. But

>> you can [clears throat]

I would push back a little bit on that

and I would just push back on it because

whether you were a constructivist,

liberal, internationalist or realist, I

think if you were given a portfolio of a

chief geopolitical strategist in any

corporation in America, you will fail.

>> Yeah. Yeah.

>> So I think that you know what I mean?

Like I just think the world of

theoretical academia should be left to

itself. I think it's hopeless. there is

no way to like solve it. I think that

this this this thing belongs in the

professional schools.

>> Well, I'll push back and I'll say that

you need in you need university

education. You need some theory and that

theory should be debatable be should be

their multiple views and perspectives

and then you gra then you move on to

whatever your your actual practition is.

>> We don't have that kind of time.

>> All I'm saying is

>> I think you're right, but we don't have

that kind of time. All I'm saying is

that I think it's the professionals.

>> But haven't you but wait but hold on.

Haven't you guys always found that

actually when you get into your 40s or

older that theory actually pays off more

rather than less?

>> I did not.

>> You did not find [laughter] I would I I

found as someone who didn't study

political science or international

relations and I joined Strafor and I'm

having to rapidly accumulate facts and

information.

>> What I find is that as I get older the

theory is what really pays off.

>> That's great. Good for you because

>> because facts is a welter facts are

>> there's zillions of facts right if you

don't know if you don't have a framework

>> I I think it's not about I don't I don't

think it matters what the content is it

just matters that there is something

that you attack and that you learn very

quickly like it can be theory it can be

engineering it it can be anything else

as long as you can write and communicate

and then you can learn things really

quickly because that's the other thing

university doesn't do like it expects

that to become an expert on something

it's going to take you five years and a

dissertation and everything else

>> 10,000 hours

>> well and to the point like great you can

have the perfect answer for the client's

question in 10,000 hours and it'll be

absolutely perfect and they will have

made three other you know huge decisions

by then or they'll be out ofision still

around

>> it's much more valuable to them that you

give them 5% of the answer tomorrow

>> but this is

>> can you can you do that can you pull it

out of yourself and add in some stuff

and give it to them the reason I think

that this belongs in professional

schools is because you need to learn how

to operationalize all the theory and all

the geopolitical mumbo jumbo you need to

understand the your client's language

and I think that that's where uh we

become overp profofessionalized over

complex some of the things that Peter

was saying in the first part

>> apply to this too

>> yeah like uh you know you were

describing how the supply chain for

semiconductors is so brittle so is like

knowledge a a PhD in political science

cannot talk to a co like they don't have

a mutual conversation in which to like

impart wisdom to one another and that's

where I think that we need to you know

operationalize it so how do you do that

>> well I feel like we're making such a

self- serving argument because we're

saying yes you desperately need a chief

geopolitical officer and there are none

but there are four right here but

>> there's three out [laughter]

>> by the way cheers to that that's an

interesting announcement today

>> like let's yeah

>> may may you have many many uh yeah fun

days in your

>> well what I'm hoping is that you'll be

like you know fish or some band that

says that they're you know they're dumb

and then you end up going on tour like a

year later share saying goodbye forever

>> or I mean would would you consider being

like a coach to a new team or you're

just out you're done?

>> No. I mean I if half of what I'm

anticipating is coming it's coming this

decade and that was before Trump

>> and uh Ouch.

>> I just I literally just don't think

there's time.

>> That's interesting. So you're you're

it's funny like I divorce my analysis

from my life decisions. Okay.

>> They're completely compartmentalized.

like geopolitics is my career and then I

live in New Orleans like a stones throw

away from

>> you break 50 that changes

>> but you know but I think in terms of

operationalizing like

I it matters how old you are see if

you're 18 I think you actually do need

to study some theory but I just don't

think it should be one theory I think

there should be some economic theory

there should be some like different

schools of political thought but there

should be and the more quantitative or

like problem solving oriented I think

that's good to have because you need a

mixed model of quantitative and

qualitative. I wouldn't want to be

purely quant, but I I'm so far away from

that that that's not a risk. But I'm

just saying that you want to mix. But if

you're 22 or 26, then it's more like to

me it's more like what you two are

saying, which is where you're going to

have to be able to speak the language of

these people who are operating in the

real economy or in finance. And you're

going to have to be able to um give them

like you said a small like using

insufficient information. You're going

to have to give them an answer. That's

the best that you can provide even

though it may not be a complete answer

and you definitely don't have complete

information.

>> Yeah.

>> Look, I I know finance better than all

other fields because that's where Matt,

you and I work, but we're just kind of,

you know, we spend a lot of hours in the

financial industry. And uh I will say

that I, you know, this idea that you

passed your CFA exam and you're somehow

qualified, you know, to do finance, it's

like

>> what, you know, what a CFA exam for

geopolitics would be.

>> But see, there should be that's kind of

what you're getting at. There should be

something like that.

>> So, so no, like so Kaya C a

>> um you know my my good friend John

Bowman CEO of KA he reached out and he

was like can you write a chapter for our

exam? So this is for alternative

investments. So CFA is for public

markets, KA is for privates, whatever

you know the point is that so that exam

now I apologize to all the Kaya students

out there across the world. You do have

to read some of my mambo jumbo. You

should blame Peter though. Um

>> you know but like so that's kind of what

I'm getting at. So my good friend John

who did that who made a decision you

know what our curriculum needs a

refresh. I would say that that needs to

be done on a broad scale because you

can't start like now it's too like to

your point like so Peter's view is like

there's not enough time. Fine. Let's

assume there is just for the sake of

this segment.

>> Well cheer me up. There is enough time

if you think about like our experiences

at Stratford where you would be thrown

in and within one or two years you would

actually be giving major speeches at

major events or writing influential

>> publications. I just think the MBA the

MBA should be 40% geopolitics and

politics.

>> That's what I'm getting at. That's how

you solve this

>> problem. I I don't know why you're

thinking about the MBA. I mean to Matt's

point like there are legions of young

people in polyside departments and

colleges around the United States that

if you went to them and said

>> here's a pipeline to corporate and

government jobs and geopolitics like

here's the path but to do that you need

some type of body whether it's the

government or the geopolitics body that

says here's the curriculum we're going

to be inside your university blah blah

>> here's the problem Jacob I think the

problem the problem is not the school of

geopolitics

I personally think it's relatively easy

to not easy. I mean, it takes a lot of

experience. But like what I'm getting is

it's it's not the geopolitical

understanding. It's not the theories

that we wield or the empirical knowledge

we know which AI is going to disrupt

anyways. It is more the reality that

once you gain all of that, you need to

make it operationalized

to either the corporate that hires you

like aerospace company in Indonesia

>> or a financial asset manager. Like you

need to understand the others. That's

why I keep saying the NBA.

>> Yeah.

>> Because you need to connect the

geopolitics or political science,

whatever you guys want to call it, you

got to connect it with the real world so

that your actual analysis is useful to

somebody.

>> Yeah. Yeah. But I I I'm back to Matt's

point because in order for that to be

effective, you have to teach someone how

to think first. And apologies to the MBA

gradu. I don't think most of the people

who are self- selecting for MBAs know

how to think. So you somehow have to

teach them how to think. No, it

>> Well, it depends on the program and it

depends on the person. But the point is

that a problem-solving mentality

you know, like versatility and a problem

solving mentality is what you need. And

then in terms of like you're going to

have to have an a facility with the way

the economy works, the way with

corporates work, especially sectors like

probably what needs to happen is certain

sectors of the econ like biotech needs

their own set of people who are both

studied in geopolitical method and know

something about biotechnology and you

need kind of both of those things. You

just need to know every collector needs

>> the scale of context that is required to

do this remotely well is huge and I

don't see any path for that that takes

less than a decade.

>> I think I just realized that the bear is

about geopolitical analysis.

>> Yeah.

>> Haven't seen that one.

>> The bear the the cookie show the the

show. Yeah. Like car me like go being

driven through you know terrible by a

terrible boss like through the

restaurant and having to learn all the

skills. [laughter]

>> Oh my god.

>> Yeah. But just had a moment.

>> No. No. But it's true. But it's it's

like you you're

you're basically saying that companies

have issues. They need to group them

into a certain category and then they

need an expert to come along and start

addressing those issues either with a

team or like that individual does it

with research that they take or

something. But they're going to have to

know the company inside and out and the

company's operations inside out. So

they're going to spend the first year

just traveling to different sites,

right? I mean,

>> but this is like

>> a year,

>> but look, it's like

>> I guess I've doing a month.

>> Yeah. Well,

>> maybe a month would be luxurious.

>> No, but what I mean is a year to set up

the shop. You know what I mean?

>> Oh, yeah. To set up the shop many years.

Like you have to start somewhere. I I

think to Peter's point to have it up and

function politics, you need to do

sociology, you need to know legal

theory, you need to know economics, you

need to know finance, you need to know

agriculture and supply chain, and then

you can learn the company.

>> But what's interesting is you only need

to know a little bit about some of these

things. It's not like we can pretend

that we know all this. What it is is

that you know the amount that's

applicable to solve a problem in a

>> in a way that's scenario like the

scenario analysis probabilistic sort of

out.

>> It's like it's like anything else. I

mean in 1980s supply chains went global.

So people had to adjust to the reality

that globalization was real and they did

you know and that's what NBA sold MBAs

sold for that's what Davos sold for. You

can solve for a deglobalized world.

>> You really can um but it's not by

creating a chief geopolitical officer

>> role. That's why I keep harping on the

NBA.

>> You can call it whatever you want. It

doesn't have to be the MBA.

>> It's just that everyone needs to become

a geopolitical strategist.

It's it's like that famous statement,

we're all keynesian now.

>> We're all geopolitical strategists. If

you're marketing at

>> you, most people might suck at it. Yeah,

>> that's fine. But being aware of it,

right? Like you can't just not be aware

of this.

>> I think and by and by the way, I I I

want to push on that because what that

statement was saying is that all

economists and and pretty much anyone

who's a thinking person in current

affairs needs to realize that the state

plays an active role. You can't

eliminate the state. So it has some role

and it's a question of degree rather

than you know if

>> so learn to analyze

>> right so to say that we're all

geopolitical strategists now is to say

that not just in economics that the

state has a role in all things so policy

and economics you know what I mean and

that's pretty important these days

because there was a belief that the

state had receded to the extent that it

could be viewed as a constant and then

you could go on to your economic

analysis or whatever

>> can I give you an exact example we're

talking Yeah.

>> Um, I was in Paris meeting a fashion

conglomerate

and

the gentleman asks me, "What should I

do?" And, you know, I adopted Peter's

point like, "Well, the world is

delizing.

Maybe you don't want to shove Italian

and French brands down Saudi Arabian

elites throats. Maybe you want to go out

there and buy an oud company. Oud is a

wood that you can make fragrance out of

candles, soaps, cosmetics, right? It's

actually sourced in Malaysia and then

Middle East loves this stuff. Um, you

know, become more local,

emphasize these local brands and then

what you can do is like you can promote

them globally, but you cannot just keep

doing the same thing that works during

the globalized world where every airport

looks the same. I mean, that's just a

small example of how in the fashion

industry, in this particular issue, you

can take what Peter thinks is the end of

the world, which, you know, I think is

just the beginning of a new era,

whatever, and you can still make a ton

of money out of it. But you just got to

know what world you live in. You cannot

just walk into this world being like,

"What works is, you know, we're going to

do a rollup of Italian small

family-owned businesses and then we're

going to like shove it down the Chinese

and Saudi uh throats." Well, no. Maybe

they want something more local, you

know, and maybe an American traveling in

Riyad doesn't want to buy a Bautga

Vaneta, which they can get anywhere

else. You see what I mean? The world is

becoming like even something like

fashion is becoming colored by this. And

so just getting a sense of that as a

young person who then enters this, you

know, fashion industry or

telecommunication industry or whatever,

I think that just raises the bar of kind

of corporate thinking. I think this is a

good time to ask the third question

which which was what's a formative book

that like formed each one of us because

I think we've all I think there are some

differences in what we're talking about

but we're all circling around the same

thing but I I have a hunch that each of

our answers to this will be very

different and we'll also be very telling

about the types of

>> well and we'll we'll also be very

telling about the types of knowledge you

need in order to do what we're talking

about. So why don't why don't we start

Marco and go down

>> uh I referred to it a couple times in

the first part of our conversation

ingenuity gap

>> you know and this idea that like

we don't really know how the world works

you know um it's become so complex that

and by the way this is an old book it's

like 20 25 years old um I read it

bizarrely in like um I think climate

politics class or something like that um

yeah I know like don't worry about it I

It's Canada. So, like just roll with it,

Peter. Um I had to.

>> So, uh but it's it's great. It's I like

it because um the idea is that

>> complexity leads to brittleleness and

also there's too many things going on at

the same time. Why is this important? I

think I think it's important because

academia stresses parsimony.

Parimony. That's what a great theory is.

It's parsimonious. It doesn't rely on a

lot of variables to prove something, you

know. Um, and even at Stratford, we were

taught a very parsimonious framework,

which I I think doesn't work in finance,

by the way. Like this is my criticism

was like, well, geography doesn't

explain everything, particularly 99% of

the things that my clients deal with,

you know, are not going to be explained

with these kind of big picture things,

right? So um I think that consilience

combining like different lenses to

explaining issues is required because

the problems in the world are so complex

you're not going to answer that just

with one or two theories.

>> That's good.

>> Peter, it's going to be a weird one,

right? World War Z.

>> Oh yes, you you made me read that and I

enjoyed it thoroughly. Movie does not do

it justice. the Oh yeah, the movie has

it h happens on earth. That's the only

thing that's in common with the book. Uh

[laughter] by far the best geopolitical

book ever written from my point of view.

Uh it just changes one thing. There are

zombies and it gets to the heart of the

political, the economic, the financial,

the demographic core of every country it

touches. It's a series of first person

chapters about h what happens because

the Australians are tech dependent. What

happens to the Russians when NATO goes

away? What happens to the United States?

what happens to Cuba uh when New York

falls

>> uh and how everyone reacts to the

situation differently and how not

everybody makes it. Yeah,

>> I mean you guys are going to clown on me

because of course I would do this but I

would say Aristotle and Thusidities and

everybody says that like everybody says

thusidities you know but it's so true

like uh you know Pericles funeral

oration is like western grand strategy

to a tea

>> but I actually would I would emphasize

Aristotle because what he shows is that

there's lots of different types of

regimes that they're all in different

phases in their uh like historical

cycle.

And that so some of them are waxing,

some of them are waning, some of them

are corrupt, others are like very

vigorous, you know what I mean? So like

as an analyst, it's extremely important

because what you're doing is you're

looking at species, you're making

observation, you know, you're you're not

going to we call it theory, but you're

not going to blunder into this with like

a mathematical theory. you're going to

go into it like a naturalist who's

looking at this regime behaves

differently because they're faced with

this food supply and they've developed

this behavior over time and they had to

evolve because they have this

competitor. You know what I mean? And so

it's it's all about like observing the

peculiarity of each species of

government and then how they change over

time. And there are common threads

there. There are theoretical

propositions that extend throughout, but

it's not like what you think of when you

think of philosophy where it's um broad

brush strokes. It's more like you need

to get down in the weeds, make

observations, note the details, observe

that the circumstances are different.

And it's classic comes up when people

talk about history because they say,

"Well, history repeats itself." Well,

no. Then they say, "No, it doesn't

repeat itself, but it rhymes." You know,

we always hear that. The point being

that that case study that you're looking

at to to compare the one that you're

studying, it might operate differently

this time because key circumstances are

different. You know what I mean? Or the

phase the neighbors are doing something

different this time or the internal

situation is different and he's the

master of that. So I always just tell

everyone it including people on LinkedIn

who get a hold of me. I'm like Reed

Aristotle.

>> By the way, can I can I say one thing? I

mean, I think both of you are saying the

same exact thing

>> because World War Z, for those of you

who don't know, is basically what would

happen if a Hollywood producer like read

Aristotle.

>> I haven't read World War Z.

>> No, but it's exactly the same.

>> The whole point is like you run World

War Z is basically a zombie apocalypse

happens.

>> Yeah.

>> Enter regime differences.

>> Yeah.

>> And starting conditions. How would like

what's the outcome? How does Israel deal

with a uh with a zombie apocalyp? It's

relative to

>> different to Iran and Pakistan.

>> That's for sure.

>> And and I think that that's what you

guys are basically saying the same

thing. I I would say that in my

political science graduates uh the time

I spent doing a PhD was in comparative

politics.

>> Yeah.

>> And that's what this is.

>> And I think we lost that a little bit.

Yeah.

>> Because nobody thinks that's sexy. Yeah.

>> It's either IR theory, international

relations theory, or like, you know,

domestic politics. But comparative

politics is awesome because it's exactly

World War Z and Aristotle just like

>> smooshed.

>> And the other thing is you go and you

reread because everyone has read

Aristotle's politics or everyone who

studied politics did

>> but

>> but we did it when we were 19.

>> Did you go back and reread it since

Trump was elected? That's a totally

different thing. You want to blow your

mind up, you know. So anyway, the point

is you're going to have to reit happen

like relax. There's a lot of analysis

that has been done and you can learn

from the and obviously I'd throw in

Mchavel and Hobbes but like honestly if

you have to cities Aristotle Mchavelli

and Hobbes

>> you don't need to go to college so maybe

that maybe that maybe you were right

about operationalizing and maybe you

don't need to study political theory as

long as you read those four masters but

you know

>> uh the thing that shifted me from a

science guy to a social sciences history

political science guy was all the king's

men by Robert Pen Warren

>> oh yeah

>> um and it's loosely based on the life of

Huey

Um, and it gets straight to what is

populism, what is power, how does a

charismatic person and personality sees

power, how does it corrupt them, how

does the journalist protagonist who's

like, you know, kind of embroiled up in

it live his life like emotionally and

also do his job of the reporting and how

does he maintain objectivity, all those

other things. I was like lost at that

point. And it's also why Marco and our

arguments I'm always going back to the

individual.

>> Yeah. Because like the book that started

me was and the question that always

animated me was what's more powerful?

Was it the context that Huie Long was

operating in or was it just there was

Huy Long and he was a force of nature of

his own and there was a thunder flash

and he happened and then he went away

and then there was no there was no Huy.

I think a lot about I mean to your point

about Rean Aristotle uh after Trump.

>> I read all the King's Men again after

Trump and there's some weird there's

some weird things going in there about

personalities and how they capture power

and things like that. Well, Jacob, you

and I you and I are going to do a whole

episode, I think, on just books.

>> Yeah, we're going to do a book rank.

>> So, I'm glad that we got World War Z and

Saddle in there. I was going to I was

not going to put that in there.

>> Yeah. To be clear, I don't have a second

place,

>> but that's interesting. I I do have to

say though about that. Um, I don't I

don't think

>> What was that?

>> Except for my books. I feel that would

be appropriate. By the way, by the way,

I was going to say,

>> read Peter Zin's books. All right. Let's

make sure. Like, there's like 12 of

them. They're all best sellers.

and Geopolitical Alpha. I mean, I was

going to name both of you guys' books,

of course, but I mean, I, you know, we

don't want to just be rubbing each

other's backs here.

>> Oh, yeah.

>> Let me say though,

>> I'll rub Peter's back.

>> I I I don't think people realize how big

of a deal it is that there was a strong

man or big man or great man theory of

history. And it used to be completely

dominant

>> and then it was utterly expuned from the

halls of academia and and elite

knowledge. And what we're witnessing

with Cinping and Vladimir Putin and

Donald Trump is that the great man

theory at this point is enormously

powerful. And it's not that they steer

everything, but it is that they create a

certain demand for the thing that

they're offering.

>> Like like that not only were they

supplying it and I know you might Yeah.

It is touchy, but the point is is that

not only did they feed a demand that

existed,

>> but they also helped ferment that demand

so that they could supply more of it.

And so they were helping to create the

reality that they exploited. And that is

that's an extremely compelling issue.

And it has to do with the fact that

humans tend to anthropomorphize things.

So we want a human.

>> Well, you know, we want America to be

embodied.

>> I don't think it's just us

anthropomorphizing.

>> Yeah.

>> I think it's you're right. Uh I just

think that even great men have to

operate within a set of constraints

>> until something breaks.

>> Well, it they do. Well, well, no. the

the the constraints are what breaks

their

>> can break or they can break something.

It can go both ways.

>> So what?

>> So I would say usually the constraints

do prevail, but when you're at the

height of power of a nation state,

>> if you concentrate your effort on a

critical vulnerability, you can actually

achieve something that normally would

have been constrained

>> 100%. That's why our leader index, by

the way, that we do on this podcast, we

we draft the best leaders. The whole

point is like who can overcome those

constraints? And actually that's why

we're biased towards like leaders of

small countries because they have so

many constraints to overcome.

>> So you know it's really hard for like

the president of the United States of

America to ever make it on our list

because well you know

>> you're you're playing with a lot of

>> yeah

why you have to add psychology now to

the geopolitical analyst's toolkit

because if you want to understand what

Putin's going to do next I mean

>> great point.

>> You have to you have to inhabit him and

it's not easy. You have to like get in

the skin. your favorite book and I know

Matt's and Peters, we all had to read

it. Psychology of um

>> intelligence analysis.

>> Intelligence analysis

>> which is don't remember.

>> Yeah, you remember that. Jay Richards

Huer.

>> Yeah, Huer.

>> He was the head of um

>> CIA's research department.

>> I have no memory.

>> Okay. It's called psychology of

intelligence.

>> I heard that the first time I still

don't remember it. Well, that was also

there's a lot of work in political

science by Robert Jervis and people who

introduced psychology

>> like into political science and

basically they told all the

behavioralists and all the rational

choice people and all the like realists

and all the like like pump the brakes in

this like states operate on this like

you know level where they're all like

billiard balls are just hitting each

other.

>> There is also like a human element to

this that you guys have to consider. So,

um, you're right. I do think we have to

revisit some of this work by Robert

Jervis and others like that that focuses

on that.

>> Well, and we haven't even mentioned

empathetic analysis, which was another

of the key, you know, tools in the

Stratfor analyst toolkit. In my in my

mind, it's the hardest one to actually

do because

>> I think it's the easiest,

>> but that's because I'm very nist.

>> Let me let me [laughter]

tell me if you guys agree with you know,

when you say empathetic analysis, like

what does one mean by that? To me what

that means is that you it's not only you

put yourself in the shoes of the

decision maker but the point is

the decision maker like you have to

think how would I make this decision

like in other words it's about the

decision maker it's not so much because

you could do like uh you know what

actors do where they live and breathe

Vladimir Putin for two years so that

they can perform a in a movie but I

don't know that that would be the right

approach. I think it's more about like

if I were the president of Russia

regardless of Vladimir Putin. If I were

the president of Russia.

>> No. And I were faced these conditions.

>> You know, you have to do that. But then

I think you also have to do something

harder. And I I hate reduct. Um let's

pull

>> I'm going to line up for this. Yeah.

>> We're going to need it for this one.

>> I I usually don't do reductto odd Hitler

rooms, but to do empathetic analysis of

Hitler,

>> you have to like nobody thinks that they

are evil. Hitler is not sitting there

thinking I'm an evil person and I'm

doing all these terrible things. He

thinks he's right.

>> He thinks he's just. He thinks he's

good. He thinks he's doing something for

the good of his nation. That his, you

know, everything is God is on his side.

Everything else. You have to think that

to analyze him. You don't get to have

your priors. You have to be in his head

and try and figure it out like it's

>> So, this is going to sound kind of

heretical, but I don't read books.

>> But you listen to I mean,

>> no, you listen to them. I like how bad

was trying to save people.

>> I'm trying to save you.

>> Yeah. He doesn't care.

>> But you have debates with people like

us. I mean, if you don't have any

interaction, it a book is just so But my

son always says a book is staring at a

dead piece of wood and hallucinating.

>> Sunset.

>> Yeah.

>> He's going to go places.

>> No, but he he got

>> that's amazing.

>> But we got that from somewhere. I'm

afraid.

>> I don't care.

>> But what he's But the point is a book is

a conversation with another human being.

You happen to be lonely and it's raining

out. So, you're having a conversation

and you're, you know,

>> and if and if that adds value to your

life and your work, great. It has never

worked for me.

>> Uh, but I have conversations.

>> I have a cheat code.

>> Uh, I'm adopted.

>> So, it is really easy for me to crawl

into someone else's head because I've

always been on the outside. M

>> uh so like you know you say two years to

study Putin from the

>> I feel like I figured him out in

February of

>> I think having left different cultures

like four times in my life it's not the

same as being adopted but

>> give you the perspective that most

people don't have.

>> Well I tried to do high school in

different countries in different

cultures. Oh my god. Yeah.

>> But let me let me try something. Have

you had a major disemboding or

displacing experience in your like

personal journey like they're saying

like other countries or being adopted or

>> I mean I feel like I mean I'm on my

dad's side I'm the descendant of

Holocaust survivors so like that trauma

is there and Jews never feel comfortable

wherever they are. I mean that's why I'm

building escape plans just in case.

>> But the bags always have to be packed.

>> Um but I but no

>> you bury the bag in the wall. Uh, no,

but I've been

>> You're very healthy.

>> I've been thinking about a bunker

though.

>> That's not the same thing.

>> Okay. Yeah.

>> But I mean I am sensing there is this is

a common thread. Is it probably

geopolitical analysts need to be a

little bit disembodied from if you

>> Well, I'll tell you and you guys can

laugh at me, but I study literature. I

was not never supposed to be here. I was

supposed to be writing literary critic.

>> I'm not laughing at you. I'm laughing

next to you. But like so but the

conversion to strappor the conversion to

geopolitics and international relations

and the business world and all that was

a mass it was like coming out of the

closet. I mean it was a total change in

my whole life.

>> And

>> but the point is is that that means I

don't approach any of the questions the

way that I would have if I had had.

>> That's great. So all I'm saying is it it

could be that the empathetic analysis

comes from having been disembodied or

dislocated in a major way, which

probably everyone has been in some way.

But it it's worth considering that

that's an important ingredient to the

analysis.

>> Sure.

>> All right. Well, that brings us right to

the question of what was the biggest

source of inspiration,

>> the formative experience. Yeah. Take it

any direction you guys want.

I'm trying to think.

>> I mean, I can go.

>> Yeah, please.

>> Mine is the easiest.

>> Okay.

>> You know, uh, the first memory I have as

a human is Iranian Scotss

over Baghdad where I was living.

>> That's like a geopolitical power play.

[laughter]

>> Like I was in Baghdad for bizarre

reasons that was very unique to the

situation. My dad's first job was in

Iraq as a you know, as a junior guy. We

thought we would never ever ever leave

Yugoslavia. My dad is a very organized

kind of OCD guy. He had a plan for me

and my sister. You know, we were all

going to stay in Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia

was basically first royalty. It was

fine. It was perfect. It was it was

great. And then, you know, like what I

saw was two things in my in my

upbringing.

Communism collapsing

like and and what you have to understand

is communism like permeated throughout

all societies. So like I was like a

little pioneer with a red, you know,

like scarf and giving an oath to like

little Tito.

>> Yeah, little Tito. We gave We sang songs

about Tito. We

>> Now everybody just thinks it's a vodka.

>> Yeah, that's right.

>> Not a really good one.

>> No, it was terrible. Actually gives me

hives. Tito's vodka.

>> That's awful. Sorry. Actually, by the

way, if you want I'm going to boo.

>> I've also met Tito. He's kind of an

[ __ ]

>> I've met him, too. I liked him a lot.

>> Did he actually bring vodka to that

part?

>> He did.

>> Okay. Yeah. He didn't bring it to mine.

Yeah.

>> But yeah, I think

>> early on in my life what I find out was

that well educated, really smart adults

were full of [ __ ]

>> you know, and so you start realizing

like well the superructure like the

reason that I always tell

>> the reason that conspiracy theories are

wrong and by the way everyone listening

to this just just hear me out. Every

conspiracy theory you've read on the

internet is complete and utter garbage

because people that are supposedly doing

them are not that smart

>> or competent. Yeah. And South Park, by

the way, crushes this. If you ever seen

the episode with South Park when like

George W. Bush pretends 911 is an inside

job and then the the the kids Stan and

Kyle are like, "Dude, you didn't do 911.

Why are you why are you perpetuating

this?" And George W. versus does this

thing where he's like voice if like

people knew we didn't know what the [ __ ]

we were doing

the [snorts] world collapse you know

like so you realize that living in this

kind of a world very quickly like I

learned this in like six years old